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I. INTRODUCTION
Generations of lawyers have been taught that arson was a common law
felony which protected the security of the habitation, and that arson remains
a felony today in all American jurisdictions by statute.' But even a casual
1. The statutes are cited infra notes 221, 223-31.
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reading of a small sample of these statutes should warn us that the law of
arson has changed dramatically from what it was at common law. Yet if we
consult the standard works on criminal law we find little more than a few
sparse paragraphs suggesting that the modern statutes have wrought changes
in the common law offense. 2 Absent from those works is a systematic treat-
ment of the evolution of arson, and an analysis of the modern law of that
offense under the American statutes.' In short, there are no contemporary
studies that explore the metamorphosis of the common law crime into its
current manifestation in the fifty American states. That is the purpose of
this paper.
Part II systematically explores the crime of arson as it existed at common
law. The contemporary law of arson is deeply rooted in the common law
crime, and this portion of the paper marks the starting point for the analysis
of the evolution of the contemporary offense; it also provides us with the
standard by which we may identify and analyze the metamorphosis of arson.
Part III explores the initial change in the purpose of the common law
offense. Arson, at common law, was an offense against the habitation. Its
purpose was to protect the dwellers from the risks of injury or death created
when the dwelling house is burned. According to the taxonomy of crime,
arson at common law was an offense against the person, although it protected
a narrow class of persons-dwellers in a dwelling house. And in recognition
of this limited protection it was characterized as an offense against the hab-
itation. The common law offense did not, however, protect property interests
in the subject matter of the offense, a dwelling house. Part III documents
the initial statutory change in the purpose of the law of arson-the expansion
of the crime to protect a wide variety of property interests in addition to
protecting the safety of dwellers. It is in this portion of the paper that we
first see the emergence of a new form of "common law," a common statutory
law of crimes in the United States which substantially differs from the ancient
ancestor. This section also explains why arson is currently characterized as
an offense against property in most contemporary thinking about this of-
fense.
Part IV completes the study of the evolution of arson into its current
manifestation: it is a complex crime protecting nearly any person and a wide
variety of property against injury, damage, death, or destruction by fire or
explosion. Today, arson must be classified as an offense against people and
property in nearly every American state.
Part IV not only reveals that the purpose of the contemporary law of
arson has changed from what it was at mid- century, but it also confirms
that there exists today a common statutory law of arson in America which
2. E.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 277, 279, 282, 285, 287-
88 (3d ed. 1982).
3. Id.
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is quite unlike either the common law offense or the arson provisions of the
Model Penal Code. Although, as one might expect, the contemporary law
of arson bears some similarity to its common law ancestor, and it has been
influenced by the Model Penal Code. Nevertheless, the statutory law of arson
in the United States is surprisingly similar. And that law demonstrates, at
least with respect to this offense, that there is emerging in America in these
latter years of the Twentieth Century a new "common law," a common
statutory law of crime.
Finally, Part V explores the details of the emerging statutory common
law of arson in contemporary America, and documents how that law differs
from both its common law ancestor and the arson provisions of the Model
Penal Code.
But before we move into the body of the paper, a few words of caution
are in order. I have excluded from this study, for treatment at a later day,
the following: (I) all misdemeanor arson related offenses;4 (2) felony pro-
visions relating to insurance fraud;' (3) special provisions in the arson statutes
pertaining to accomplice liability, 6 and to the offense of attempted arson; 7
and (4) felony statutes which can be committed by means other than by
damaging property or endangering people by fire or explosion. 8 In other
words, this study is limited to the felony provisions in the statutes which are
the modern equivalent of the common law felony of arson, regardless of the
terminology used to identify those offenses. 9
4. A number of states have arson-related misdemeanors in addition to a
misdemeanor offense patterned on the common law crime of malicious mischief.
5. It is quite common to find insurance fraud provisions in the general arson
statutes. This approach was used by the Model Arson Law, and the states that either
enacted the Model Arson Law or substantially patterned their a-son statutes upon its
provisions used this approach as well. The Model Arson Law is set forth infra
Appendix C. The states which have either enacted the Model Arson Law or have
statutes with most of its salient provisions are identified infra note 148. The Model
Penal Code's arson provisions also contain an insurance fraud provision. The Model
Penal Code provisions are set forth infra Appendix B.
6. It is not uncommon to have special provisions pertaining to accomplice
liability in the general arson statutes. This approach was also followed by the Model
Arson Law. For illustrations of their use, see infra Appendices A and B.
7. Special provisions relating to attempt liability are frequently found in the
general arson provisions of many states. This approach was also followed by the
Model Arson Law. For illustrations of their use, see infra Appendices A and B.
8. This excludes statutory crimes which protect property from damage or
destruction by a wide variety of means. This paper is solely concerned with damage
or destruction inflicted or endangered by fire or explosion. There is, however, one
exception. Uniquely, Hawaii has no statutory felonies which protect property only
from damage or destruction caused by fire or explosion. I have, nevertheless, included
the Hawaii statutes in the analysis of the statutory provisions of the fifty states.
9. The statutes do not always use the term "arson." See, e.g., infra notes
275-77 and accompanying text.
298 [Vol. 51
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/1
1986] ARSON LAW 299
II. COMMON LAW ARSON
A. Introduction to the Common Law of Arson
Arson, at common law, was the malicious burning of the dwelling house
of another.' 0 Like most of the other common law felonies, it was punishable
by death." Anciently, the convicted incendiary was burned to death, 2 but
before Lord Hale wrote, the method of execution had been changed to death
by hanging.'"
The primary purpose of common law arson was to preserve the security
of the habitation,' 4to protect the dwellers within the building from injury or
10. 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES 65-67 (1641). Coke referred to arson as the ancient
felony known as the "Burning of Houses." Id. at 65. He offered the following
definition: "Burning is a felony at the common law, committed by any that mali-
ciously and voluntarily, in the night or day, burneth the house of another." Id. at
66. Coke did not use the term arson. 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 105-06
(1716). "Arson is a Felony at Common Law, in maliciously and voluntarily burning
the House of another by Night or by Day." Id. at 105; 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 566-74 (1736). "The felony of arson or willful burning of houses is described
by my Lord Coke... to be the malicious and voluntary burning the house of another
by night or by day." Id. at 566 (emphasis in original); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 220-28 (Ist American Ed. 1772). "Arson ... is
the malicious and willful burning of the house or outhouses of another man." Id.
at 220; 4 W. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1024-28 (1865 ed.).
"Arson is . . .malicious and willful burning the house of another." Id. at 1024
(emphasis in original); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 273.
The felony of "Burning of Houses" (arson) has been traced by Hale to ancient
Saxon laws. 1 M. HALE, supra, at 556. Pollock and Maitland state that "[t]he crime
we call arson and which our ancestors called baernet was mentioned by Cnut as one
of the bootless crimes; ancient law is wont to put it in the same class with 'manifest'
theft. It naturally finds a place in the list of felonies. We are told that the punishment
was death by burning, and we are able to vouch a case from John's day in which
this punishment was inflicted, but the fully developed common law substituted the
gallows for the stake." 2 E. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
492 (1895).
11. The offence of arson was denied the benefit of clergy by statute 21
Hen. VII c.1. but that statute was repealed 1 Edw. VI c.12 and arson was
afterwards held to be ousted of clergy, with respect to the principal offender,
only by inference and deduction from the statute 4 & 5 P. & M. c.4. which
expressly denied it to the accessory: Though now it is expressly denied to
the principal also, by statute 9 Geo. I. c.22.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 222-23.
12. 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 566.
13. Id.; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 222.
14. E.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 220; see also State v. Toole,
29 Conn. 342 (1860); Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872); People v. Fisher, 51
Cal. 319 (1876); State v. Haynes, 66 Me. 307 (1876); Peinhardt v. State, 161 Ala.
70, 49 So. 831 (1909); State v. Midgeley, 15 N.J. 574, 105 A.2d 844 (1954); State v.
Long, 243 N.C. 393, 90 S.E.2d 739 (1956).
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death by fire,'5 although it functioned to protect the possessory interest in
the house as well. ' 6 Of the common law felonies, it was considered to be one
of the worst. Sir William Blackstone explains why this was so:
This is an offense of very great malignity, and much more pernicious to the
public than simple theft: because, first, it is an offense against that right,
of habitation, which is acquired by the law of nature as well as by the laws
of society: next, because of the terror and confusion that necessarily attends
it; and, lastly, because in simple theft the thing stolen only changes it's
master, but still remains in esse for the benefit of the public, whereas by
burning the very substance is absolutely destroyed. It is also frequently more
destructive than murder itself, of which too it is often the cause: Since
murder, atrocious as it is, seldom extends beyond the felonious act designed;
whereas fire too frequently involves in the common calamity persons un-
known to the incendiary, and not intended to be hurt by him, and friends
as well as enemies. 7
B. The Dwelling House
Since burglary and arson were both offenses against the security of the
habitation, they, for the most part, shared a common definition of "dwelling
house." Though it is frequently said that there could be no arson of a house
in which there could be no burglary, there may well have been some slight
difference in the concept of the "dwelling house" between arson and bur-
glary. "
As with the law of burglary, 9 the common law defined a dwelling house
as a building20 o~cupied as a place of human habitation. 2' What then were
15. E.g., State v. Stubba, 113 Ariz. 434, 556 P.2d 8 (1976) (en banc) (con-
struing a statute which made common law arson, first degree arson); People v. Foster,
103 Mich. App. 311, 302 N.W.2d 862 (1981); State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 289
S.E.2d 325 (1982); State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978).
16. E.g., Williams v. State, 177 Ala. 34, 58 So. 921 (1912); State v. Blumen-
thai, 133 Ark. 584, 136 Ark. 532, 203 S.W. 36 (1918); State v. Martin, 87 Neb. 529,
127 N.W. 896 (1910); Daniels v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 583, 1 S.E.2d 333 (1939);
see also FOSTER, CROWN LAW 113-16 (1762) (discussion of Elizabeth Harris' case).
17. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 220.
18. E.g., Elsmore v. The Inhabitants of the Hundred of St. Briavells, 8 Barn.
& C. 461, 108 Eng. Rep. 1114 (1828); The Queen v. Allison, I Cox C.C. 24, 25
(1843); State v. Timbury, 114 N.H. 763, 329 A.2d 143 (1974); 1 M. HALE, supra
note 10, at 567; 2 EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1020 (1803).
19. For general discussions of the "dwelling house" requirement for common
law burglary see W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 711-13 (1972);
R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 255-61.
20. There is a paucity of cases which define the necessary physical charac-
teristics of a structure to qualify as a "building" for common law arson or burglary.
It is generally agreed, however, that the structure must be enclosed by walls and
6
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the criteria for determining whether a building was a place of human habi-
covered by a roof and erected or used as shelter for humans or personal property.
See People v. Stickman, 34 Cal. 242 (1867). A chicken house was held to be the
subject matter of burglary under a statute which used the phrase "any house." "A
house, in the sense of the statute, is any structure which has walls on all sides and
is covered by a roof." Id. at 245. Although the structure was used for the shelter of
personal property, the court did not mention that requirement. The court did opine
that "it was by no means clear that it would not have been burglary at common
law." Id. at 244; McCabe v. State, 1 Ga. App. 719, 58 S.E. 277 (1907). A structure
with a roof but no walls erected to shelter personal property was not a "house" for
purposes of the statutory offense of larceny from a house. Relying, in part, on
burglary and arson cases, the court said that in all of the cases "the structure...
was not only covered by some sort of roof, but was also enclosed in some way or
by some kind of material. In other words, according to those decisions, a platform
covered by a roof is not enough to constitute a house, but, in addition to the platform
or roof, or floor, there must be some lateral enclosure-an enclosed structure, where
people live or work, or animate property is confined, or inanimate property is stored
or contained." Id. at 721, 58 S.E. at 278; State v. Ebel, 92 Mont. 413, 15 P.2d 233
(1932). A sheepherder's wagon used as a habitation and as a place to store personal
property was a house or building within the meaning of the burglary statute. "Here
we have 'a structure which has walls on all sides and is covered by a roof'-a house,
a building." Id. at 416, 15 P.2d at 234. "This is in conformity with the general rule
that a structure, to be termed a building, must have been erected for the purpose of
habitation by humans or animals, or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, or the
housing of goods and chattels." Id. at 417, 15 P.2d at 235. The court relied heavily
on Stickman, 34 Cal. 242; Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1976), reh'g denied,
560 P.2d 369 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840 (1977). A wooden frame completely
enclosed by a plastic covering was the subject matter of the law of burglary under a
statute prohibiting the entry into "any building." The court said, "'[g]enerally speak-
ing ... to support a charge of burglary at common law or under the statutes, there
must be a breaking and entering, or an entering, of a building or structure enclosed
by walls and a roof."' Id. at 227 (quoting from 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 16, at 678
(1980)). The court, on procedural grounds, refused to decide whether that structure
had to be used as shelter. See also Regina v. Labadie, 32 U.C.Q.B. 429 (1872)
(construing the Dominion Statute of 1869 in accord).
Despite the frequent use of the phrase "mansion house" which connotes a large,
stately building constructed of materials which will endure the ages, e.g., State v.
Blumenthal, 136 Ark. 532, 203 S.W. 36 (1918); 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 66-67,
even the most humble structure, regardless of the materials from which it was con-
structed, qualified as a building for the law of arson. State v. Jones, 106 Mo. 302,
17 S.W. 366 (1891). The Jones case involved a prosecution for arson for burning a
barn in which a person lived. The court observed that
[i]t matters not how rude and devoid of comforts this dwelling may be, if
it is the usual sleeping place of a human being, and he is occupying it when
it is feloniously burnt, the statute makes it arson in the first degree. The
statute makes no distinction between the burning of a palace and the hostler's
room in this respect.
Id. at 310, 17 S.W. at 368; accord People v. Orcutt, 1 Parker's Cr. Rep. 252
(N.Y. 1851); Favro v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 452, 46 S.W. 932 (1898) (burglary-the
walls and roof were made from a "wagon sheet"-the structure was, in essence, a
tent.); Ash, 555 P.2d 221 (burglary-the walls and roof consisted of a thin plastic
7
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tation? Although it is traditionally said that the test was whether the building
cover over a wooden frame); Schacke v. State, 164 Ind. App. 153, 326 N.E.2d 856
(1975). But see I W. HAWKINs, supra note 10, at 104:
From what has been said it clearly appears, that no burglary can be com-
mitted by breaking into any ground enclosed, or booth, or tent. & C. for
there seems to be no colour from any authority ancient or modern, to make
any offense burglary that is not done either against some house, or church
Id.; accord 1 M. HALE, supra note 10 at 557; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 10, at 226:
Neither can burglary be committed in a tent or booth erected in a market
or fair; though the owner may lodge therein: for the law regards thus highly
nothing but permanent edifices; a house, or church, the wall, or gate of a
town; and it is the folly of the owner to lodge in so fragile a tenement: but
his lodging there no more makes it burglary to break it open, than it would
to be to uncover a tilted wagon in the same circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
Neither Hawkins, Hale, nor Blackstone cite case law for these assertions. But
even if they correctly related the common law of burglary on this subject, this may
well be a point at which the common law concept of "dwelling house" for the law
of arson differed from that for burglary. The law of burglary essentially sought to
protect the dwellers from forcible entries into the dwelling house. Thus an intruder
who crawled through an entirely open window into the dwelling house of another at
nighttime with the requisite felonious intent was not guilty of burglary because there
had been no breaking, no breach of the security of the habitation. Blackstone gives
as the reason for this rule essentially the same reason why the breaking into a tent
is not burglary: "But if a person leaves his doors or windows open, it is his own
folly and negligence; and if man enters therein, it is no burglary ... ." Id. at 226.
Since the law of arson protected against the risk of injury or death by fire, it is hard
to see why the protection of the law of arson should not extend to persons who
resided in tents. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate any common law case discussing
this point. Not infrequently, however, American statutes do name tents as the subject
matter of arson. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01(3) (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.556(3) (West Supp. 1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.01 (Page 1975).
Though the structure in question was completely enclosed by walls and a roof,
was it also required to be of sufficient size to permit a person to enter the structure
in the normal course of its use? Quite obviously when the issue was whether a
particular building qualified as a "dwelling house" itself, the answer seemed to be
"yes," for a building could not be a dwelling house unless it was also occupied as
a place of human habitation. See authorities cited supra note 14 and infra notes 22-
35. But what if the claim was made that the building qualified as the subject matter
of arson on the theory that it was a building within the curtilage? See infra the text
accompanying note 33. The fact that the "structure" in question was completely
enclosed by walls, a floor, and a roof, and was intended or used as shelter for property
would not distinguish a storage box for grain from a barn used for the storage of
grain unless other criteria were used.
Although the issue does not appear to arise in the ancient cases, it has been
litigated under statutes which make "buildings" or "houses" the subject matter of
arson or burglary. Since the issue is not generally resolved on the basis of statutory
language or unique expressions of legislative intent, those cases are relevant to our
current inquiry. Under those cases, the size of the structure is crucial. The distinction
[Vol. 51302
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was regularly used by the occupants as a sleeping place, arguably this test
reflected two general requirements, one physical and one mental: (1) there
had to be physical acts of occupancy, (2) which were done with the intention
of making the place "home. ' 22 Both requirements had to concur before a
drawn is between a building (which qualifies) and a box (which does not). In Wil-
liamson v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 60, 44 S.W. 1107 (1898), a header box was used to
store the heads of grain as they were harvested. The box was four feet high on one
side, eighteen inches on the opposite side with ends sloping from one side to the
other, fourteen feet long and six feet wide. The court held that it was a "box" and
not a "house" within the meaning of the Texas burglary statute. The court said:
The question here is, was this a 'house', within contemplation of the statute
of burglary. We are of opinion that it was not. It is true that it had four
sides, and was covered over, but it was nevertheless a box, and not a house.
All boxes which contain goods-shoes, groceries, etc.-for shipment would be
houses if this box is held to be one.
Id. at 61, 44 S.W. at 1107. Although some of the cases distinguish a "box" from a
"building" by simple judicial fiat, e.g., Williamson, 39 Tex. Crim. 60, 44 S.W. 1106;
State v. Terrell, 55 Utah 314, 186 P. 108 (1919), others have used objective criteria
for making this distinction. The West Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that "the com-
mon understanding of the meaning of a building would, at the very least, exclude a
structure into which an adult human being could not enter erect and in which he would
scarcely have sufficient room to turn around." State v. Crites, 110 W. Va. 36, 37,
156 S.E. 847, 847 (1931) (conviction for burglary of a chicken house reversed because
of the failure of the prosecution to prove that it was a "building" within the curtilage
under this criterion); accord State v. Neff, 122 W. Va. 549, 11 S.E.2d 171 (1940) (alter-
nate holding). Other courts have suggested that the distinction between a "box" and
a "building" may depend, at least in part, upon whether the structure is affixed to
the soil so as to be classified as a fixture or real property as opposed to personal pro-
perty. E.g., Williamson, 39 Tex. Crim. 60, 44 S.W. 1107 (dictum); see Simmons v.
State, 234 Ind. 489, 499 n.5, 129 N.E.2d 121, 126 n.5 (1955).
If a jurisdiction followed the real property/personal property dichotomy to de-
cide which "boxes" were "buildings" in the law of arson, the burning of a small
bird box affixed to a pole within the curtilage would be arson (assuming that it
otherwise qualified as a "building" which it might well do). Under the West Virginia
rule that the building must be of sufficient size to permit an adult to enter, stand
erect, and turn around, it would not be arson. The choice between the West Virginia
rule and the real property/personal property rule should be made on the basis of the
purpose for the curtilage rule itself.
Finally, many cases have considered the question of whether an unfinished struc-
ture is the subject matter of arson at common law. This issue is usually resolved on
the basis of the rule that requires the building to be a place of human habitation.
See authorities cited supra note 22. However, if the unfinished structure was within
the curtilage of a dwelling house, then the structure would have to qualify as a building
(it would have to be completed to the point of being enclosed with four walls and a
roof) to be the subject matter of arson. See 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 67.
21. The authorities are cited supra note 14 and infra notes 22-35.
22. The house or building had to be a place where a person resides or dwells.
Thus Hawkins explained that burning the frame of a house (meaning, no doubt, a
building so incomplete that it had no walls or roof) "is not accounted arson, because
9
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building was the subject matter of the law of arson. One without the other
would not do. Thus, a structure built by the prospective dweller (or another)
solely for the purpose of becoming the dweller's new home would not be
the subject of arson until the prospective dweller occupied the structure (by
appropriate physical acts) with the intent of making it her home at that
time.23 Physically moving furniture into a house with the intent of making
it cannot come under the word domus." I W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 105;
accord 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 567-68.
In connection with the law of burglary it is frequently said that the test for
determining whether a building was a dwelling house at common law was whether it
was regularly used as a place to sleep by the occupants. Rex v. Martin, Russ. & R.
108 (1806); Rex v. Stock, Russ. & R. 138, 2 Leach 1015, 2 Taunt 339 (1806); Ex
Parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145 (1855); Scott v. State, 62 Miss. 781 (1885); Carrier v.
State, 227 Ind. 726, 89 N.E.2d 74 (1949); Marston v. State, 9 Md. App. 360, 264
A.2d 127 (1970); Poff v. State, 4 Md. App. 186, 241 A.2d 898 (1968); State v.
Ferebee, 273 S.C. 403, 257 S.E.2d 154 (1979); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 988 (7th ed. 1967); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2,
at 256. However, occasional sleeping on the premises did not make the building a
dwelling house. Marston, 9 Md. App. 360, 264 A.2d 127; Scott v. State, 62 Miss.
781 (1885); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra, at 988; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 256.
The problem, of course, is the difficulty of defining exactly what we mean when
we call a place one's "home," the place where one lives. Surely regularly sleeping in
a building is one of the clear indicia that the place is home, but is this the only test
for determining whether a building is a dwelling house? The Alabama Supreme Court
recognized the propriety of the sleeping test for the law of burglary because that
offense could only be committed during the nighttime; and it was thus only during
the nighttime that the law of burglary sought to secure the occupants from felonious
intrusions into the building. Ex Parte Vincent, 26 Ala. at 151-52; see also State v.
Ferebee, 273 S.C. 403, 257 S.E.2d 154 (1979). But it is not so clear that this part of
burglary's dwelling house doctrine accurately reflected the common law position con-
cerning arson. Arson could be committed at any time of the day or night. 3 E. COKE,
supra note 10, at 66; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 105; 1 M. HALE, supra note
10, at 566. Hence the sleeping rule did not coincide with the protection afforded by
the law of arson, for arson sought to protect the occupants from the risks of burning
the dwelling at all hours. Nevertheless, the sleeping test has been accepted by some
courts as the test for determining whether a building qualified as a dwelling house
for purposes of arson. E.g., State v. Jones, 160 Mo. 302, 17 S.W. 366 (1891); People
v. Orcutt, I Parker's Cr. Rep. 252 (N.Y. 1851); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note
2, at 280. Convictions for arson have been sustained, however, when the structure
was built as a dwelling house and occupied as such though no one had ever slept in
the building. State v. Timbury, 114 N.H. 763, 329 A.2d 143 (1974).
23. E.g., Elsmore v. The Inhabitants of the Hundred of St. Briavells, 8 Barn.
& C. 461, 108 Eng. Rep. 1114 (1828); The Queen v. Allison, I Cox C.C. 24 (1843);
State v. McGowan, 20 Conn. 245 (1850); Commonwealth v. Barney, 64 Mass. (10
Cush.) 478 (1852) (dictum); State v. Wofenberger, 20 Ind. 242 (1863); Stallings v.
State, 47 Ga. 572 (1873); Dick v. State, 53 Miss. 384 (1876); Davis v. State, 153 Ala.
48, 44 So. 1018 (1907); People v. Losinger, 331 Mich. 490, 50 N.W.2d 137 (1951);
State v. Timbury, 114 N.H. 763, 329 A.2d 143 (1974); see also Commonwealth v.
Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 393 N.E.2d 391 (1979). The victims rented an apartment
10
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it home (moving in) sometime later made the building a place of storage
rather than a dwelling house. 24 And despite the fact that a guest may "move
into" the guest room in a friend's house with acts quite sufficient to satisfy
the physical act requirement, the room would not be the dwelling house of
the guest unless the guest also intended to make the room "home," a place
of permanent residence. 25 Though not the dwelling house of the guest, it
would remain the dwelling house of the friend. 26 The same would be true of
transient guests in a hotel or motel.27 But once a person moved into a house
and took possession by securing a key and visiting the premises with the intention
to live there. The victims had not moved any of their possessions into the apartment
and they had never slept there. The court held that the apartment was a dwelling
house for the purpose of the law of burglary. Id at 755-57, 393 N.E.2d at 394-95;
State v. Matson, 3 Or. App. 518, 475 P.2d 436 (1970). A tenant leased an apartment
in Oregon, moved several items of personal property into the apartment, apparently
with the intention of then making it his home, and then left to pick up his family
and the remainder of his possessions in California without ever sleeping in the apart-
ment. Between the time the tenant took possession of the apartment and his return
from California, the defendant broke into the apartment. The court held that the
apartment was a "dwelling house" for the purpose of the law of burglary. Id. at
519-20, 475 P.2d at 437; accord Commonwealth v. Brown, 3 Rawle 207 (Pa. 1832).
24. See Marston v. State, 9 Md. App. 360, 264 A.2d 127 (1970) (burglary);
Poff v. State, 4 Md. App. 186, 241 A.2d 898, (1968) (burglary and storehouse
breaking); Commonwealth v. Brown, 3 Rawle 207 (Pa. 1832) (burglary); Moss v.
State, 574 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
25. Although not apparently addressed by the cases, one would also assume
that the room would be recognized as the "dwelling house" of the guest only if the
guest had the permission of the friend to make the room the guest's home. This issue
is only likely to arise in conjunction with the "of another" requirement discussed
infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
This result would follow by force of the intent requirement documented supra
notes 22-24 and infra note 28. This clearly was the rule for burglary. E.g., 2 E. EAST,
supra note 18, at 500 (burglary); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 257
(burglary).
26. E.g., 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 500 (burglary); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 257 (burglary).
27. Like the situation of the guest in the guest room in the private home, this
result would follow by force of the intent requirement documented supra notes 22-
24 and infra note 28.
Again, under the law of burglary this was clearly the rule. E.g., Holt v. State,
46 Ala. App. 555, 246 So. 2d 85 (1971); People v. Carr, 255 Il1. 203, 99 N.E. 357
(1912); Herbert v. State, 31 Md. App. 48, 354 A.2d 449 (1976); Mason v. People,
26 N.Y. 200 (1863); People v. Bush, 3 Parker's Cr. R. 552 (N.Y. 1857); State v.
Clark, 42 Vt. 629 (1870); 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 556; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 257.
Nevertheless, the motel or hotel, like the guest room in the friend's house, was
the subject matter of arson because it was regularly used as a place of human hab-
itation. E.g., State v. Stubba, 113 Ariz. 434, 556 P.2d 8 (1976). The law of burglary
was in accord. E.g., Herbert, 31 Md. App. 48, 354 A.2d 449; Rodgers v. People, 86
N.Y. 360 (1881); 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 557; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 2, at 257.
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or room with the necessary intent, it remained that person's place of human
habitation, a "dwelling house" for the purpose of the law of arson, until
the premises were permanently abandoned by that dweller. Abandonment
required that the dweller vacate the premises with the intent to cease using
the dwelling as home.21 However, temporary absence of the dweller, an ab-
sence coupled with the intent to maintain the house as "home" and return
to it, did not alter the building's status as a dwelling house, for the common
law did not require the dweller to be physically present in the dwelling when
it was burned. 29
It was recognized at a very early point in the development of the law
of burglary that a person could have more than one dwelling house. 0 As
long as the dweller moved into each house (the physical acts) with the intent
of making it one of the dweller's homes (the intent requirement), all were
the subject matter of the law of burglary.3 The same was true of the law
of arson. 2
Furthermore, a building did not have to be exclusively used as a place
of habitation. Though it was not arson at common law to maliciously burn
28. E.g., P.P.M. v. State, 445 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State
v. Warren, 33 Me. 30 (1851); People v. Foster, 103 Mich. App. 311, 302 N.W.2d
862 (1981) (error to exclude testimony concerning the intent to abandon the building
as a dwelling house); State v. Clark, 52 N.C. 167 (1859); The Queen v. Allison, 1
Cox C.C. 24 (1843); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 280; see also Fillman
v. State, 251 A.2d 557 (Del. 1969); Hooker v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. (13 Gratt) 763
(1885).
The law of burglary was in accord. E.g., State v. Ervin, 96 N.M. 366, 630 P.2d
765 (1981); the burglary cases are collected in Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4th 349, 361-62
(1983); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 258.
29. E.g., Johnson v. State, 48 Ga. 116 (1873); State v. Warren, 33 Me. 30
(1851); see also People v. Losinger, 331 Mich. 490, 50 N.W.2d 137 (1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 911 (1952); State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982);
State v. Gulley, 46 N.C. App. 822, 266 S.E.2d 8 (1980); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 280-81.
The same principles governed the law of burglary. E.g., Moore v. State, 35 Ala.
App. 95, 44 So. 2d 262 (1950); Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315, 85 So. 911 (1920);
Schwabacher v. People, 165 I11. 618, 46 N.E. 809 (1897); Scott v. State, 62 Miss. 781
(1885); State v. Meerchouse, 34 Mo. 344 (1864); State v. Ferebee, 273 S.C. 403, 257
S.E.2d 154 (1979); 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 556; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
10, at 225; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 257-58; Annot., supra note 28,
at 360-62.
30. Resolution of Judges, Popham 52, 79 Eng. Rep. 1169 (1593); 1 W. HAWK-
INS, supra note 10, at 103; 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 566; 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 10, at 225.
31. Moore v. State, 35 Ala. App. 95, 44 So. 2d 262 (1950); Schwabacher v.
People, 165 II!. 618, 46 N.E. 809 (1897); State v. Meerchouse, 34 Mo. 344 (1864);
State v. Lisiewski, 20 Ohio St. 2d 20, 252 N.E.2d 168 (1969); State v. Berry, 598
S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. 1980); State v. Bair, 112 W. Va. 655, 166 S.E. 369 (1932).
32. People v. Losinger, 331 Mich. 490, 50 N.W.2d 137 (1951) (by implication).
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shops, stores, warehouses, barns, and similar buildings, which were not within
the curtilage of a dwelling house,33 such buildings were the subject of arson
when a portion of the building was someone's dwelling house.3 4 In that case,
arson could be committed by maliciously burning any part of the building."
In other words, it was not the character of the building, such as the distinction
between a commercial building and a single family residence, but its use as
a home that was important.3 6 Likewise, a single building, such as an apart-
ment house, may contain a number of separate dwelling houses.17
Finally, if all dwellers moved from the dwelling house with the intent
of never returning, of abandoning the house as their home, the building
would no longer be a dwelling house, the subject of the law of arson, until
it was made a place of human habitation again by others.3"
Nevertheless, as with the law of burglary,3 9 a building which was not
itself a dwelling house could be the subject of arson if it were within the
33. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
34. E.g., United States v. Cardish, 145 F. 242 (1906); Smith v. State, 31 Md.
App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976); State v. Janes, 106 Mo. 302, 17 S.W. 366 (1891);
People v. Orcutt, I Parker's Cr. Rep. 252 (N.Y. 1857).
In both Cardish and Smith it is said that the use of one part of the building as
a dwelling house gives the character of a dwelling house to the entire building if there
is internal communication between the part used for dwelling purposes and the part
used for other purposes. I find no case which holds that it is not arson to burn the
non-dwelling house portion of a building when there is no internal communication
between the dwelling house portion and the non-dwelling house portion. Surely the
curtilage doctrine may or may not apply depending upon who used the non-dwelling
house portion of the building. If that portion was used by the dweller, then the non-
dwelling house portion of the building would qualify as the subject matter of arson
as being a building within the curtilage. But even if the non-dwelling house portion
is used exclusively by a non-dweller, this type of building should be regarded in the
same way as an apartment house, and it should thus be arson to burn any portion
of the building for the same reason that it was arson for the dweller in an apartment
house to burn her own apartment even though the fire did not spread beyond the
confines of her own apartment. See infra text accompanying notes 59-61.
35. In addition to the authorities cited infra note 57, see People v. Oliff, 361
11. 237, 197 N.E. 777 (1935); State v. Caliendo, 136 Me. 169, 4 A.2d 837 (1939)
(The lower floor, containing a business, was burned. The fire did not extend to the
second floor which was used as a "dwelling house." The point was assumed, not
discussed.); State v. Meseruie, 121 Me. 564, 118 A. 482 (1922).
36. State v. Jones, 106 Mo. 302, 17 S.W. 366 (1891).
37. E.g., Levy v. People, 80 N.Y. 327 (1880); State v. Stubba, 113 Ariz. 434,
556 P.2d 8 (1976); See 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 64-65 (burglary); I W. HAWKINS,
supra note 10, at 103; 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 556-557 (burglary); 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 225 (burglary).
38. The Queen v. Allison, I Cox C.C. 24 (1843); State v. Warren, 33 Me. 30
(1851); Hooker v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. 763 (1855); State v. Clark, 52 N.C. 167
(1859); People v. Foster, 103 Mich. App. 311, 302 N.W.2d 862 (1981).
39. Rex v. Clayburn, Russ. & R. 360, 168 Eng. Rep. 845 (1818); The King
v. Gibson, 1 Leach C.C. 357, 168 Eng. Rep. 281 (1785); Devoe v. Commonwealth,
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curtilage of a dwelling house. Thus, a "barn, stable, cow-house, sheephouse,
dairy house, milkhouse, [garage] and the like" 4 which was located within
the curtilage of a dwelling house was the subject matter of arson at common
law.4' The curtilage was a small area around the dwelling house 42 which was
typically, though not necessarily, enclosed by a fence or hedge.43 If not
enclosed by a fence or hedge, the curtilage was only the area which could
have been so enclosed. Thus, a building very near the dwelling house but
separated by a road was not within the curtilage. 4 Nevertheless, proximity
to the dwelling house was not enough. To qualify as the subject matter of
arson, the building also had to be regularly used by the occupants of the
dwelling house. 41 Since the purpose of the law of arson was to protect the
44 Mass. 316 (1841); Armour v. State, 22 Tenn. 379 (1842); 3 E. COKE, supra note
10, at 64; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 104; 2 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 556-
57; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 225.
40. 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 66-67; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at
105 ("outbuildings" within the curtilage); 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 567 (quoting
from Coke); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 221 (citing Hale).
41. E.g., Commonwealth v. Barney, 64 Mass. 480 (1852); People v. Alpin,
86 Mich. 393, 49 N.W. 148 (1891); State v. Sarvis, 45 S.C. 668, 24 S.E. 53 (1896);
State v. Blumenthal, 133 Ark. 584, 136 Ark. 532, 203 S.W. 36 (1918); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 110, 38 S.W.2d 971 (1931); Duke v. State, 134 Fla. 456,
185 So. 422 (1938); Daniels v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 583, 1 S.E.2d 333 (1939);
State v. Ferguson, 233 Iowa 354, 6 N.W.2d 856 (1942); State v. Cuthrell, 235 N.C.
173, 69 S.E.2d 233 (1952); State v. Varsalona, 309 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1958).
42. A barn 5 rods (82.5 ft.) from the house and connected to it by a lane
was within the curtilage, People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250 (1851), and so was a barn
that had been converted into a combination garage-work area-recreation room located
80 to 100 feet from the dwelling house. Fox v. State, 179 Ind. App. 267, 384 N.E.2d
1159 (1979). But a former house which had been converted into a crib for fodder,
located 250-300 yards (750-900 ft.) from the dwelling house was outside the curtilage.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 110, 38 S.W.2d 971 (1931).
43. State v. Shaw, 31 Me. 523 (1850); People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 251 (1851);
Holland v. State, I 1 Ala. App. 164, 65 So. 920 (1914).
44. State v. Stewart, 6 Conn. 47 (1825); Curkendall v. People, 36 Mich. 309
(1877). See State v. Sampson, 12 S.C. 567 (1879) (burglary); State v. Neff, 122 W.
Va. 549, 11 S.E.2d 171 (1940) (burglary).
45. It is commonly said that the building must be used in connection with
the dwelling house in the conduct of family affairs and for carrying on domestic
purposes or employment. E.g., State v. Bugg, 66 Kan. 668, 72 P. 236 (1903); Jones
v. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 70 N.E. 952 (1904); State v. Lee, 120 Or. 643, 253 P. 533
(1927); Jones v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 110, 38 S.W.2d 971 (1931); Fox v. State,
179 Ind. App. 267, 384 N.E.2d 1159 (1979).
Such statements should not be taken literally, for a building sufficiently close
to the dwelling house was the subject of arson even though it was used for business
purposes by the occupants of the dwelling house. The King v. Gibson, 1 Leach 357,
168 Eng. Rep. 281 (1785) (burglary); Rex v. Chalking, Russ. & Ry. 334, 168 Eng.
Rep. 831 (1817) (burglary); I M. HALE, supra note 10, at 557 (burglary). The crucial
question was whether the building within the curtilage was regularly used by the
occupants, not the type of use, e.g., family affairs and domestic purposes and em-
ployment as opposed to general business use by the dwellers.
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security of the dwellers in their habitation, and since the burning of buildings
within the curtilage posed nearly the same human risks as burning the dwell-
ing house itself, buildings within the curtilage which were used by the dwellers
were the subject matter of arson as well.4 But the common law drew a sharp
distinction between buildings used by the dwellers within the curtilage and
any other type of property. Thus, the burning of an automobile, truck, or
other personal property located within the curtilage and regularly used by
the dwellers was not arson despite the similar human risks involved; and
neither was it arson to burn a building physically within the curtilage if it
were not used by the dwellers, but by someone else.4 7 The common law judges
46. Simmons v. State, 234 Ind. 489, 129 N.E.2d 121 (1955) (Bobbitt, J.,
concurring); Fox v. State, 179 Ind. App. 267, 384 N.E.2d 1159 (1979).
47. The King v. Taylor, 1 Leach 49, 168 Eng. Rep. 127 (1759); Graham v.
State, 40 Ala. 659 (1867); O'Daniel v. State, 188 Ind. 477, 123 N.E. 241 (1919); State
v. Schenk, 100 N.J. Super. 122, 241 A.2d 267 (1968); 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at
568.
And, of course, it was not arson to burn a building which was outside the
curtilage which did not otherwise qualify as a dwelling house. E.g., State v. Stewart,
6 Conn. 47 (1825); Curkendall v. People, 36 Mich. 309 (1877); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 239 Ky. 110, 38 S.W.2d 971 (1931).
The cases seldom discuss the reasons for extending the protection of the law of
arson to buildings within the curtilage. One can pose three risks associated with
burning buildings within the curtilage: (1) the risk that fire will spread to the dwelling
house itself, because the building being burned, within the curtilage, is so physically
close to the dwelling house (a rationale that emphasizes the physical proximity re-
quirement of the curtilage rule), McClaine v. Territory, 1 Wash. 345, 25 P. 453
(1890); (2) the risk that the dwellers will respond to the fire and try to put it out,
and thereby be subjected to the risk of being burned (a rationale that emphasizes the
use requirement of the curtilage rule for it is their property that is being burned);
and, in a similar vein, (3) the risk that the dwellers will actually be in the building
when it is burned (a rationale that also emphasizes the use requirement of the curtilage
rule). Of course, none of these rationales are mutually exclusive and they all support
the inclusion of buildings within the curtilage as the subject matter of arson. But
only the first rationale (the risk that fire will spread to the dwelling house itself)
clearly supports the exclusion of buildings as being the subject matter of arson when
they are too distant to pose a risk of fire spreading to the dwelling. Buildings that
are physically close enough to pose a substantial risk to the dwelling house (i.e.,
buildings within the physical curtilage) are excluded from the protection of the law
of arson when they are not used by the occupants of the dwelling house, yet these
buildings pose the same risk that the fire may spread to the dwelling house because
they are physically within the curtilage. As a rule of exclusion, the use requirement
is thus in tension with the physical proximity requirement. If the risk is substantial,
the dwellers may well respond to the fire and attempt to extinguish it, thereby sub-
jecting themselves to the very risk that the law of arson should protect them against.
Yet it would not. The third rationale (the risk that the dwellers may be physically
present in the buildings within the curtilage) justifies a rule of exclusion only if one
values the lives of the dwellers higher than the lives of those who may be present in
the building physically within the curtilage though unconnected with the dwelling
house. Again, as a rule of exclusion, the use requirement may well produce purely
15
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would not extend the law of arson so drastically. That task was left to the
legislature.4
8
There was, however, one arguable exception to the curtilage rule: the
"burning of a barn," according to Lord Coke, "being no parcel of a mansion
house, is no felony: any yet if there be corn or hay within it, the burning
thereof is felony, though the barn be not part of a mansion. ' 49 It is highly
doubtful that Coke's statement accurately reflected the common law. '
arbitrary results. Why then did the common law adhere to the use requirement of
the curtilage rule? Unless the law of arson was changed to prohibit the burning of
any building (or personal property) which posed a substantial risk to the occupants
of all buildings, some arbitrary distinction had to be drawn. And since the judges
apparently did not believe they had the authority to so drastically extend the concept
of arson, they adhered to the ancient curtilage rule, a rule founded on tradition which
was heavily supported by the law of burglary. In burglary, the curtilage rule appeared
to work well enough. Burglary protected the dwellers from nocturnal felonious entries,
and the judges could easily believe that the dwellers would only venture out into the
night to protect their property from the "midnight terror" in buildings both physically
close and used by them. The uncritical acceptance of the curtilage rule for the law
of arson thus was capable of producing more arbitrary results in the law of arson
than in the law of burglary.
It is not, therefore, surprising, that the legislatures of every American jurisdiction
have rendered the curtilage rule obsolete by changing the definition of the property
and the risks protected by the modern law of arson.
48. The modern legislative response to the crime of arson is considered infra
beginning with the text accompanying note 273.
49. 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 67. Coke also states that "the ancient authors
extended this felony, further then (sic) houses, viz. to stacks of corn, wagons or carts
of coal, wood or other goods." Id. This is no indication that Coke thought these
statements to be accurate descriptions of the common law. By 1716, when Hawkins
wrote his treatise, the extension mentioned but not approved by Coke had been
rejected. Hawkins wrote:
out-buildings, as barns, and stables, adjoining thereto, and also barns full
of corn, whether they be adjoining to any house or not, are so far secured
by law, that the malicious burning of them is arson .... But it seems that
at this day the burning of the frame of a house, or of a stack of corn, etc.,
is not accounted arson ....
I W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 105. Twenty years later, Sir Matthew Hale
wrote that "the burning of a stack of corn was no felony by the common law." 1
M. HALE, supra note 10, at 568. Hale agrees with Coke's statement about the burning
of a barn containing hay or corn. Id. at 567; accord 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
10, at 221.
Edward East expressed doubt that it was ever arson at common law to burn a
stack of corn, but he approved Coke's statement concerning a barn containing hay
or corn. 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1020. Sir William Russell also asserts that a
single barn in a field containing hay or corn was the subject matter of arson. 4 W.
RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 1024.
50. All of the commentators mentioned supra note 49, except Russell, simply
rely on Coke's statement as the foundation for this exception. Coke cites no authority
in its support. In 1531, over a century before Lord Coke wrote, the burning of a
16
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C. Of Another
Since the primary purpose of the law of arson was to protect the physical
safety of the inhabitants of the dwelling house, the "of another" requirement
meant that the dwelling house had to be in the possession of someone other
than the incendiary." Accordingly, an owner could be guilty of common law
arson by burning a dwelling house in the possession of someone else, as
where a landlord burned a house occupied by tenant,2 or where an owner
burned a dwelling in the possession of any other person." And, of course,
the burning of a dwelling house by the person in actual possession of the
barn containing corn was made felony by the statute of Henry VIII, c.1, f.3. On the
available evidence, it is impossible to tell whether this statute was declaratory or
amendatory of the common law. It is also impossible to tell whether Coke was relying
upon that statute for his statement that the burning of barns containing hay or corn
was felony. Though too much can be made of the fact that Coke did not say the
"burning of houses" (arson), as he frequently refers to the common law felony he
is discussing as "felony".
Russell is apparently the first commentator to cite a case in support of the free
standing barn exception: Barnham's Case, 4 Coke 20a, 76 Eng. Rep. 908 (1602) (not
cited by Coke). But it is equally unclear whether this civil case relies on the 1531
statute or the common law. See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 281.
On the other hand, Pollock and Maitland state that "already in 1220 we find
the burning of a barn that was full of corn treated as felony." 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 490. If this statement is accurate, Henry's statute may
have simply confirmed the common law result, and Coke's statement would reflect
the ancient common law position.
In any event, in 1670 a statute was enacted making it a felony to bum any barn
at nighttime. 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 7, § 2. And modern statutes generally include any
barn as the subject matter of arson. See infra text accompanying notes 438-41, 445-
48.
51. In addition to the authorities cited supra note 10, see The King v. Breeme,
I Leach 220, 168 Eng. Rep. 213 (1780); State v. Fish, 27 N.J.L. 323 (1859); Snyder
v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872); Heard v. State, 81 Ala. 55, 1 So. 640 (1886); People
v. DeWinton, 113 Colo. 403, 45 P. 708 (1896); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 316 Pa.
394, 175 A. 518 (1934); State v. Beckwith, 135 Me. 423, 198 A. 739 (1938); State v.
Varsalona, 309 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1958); State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E.2d
325 (1982); see also Annot., 17 A.L.R. 1168 (1922).
52. Rex v. Harris, FOSTER, CROWN LAW 113, 168 Eng. Rep. 56 (1753); Erskine
v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. (Gratt.) 624 (1851); State v. Toole, 29 Conn. 342 (1860);
Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872); 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1023; 4 W.
RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 1027.
53. State v. Tennery, 9 Iowa 436 (1859); Commonwealth v. Gentzler, 15 Pa.
934 (1906).
The possession of the person other than the owner did not have to be "rightful"
possession. "Wrongful" possession would do. Rex v. Wallis, 1 Moody 344, 168 Eng.
Rep. 1297 (1832); see Sullivan v. State, 5 Ala. 47 (5 Stew. & P. 175) (1834) (a person
who adversely possessed a dwelling house could not commit arson by burning it).
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premises was not common law arson.14 For the same reason, it was not arson
for one occupant to burn a dwelling house which was shared with another
when both possessed the entire building.5 For example, if a wife burned the
dwelling house in which she, her husband and her family resided, it was not
arson at common law. 56
Thus far the "of another" requirement has been the same for arson
and burglary.17 In one respect, however, there was a material difference.
When a single building is divided into more than one dwelling house, even
though they may be joined by a common hail, and one of the dwelling units
is broken and entered under the requisite circumstances, a burglary is com-
54. The King v. Spalding, 1 Leach 218, 168 Eng. Rep. 211 (1780); Rex v.
Pedley, I Leach 242, 168 Eng. Rep. 224 (1782); Proberts' Case, 2 E. EAST, supra
note 18, at 1030 (1799); State v. Fish, 27 N.J.L. 323 (1859); State v. Sandy, 25 N.C.
570 (1843); State v. Hannett, 54 Vt. 83 (1881); State v. Young, 139 Ala. 136, 36 So.
19 (1904); Kopcyznski v. State, 137 Wis. 358, 118 N.W. 863 (1908); 4 W. RUSSELL,
supra note 10, at 1027.
At least one case has drawn the distinction, so apparent in the law of larceny,
between custody and possession. Thus where the defendant was classified as a "serv-
ant," the burning of the house occupied by himself and his family, but provided him
by the master, was held to be arson. Rex v. Gowen, 1 Leach 246 (1786). Gowen is
explainable on other grounds, and it has not been followed. The case would seem to
be wrong on principle. Gowen is noted in 4 W. RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 1027 and
in 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1027.
55. The rule was different if the building was divided into a number of sep-
arate dwelling houses, such as an apartment house. See infra text accompanying note
58. The rule here under discussion applies to joint-occupants of a single dwelling
house. In addition to the authorities cited infra note 56, see State v. Haynes, 66 Me.
306 (1876). In Haynes, a mother and daughter jointly resided in a dwelling house.
The mother and daughter procured another to burn it. The court held that it was
not arson at common law. Id.; Shepherd v. People, 19 N.Y. 537 (1859) (recognizing
the common law rule, but construing a statute to reach the opposite result); R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 283. Contra State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327,
289 S.E.2d 325 (1982). The Shaw court stated:
While there is some authority in the older cases from other jurisdictions to
the contrary, we find the need for protection from willful and malicious
burning of a dwelling house so compelling that we hold that the common
law arson requirement that the dwelling burned be that of 'another' is sat-
isfied by a showing that some other person or persons, together with the
defendant, were joint occupants of the same dwelling units.
Id. at 338, 289 S.E.2d at 331 (footnote omitted).
56. Snyder v. People, 26 Mich. 106 (1872); Kopcyznski v. State, 137 Wis.
358, 118 N.W. 863 (1908). But, of course, if the wife is separated from the husband
(living in a different dwelling house), the wife can be guilty of arson if she burns the
husband's dwelling house. Id.; Frazier v. State, 16 Ohio App. 8 (1922). Contra Rex
v. Marsh, I Moody 182, 168 Eng. Rep. 1233 (1828) (This case was based upon the
now rejected notion of the legal unity of man and wife.).
57. A joint occupant cannot commit burglary of the jointly possessed dwelling
house. E.g., Commonwealth v. Clarke, 66 Va. 908 (1874); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 10, at 262.
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mitted only of the premises actually entered.18 Hence, the nocturnal breaking
and entering of a single apartment "of another" in an apartment house was
burglary only of the apartment entered. It was not burglary of the apartments
within the building that were not entered, and she could not be guilty of
burglarizing her own apartment, for it was not the dwelling house "of an-
other." But under the law of arson, if one tenant in an apartment house
burned his own apartment, even if the fire were totally contained within that
single apartment unit, the tenant was guilty of arson. 9 The theory was ex-
plained by the North Carolina Supreme Court:
[T]he main purpose of common law arson is to protect against danger to
those persons who might be in the dwelling house which is burned. Where
there are several apartments in a single building, this purpose can be served
only by subjecting to punishment for arson any person who sets fire to any
part of the building. '
Of course, for this rule to apply, the building had to have been occupied as
a dwelling house. Thus, a hotel owner could not be convicted of arson at
common law for burning a portion of her hotel building when the rooms
were rented only to transient guests. 6'
Although the purpose of the law of burglary and arson is to protect the
security of the habitation, 62 these two bodies of law protect dwellers from
very different risks. Burglary protects against the evils associated with fe-
lonious nocturnal breakings and enterings, 63 whereas arson protects against
58. E.g., R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 10, at 284.
59. Levy v. People, 80 N.Y. 327 (1880); Shepherd v. People, 19 N.Y. 537
(1859); State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 284; see also State v. Young, 153 Mo. 445, 449-50, 55 S.W. 82, 83
(1900) (construing a statute making it arson in the first degree to burn "any dwelling
house in which there shall be at the same time some human being" as being satisfied
when dwellers were physically present in other apartments when the defendant burned
a separate apartment).
60. State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 77-78, 248 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1978).
61. State v. Parrish, 205 Kan. 33, 468 P.2d 150 (1970) (under a statute re-
quiring the burning of "property of another"). If the building was burned by a third
person it was, however, arson at common law because a hotel was a "dwelling house"
of the owner of the hotel. See authorities cited supra note 27 and accompanying text.
62. This is why the "dwelling house" requirement is nearly the same for both
crimes.
63. E.g., Smart v. State, 244 Ind. 69, 190 N.E.2d 650 (1963):
It is evident that the offense of burglary at common law was considered
one aimed at the security of the habitation rather than against property.
That is to say, it was the circumstance of midnight terror aimed toward a
man or his family who were in rightful repose in the sanctuary of the home,
that was punished, and not the fact that the intended felony was successful.
Such attempted immunity extended to a man's dwelling or mansion house
has been said to be attributable to the early common law principle that a
man's home is his castle. The jealousy with which the law guarded against
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human dangers created when the dwelling house is burned.6 The burglary
of one apartment does not necessarily pose a similar risk to dwellers in other
apartments in the same building. But the burning of any portion of a building
endangers all of its occupants. One of the principal purposes of the law of
arson was to prevent such risks by deterring people from burning "dwelling
houses." 61 The interests protected by the law of arson thus called for a rule
different from the rule which served the interests of the law of burglary.-
D. Burning
Burning. Putting of fire into any part of a house, whereby that part burneth.
For it is necessary, that there be a burning, but it is not necessary, that all
or any part be wholly burnt, nor that the fire hath any continuance, but
the intent only sufficeth not. As if one put fire into any part of a house,
and it burneth not, this is not felony, for the words of the indictment be,
incendit, et combussit. Again, if it doth burn, though it goeth out of itself,
it is felony.67
Thus, arson protected dwellers against the burning of the dwelling house
itself and the burning of a building within the curtilage. And though some-
any infringement of this ancient right of peaceful habitation is best illustrated
by the severe penalties which at common law were assessed against a person
convicted of burglary, even though the enterprise, except for the essential
elements of breaking and entering a mansion house or dwelling house at
night with intent to commit a felony therein, was unsuccessful.
Id. at 72-73, 190 N.E.2d at 652 (quoting Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 831, 834-35 (1955));
accord Kanaras v. State, 54 Md. App. 568, 460 A.2d 61 (1983); State v. Celli, 263
N.W.2d 145 (S.D. 1978) (quoting from Smart).
64. See authorities cited supra notes 14-15.
65. This rationale was not extended to situations in which two separate dwell-
ing houses were situated very close but were not actually attached (so that they could
not be characterized as a single building with multiple dwellings). As long as only
one building was burned, it was arson only of the building actually burned regardless
of the severity of the risk that the fire would spread to the other. See I M. HALE,
supra note 10, at 568-69.
If the adjoining building was also burned, it could be arson if the mens rea
element was also satisfied.
66. Unlike burglary, which required nocturnal acts, arson could be committed
at any time of the day or night. Curran's Case, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 619, 619 (1850);
see also authorities cited supra note 10. And unlike larceny, the value of the property
burned was of no importance to a charge of arson at common law. This was because
arson primarily sought to protect the safety of the inhabitants, not the interests in
the property destroyed. Clark v. People, 2 11. 117 (1833); Ritchey v. State, 7 Blackf.
168 (Ind. 1844); McClaine v. Territory, I Wash. 345, 25 P. 453 (1890).
67. 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 66; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 106
(semble); I M. HALE, supra note 10, at 568-69 (semble); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 10, at 222 (semble); 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1020 (accord); 4 W. RUSSELL,
supra note 10, at 1024-25.
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what similar risks were created when property within the dwelling was burned,
the burning of property which was not a dwelling house (or a building within
the curtilage, wherever situated) constituted the common law misdemeanor
of malicious mischief,68 not arson. 69 It was sufficient, however, for common
law arson if any portion of the dwelling house itself was burned, no matter
how small, no matter how insignificant to the structural integrity of the
building. 70 As long as what burned was permanently incorporated into the
68. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note 22, at 978-82; R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, supra note 2, at 282, 405-413. Malicious mischief was a crime against property
interests. See infra text accompanying notes 117-21.
69. Commonwealth v. Francis, 1 Thacher C.C. 240 (Mass. 1830) (setting fire
to a boat in a building is not arson unless some portion of the building burns); Dedieu
v. People, 22 N.Y. 178 (1860) (burning personal property within a dwelling house is
insufficient unless some portion of the building bums); Graham v. State, 40 Ala. 659
(1867) (burning a bale of cotton in a building when no portion of the building is
burned is not arson); State v. Levesque, 146 Me. 351, 81 A.2d 665 (1951) (rubbish
fire in celler not arson unless some portion of the building burns).
70. Commonwealth v. Van Schaack, 16 Mass. 104 (1819). (Defendant placed
a coal of fire on the sill of the dwelling house. The sill was burned for about six
inches, and the fire spread to a board, part of the exterior of the house, burning it
to the extent of eighteen inches in length and seven inches in width. The court held
it was arson. "It is impossible to draw the line of distinction between the burning in
this case and that which should consume a greater part, or the whole, of a dwelling
house.... If any part of a dwelling house, however small, be consumed by fire, the
offense is complete." Id. at 105); People v. Butler, 16 Johns. 203, 204 (N.Y. 1819)
(The burning of two or three of the kitchen stairs was a sufficient burning of the
dwelling house for arson at common law. It is not necessary that the house should
be absolutely consumed or burned.); People v. Haggerty, 46 Cal. 355, 356 (1873)
(The burning of any part of the building, however small, completes the offense of
arson. A spot on the floor was charred and that was held sufficient.); State v.
Braathen, 77 N.D. 309, 315, 43 N.W.2d 202, 207 (1950) (There was a "burning and
charring" of the wood of some of the interior before the fire was extinguished. That
was sufficient for arson. It is not necessary that the building should be consumed or
materially injured. The burning of any portion, however small, suffices.); Hinkley v.
State, 389 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (the charring of wood siding in
an area of roughly 12 inches square suffices for arson); Fulford v. State, 8 Md. App.
270, 259 A.2d 551 (1969).
About twenty-four inches by four inches of the window frame had been
burned. While it was a metal frame, the paint had been burned completely
off. In addition, the venetian blind, which the trial judge found as a fact
to be a permanent fixture and a part of the building, was burned and the
cords which held the venetian blind were totally burned. Without deciding
whether the venetian blind was or was not a permanent fixture, the burning
of the window frame was sufficient to establish a burning. If there is the
slightest burning of any part of the building, the offense is complete.
Id. at 273-74, 259 A.2d at 553.; State v. Oxendine, 305 N.C. 126, 130-31, 286 S.E.2d
546, 548-49 (1982). A witness testified that there were dark or burned patches over
the wall, and that the wallpaper was burned. Defendant argued that this was an
insufficient burning of the building for arson. Affirming the conviction for arson,
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structure of the building, it was a burning of the building itself.7' Hence it
was arson to burn the floor,72 the baseboards, 7 interior walls, 74 wallpaper
affixed to a wall, 75 ceilings 7 6 window frames, 77 the paint from an interior
window frame, 7 interior stairs,79 thresholds and doors, 0 the eves over win-
the court said:
It is difficult to perceive how dark, burned patches could appear on a wall
absent the prior incidence of at least minor charring of that wall's substantive
material. Defendant's ... argument that the presence of burnt wallpaper in
the dwelling had no rational tendency to indicate the charring of the build-
ing's structure simply defies good sense and logic. Wallpaper affixed to an
interior wall is unquestionably a part of the dwelling's framework. If the
wallpaper is burning, it would perforce suggest that the house is also burning.
Hence we hold that where, as here, the evidence discloses that the wallpaper
in a dwelling has been burned, it completely substantiates the [burning]
element of arson.
Id.; 286 S.E.2d at 548-49 (1984) (emphasis in original); see also Annot., 28 A.L.R.
4th 483 (1984) (collecting many of the modern cases).
71. Although very few cases have considered the point, it is apparently gov-
erned by the law of fixtures, the law which determines when personal property be-
comes real property by being incorporated into the realty. Thus in State v. Oxendine,
305 N.C. 126, 286 S.E.2d 546 (1982), the court said in note 3, "Once it is affixed
to the house, wallpaper is generally immovable and permanently attached thereto and
as such becomes part of the realty." Id. at 130 n.3, 286 S.E.2d at 548 n.3. For
definitions of fixtures, real estate, and real property, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
574, 1096, 1137 (5th ed. 1979); BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIoNARY 480, 1059 (3d ed.
1969); see also I THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 6, 55 (Grimes ed. 1980)." In
Fulford v. State, 8 Md. App. 270, 273-74, 259 A.2d 551, 553 (1969), the court
apparently used the same line of reasoning with respect to the paint on the window
frame. And though the trial court in Fulford used the law of fixtures to hold that
the venitian blinds were a part of the building, the appellate court, finding that it
was sufficient to burn all of the paint off of the metal window frame, did not reach
the question of whether the blinds were part of the building. In State v. Nielson, 25
Utah 2d 11, 12, 474 P.2d 725, 726 (1970), the court held that an acoustical tile ceiling
is an integral part of the building for the law of arson.
72. State v. Sandy, 25 N.C. 570 (1843), People v. Haggerty, 46 Cal. 355
(1873); Luke v. State, 49 Ala. 30 (1873); State v. Witham, 281 S.W. 32 (Mo. 1926);
State v. Schenk, 100 N.J. Super. 122, 241 A.2d 267 (1968).
73. State v Schenk, 100 N.J. Super. 122, 241 A.2d 267 (1968).
74. People v. Simpson, 50 Cal. 304 (1875); Kehoe v. Commonwealth, 149
Ky. 400, 149 S.W. 818 (1912).
75. State v. Oxendine, 305 N.C. 126, 286 S.E.2d 546 (1982).
76. State v. Nielson, 25 Utah 2d 11, 474 P.2d 725 (1970) (an acoustical tile
ceiling); People v. Oliff, 361 Il1. 237, 197 N.E. 777 (1935) (ceiling, floor, and a wall).
77. State v. Spiegel, 111 Iowa 701, 83 N.W. 722 (1900); Rogers v. State, 102
Tex. Crim. 331, 277 S.W. 664 (1925) (exterior).
78. Fulford v. State, 8 Md. App. 270, 259 A.2d 551 (1969).
79. People v. Butler, 16 Johns. 203 (N. Y. 1819).
80. State v. Spiegel, 11 Iowa 701, 83 N.W. 722 (1900) (interior doors); Crow
v. State, 136 Tenn. 333, 189 S.W. 687 (1916) (exterior door); State v. Pisano, 107
Conn. 630, 141 A. 660 (1928) (threshold and exterior screen door).
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dows,8' exterior walls,8 2 the roof,8 3 the floor of a porch, 4 and, of course,
any portion of the frame of the house. 5
What then was meant by "burning"? The common law required the
actual combustion of a portion of the material of which the dwelling house
was composed. Or to put it another way, there had to be an ignition of the
material by the application of an external heat source.8 6 In the parlance of
the street, some part of the material had to be destroyed or consumed by
fire. 8 7 And in the language of the law, many courts said that a "charring"
of the material was necessary.u "Combustion," "ignition," "destroyed or
consumed by fire," and "charring" were all synonymously used to describe
the common law "burning" requirement. On the other hand, damage from
heat insufficient to cause combusion or ignition (or the synonymous terms)
was not a "burning." Thus, if the material were only discolored by heat,
singed, scorched, or damaged by smoke, there was no arson. 9 But once the
81. Washington v. State, 290 Ala. 344, 276 So. 2d 587 (1973).
82. Commonwealth v. Van Schaack, 16 Mass. 105 (1819); Hinkley v. State,
389 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); State v. Kelso, 617 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981); State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E.2d 325 (1982).
83. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 110 Mass. 403 (1872) (shingles burned in two
places).
84. State v. Witham, 281 S.W. 32 (Mo. 1926).
85. Jones v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 647, 113 S.W.2d 7 (1938) (floor joists);
State v. Caliendo, 136 Me. 169, 4 A.2d 837 (1939) (floor joists).
86. E.g., State v. Taylor, 45 Me. 322, 329 (1858) ("It is not necessary, to
constitute arson, that any part of the building should be consumed. If there is actual
ignition of any part, however small, though the fire immediately go out of itself, the
offence is committed.") (emphasis added); State v. Spiegel, 111 Iowa 701, 704, 83
N.W. 722, 723 (1900) ("The rule of these cases is that if there is actual ignition, and
the fiber of the wood or other combustible material is charred, and thus destroyed,
even in small part, the burning is complete.") (emphasis added).
Ignition, in turn, is the point at which the oxidation produced by the heat source
(fire) becomes self-sustaining (meaning that it will continue rapid oxidation when the
external heat source is removed).
Surely the process of oxidation is one of degree, but the common law drew the
line at ignition.
87. E.g., Graham v. State, 40 Ala. 659 (1867); People v. Haggerty, 46 Cal.
354 (1873); State v. Spiegel, 111 Iowa 701, 83 N.W. 722 (1900); State v. Schwartz,
35 Del. 418, 166 A. 666 (1932).
88. E.g., People v. Oliff, 361 111. 237, 197 N.E. 777 (1935); State v. Schenk,
100 N.J. Super. 122, 241 A.2d 267 (1968); Hinckley v. State, 389 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1965); State v. Nielson, 25 Utah 2d 11, 474 P.2d 725 (1970); State v.
Kelso, 617 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 4th 482, 488-89
(1984) (collecting many of the American cases).
89. E.g., Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 541, 174 Eng. Rep. 626 (1842); Graham
v. State, 40 Ala. 659 (1867); State v. Hall, 93 N.C. 571 (1885); Honey v. State, 112
Tex. Crim. 439, 17 S.W.2d 50 (1929); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 4th 482, 489-90 (1984).
As properly used by the cases, "singed" or "scorched" means damage caused
by the application of heat insufficient to cause "combustion" or "ignition" (or the
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material began to burn, once it was ignited, there was no requirement that
it burn for any substantial period of time. Liability attached the instant the
burning began, and it made no difference whether the fire was immediately
extinguished or went out by itself.9 Nor was it necessary for the material
ever to be ablaze; the only requirement was that it burn - smoldering would
do.9'
Finally, the manner by which the arsonist caused the dwelling to burn
was equally of no importance as long as all of the elements of the crime
were met. Any method of applying heat to the dwelling which caused it to
burn, regardless of how unique or exotic it was, sufficed for arson. 9z Even
an explosive would suffice, so long as the house burned rather than first
being torn apart by the blast.93 And it made no difference whether'the burning
was caused by directly applying the source of heat to the dwelling, or by
more indirect methods. For example, although it was not arson to burn one's
own dwelling house (or any other building not within the curtilage of the
dwelling house of another except, of course, one's own apartment in an
apartment house), if one did so under circumstances which created an ex-
tremely high risk of burning another dwelling house (or another building
within its curtilage) and the adjoining building was burned, it was arson of
the adjoining building,94 provided the act was done with the necessary mens
rea.
other synonymous terms). Because these terms are also frequently used to include
minor "burning" (which was sufficient for arson at common law), they inject am-
biguity into some of the cases. Nevertheless, when the issue is presented, courts
generally adhere to the common law definition.
A person who sets fire to material which forms part of a dwelling house without
burning it (e.g., discoloring, singing, or scorching it, or perhaps producing no damage
at all) would be guilty of attempted arson if the other requirements of that offense
are met.
90. Bennett v. State, 201 Ark. 237, 144 S.W.2d 476 (1940); Mary v. State,
24 Ark. 44 (1862); State v. Schwartz, 35 Del. 418, 166 A. 666 (1932); State v. Morris,
98 N.J.L. 621, 121 A. 290 (1923); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 222; 3 E.
COKE, supra note 10, at 66; 1 W. Hawkins, supra note 10, at 106.
91. Graham v. State, 40 Ala. 659 (1867); People v. Haggerty, 46 Cal. 354
(1873); Woolsey v. State, 30 Tex. App. 343, 17 S.W. 546 (1891).
Thus in State v. Schenk, 100 N.J. Super. 122, 241 A.2d 267 (1968), testimony
that "the floor woodwork was starting to smolder," coupled with evidence that an
investigating officer "found charred debris ... on the floor .... and the baseboard
and the floor were also damaged" was sufficient to prove a burning for a charge of
arson. Id. at 127, 241 A.2d at 269.
92. E.g., Overstreet v. State, 46 Ala. 30 (1871); State v. Lockwood, 24 Del.
(1 Boyce) 28, 74 A. 2 (1909).
93. Nelson v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. 80, 66 S.W.2d 312 (1933); Landers v.
State, 39 Tex. Crim. 671, 47 S.W. 1008 (1898); see also Fannin v. State, 128 Tex.
Crim. 185, 80 S.W.2d 992 (1935) (opinion on rehearing); Johnson v. State, 96 Tex.
Crim. 216, 257 S.W. 551 (1923).
94. People v. Hiltel, 131 Cal. 577, 63 P. 919 (1901); Combs v. Common-
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E. The Mens Rea of Arson: "Maliciously"
"Arson was one of the earliest felonies in which the mental element was
stressed. By Bracton's day it seems to have been well settled that to convict
for arson proof must be had that the burning was with evil design (mala
conscientia); a burning caused by negligence was not arson." 9 But by Coke's
time the mens rea of arson had evolved from the requirement of an evil
design, in the sense of "a motive of malevolence, desire to injure, or general
ungodliness, ' 96 to the enduring common law definition of the mental element
of this offense: a burning which was done "maliciously and voluntarily. 9 7
Coke's terse explanation of the mental element of arson quite clearly assumes
the reader will understand that an intentional burning will suffice for arson.
He thus concentrates on the possibility of committing arson unintentionally:
The law doth sometime imply, that the house was burnt maliciously and
voluntarily. As if one intend to burn the house of A only, and not the house
of B. And yet in burning the house of A, the house of B is burnt; in this
case the burning of the house of B is felony, because it proceeded of the
malicious and voluntary burning of the house of A. And the event shall be
coupled to the cause, which was voluntary, and malicious .... 98
In the preceding paragraph, Lord Coke excluded from arson burnings "done
by mischance, or negligence." 99 Arson could thus be committed intentionally
or unintentionally in Coke's time so long as the arsonist's mental culpability
was more than "negligence." Coke's rationale for unintentional arson was
that the law sometimes implies that it was malicious and voluntary. What
was meant by "implied malice" and when it would be implied were not
explained. If what he meant was malice "implied in law," then liability would
wealth, 93 Ky. 313, 20 S.W. 221 (1892); State v. Hill, 55 Me. 365 (1868); Common-
wealth v. Andrews, 155 Mass. 68, 28 N.E. 1124 (1891) (burning to defraud insurer);
3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 66; 1 W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 106; 1 M. HALE,
supra note 10, at 568; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 221; 2 E. EAST, supra
note 18, at 1019; 4 W. RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 1026; see also Regina v. Price, 9
Car. 6 P. 729, 173 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1841).
95. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 1002 (1932).
96. Id. at 1003.
97. 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 66. The commentators after Coke either
borrowed his description or rephrased it as "maliciously and willfully." See defini-
tions cited supra note 10.
"The malice which is a necessary element in the crime of arson need not ...
take the form of malevolence or ill will ... ." State v. Pisano, 107 Conn. 630, 632,
141 A. 660, 661 (1928); accord Commonwealth v. Lamothe, 343 Mass. 417, 179
N.E.2d 245 (1961).
98. 3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 66.
99. Id.; accord 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 569; 1 HAWKINS, supra note
10, at 106; 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1019; 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at
222; see also Morris v. State, 124 Ala. 44, 27 So. 336 (1899).
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be based upon a felony-arson theory, similar to the common law felony-
murder rule.10 In Coke's example, the burning of B's house was caused by
the arson of A's house. Hence the culprit would be guilty of two counts of
arson; intentional arson of A's house and unintentional arson of B's house,
the conviction for the arson of B's house would be based upon a felony-
arson theory. Certainly, Coke used words which suggested such a theory' 0 ,
On the other hand, he may have meant that malice was implied "in fact"-
the culprit's conduct gave rise to sufficient factual inferences to support a
finding of guilt. Was this the reason he wrote that "the law doth sometime
imply that the house was burnt maliciously or voluntarily"? If this was what
he meant, then there was no felony-arson rule, but liability was imposed on
a yet unarticulated legal theory, a theory based on neither intent nor negli-
gence. How then was a culprit held liable for an unintentional arson?
100. For a general discussion of the common law felony murder rule, see W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 545-61; R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, supra note
2, at 61-72.
101. His emphasis on the voluntary and malicious nature of the burning of
A's house indicates that the initial burning was arson, a felony, and B's house was
burned as a result of this felonious act.
One can also construct a theory of transferred intent from Coke's use of the
term "the event shall be coupled to the cause, which was voluntary, and malicious."
3 E. COKE, supra note 10, at 67.
Indeed, Hawkins writes that:
[I]f one maliciously intending only to burn the house bf A happen thereby
to burn the house of B, it is certain that he may be indicted as having
maliciously burned the house of B, for where a felonious design against one
man misses its aim, and takes effect upon another, it shall have the like
construction as if it had been leveled against him who suffers by it.
I W. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 106. This, of course, is an explanation based upon
the theory of transferred intent.
In a similar vein, Professors Perkins and Boyce read Hale's statement ("But if
A have a malicious intent to burn the house of B and in setting fire to it burns the
house of B and C or the house of B escapes by some accident, and the fire takes in
the house of C and burneth it, then A did not intend to burn the house of C, yet
in law it shall be said the malicious and willful burning of the house of C, and he
may be indicted for the malicious and willful burning of the house of C." (citing the
passage from Lord Coke set forth in the text)) as an application of the doctrine of
transferred intent. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 923. Professors LaFave
and Scott, though not relying upon Coke and Hale, make a similar statement that
this factual situation correctly invokes the doctrine of transferred intent. W. LAFAvE
& A. ScoTr, supra note 19, at 253.
The doctrine of transferred intent is quite frequently an alternate theory in a
fact pattern which raises a wanton and willful disregard theory. These two theories
are not inconsistent and they frequently, though not inevitably, reach the same result.
Be this as it may, it is clear that the so called doctrine of transferred intent is quite
distinct from the common law felony murder rule. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra
note 19, at 243-44 (1972); R. PERKINs & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 921-24. A
discussion of the doctrine of transferred intent is beyond the scope of this paper as
it has nothing to do with the law of arson per quod.
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The answer came with the passage of time. The evolution of the common
law theory of liability for unintentional arson took many years, years in
which great ambiguity and confusion prevailed, a condition that persists
today in many jurisdictions that adhere to the common law.10 2 The first
answer came with the rejection of the "implied-in-law" theory of malice.
The common law courts thus have generally refused to apply a felony-arson
rule. 103 Instead, when clearly faced with the issue of arson liability for an
102. Compare, e.g., Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788 (1979) with
Brown v. State, 39 Md. App. 497, 388 A.2d 130 (1978) (the same case decided by
the Maryland Court of Special Appeal and the Maryland Court of Appeals).
103. Regina v. Faulkner, 13 Cox CC. 550 (1877); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 276.
Occasionally, commentators will suggest that there is a felony-arson rule, but
the cases upon which they rely do not support that position. Perhaps the most
influential was Joel Prentiss Bishop. In his eighth edition he wrote (1) that liability
for arson could be based upon the accidental burning of a house "while endeavoring
to do some other wrong, ... provided the wrong he intends is of sufficient mag-
nitude." 2 J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 9 (8th ed. 1892).
And, (2) "A fortiori, if one intending to burn the house of a particular person
accidentally burns another's, he commits the offense; or doubtless he does in all cases
where his intent is to do an act which is a felony." Id. He relies on Lusk v. State,
64 Miss. 845, 2 So. 256 (1887) for the first statement, and the quote from COKE'S
INSTITUTrEs (see supra text accompanying note 67), together with East's statement (2
E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1019) which essentially repeats Coke's words. As we have
seen, Coke's statement is wonderfully ambiguous, and East's adoption of it adds
nothing. Lusk is simply incorrectly cited by Bishop. The portion of the opinion upon
which he relies referred to the liability of a conspirator for the acts of his co-con-
spirator which are "the natural and probable consequences" of the target offense.
Lusk, 64 Miss. at 850, 2 So. at 257. The statement did not refer to the liability of
a perpetrator for arson. No reported case cites Lusk on the issue of a perpetrator's
liability. Instead they all cite Lusk for the liability of conspirators for the acts of a
co-conspirator. E.g., Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Forman v. State, 220 Miss. 276, 70 So. 2d 848 (1954). Since Bishop offered no
principled argument in favor of a felony-arson rule, and he cites no authority in
support of that doctrine, his statement is entitled to little weight.
Dean Justin Miller also wrote that there was a felony-arson rule in J. MILLER,
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 327 (1934). In addition to Bishop, and the authorities
upon which Bishop relied, he cites one case, Colbert v. State, 125 Wis. 423, 104
N.W. 60 (1905).
In Colbert the defendant intentionally burned building A. The fire spread to
buildings B and C. Convicted of the arson of building C as well, the defendant argued
on appeal that she did not willfully burn building C. The Court replied, "The statute
only requires that the first building shall be maliciously and willfully set on fire and
that by the burning thereof the dwelling of another shall be burned. It is not required
that the malicious intent to burn the dwelling house shall exist." Id. at 431, 104 N.W.
at 64. The court cited no authority. Except for the last sentence, everything that the
court said and did is perfectly consistent with both the implied-in-fact theory and the
felony-arson theory (implied-in-law). Indeed, the last sentence, in context, seems to
mean no more than the defendant does not have to intend to burn each building
actually burned (as long as the burning of the first house sufficiently endangered the
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unintentional burning, the courts have adopted the implied-in-fact malice
theory, a theory which is usually referred to as wantonness or wanton arson.
Wanton arson is committed when a person intentionally does an act
(such as starting a fire or burning a house) under circumstances in which the
act creates a very high risk of burning the dwelling house of another, when
the actor knew of that risk and yet did the risk-taking act despite that
knowledge.1 4 Returning to Coke's example, the metaphor upon which all
thinking about unintentional arson has been based, it is nearly the paradigm
of wanton arson. If we add to Lord Coke's facts the circumstance that the
burning of A's house created a very high danger that other dwellings in the
area would also burn (B's house), and this risk was known to the culprit
when the initial fire was started, we have a perfect case of wanton arson.,"
other houses that were burned as well). Nevertheless, no subsequent reported case
has interpreted Colbert as creating a felony-arson rule.
Finally, CoRPuS JURIS SECUNDUM states that there is a felony-arson rule. The
statement is as follows: "If a person sets fire to or burns a house while engaged in
the commission of a felony, he is guilty of arson, even though he did not intend to
set fire to or destroy the house." 6A C.J.S. Arson § 7, at 224 (1975). Two cases are
cited in support of this statement: Luke v. State, 49 Ala. 30 (1873), and People v.
Fanshaw, 137 N.Y. 68, 32 N.E. 1102 (1893). Luke is an intentional burning case.
The supposed felony-arson rule was not involved in that case. The court quotes from
Bishop in a dictum statement. Fanshaw involved a question of statutory construction:
whether an intent to destroy the building intentionally burned was required for first
degree arson. The court held that it was not. In the course of the opinion the court
cites Bishop ("but it has been said that if a person set fire to or burn a house while
engaged in the commission of a felony, it is arson, though there was no intent to set
the fire or burn the building .... ." Id. at 76, 32 N.E. at 1104) and concludes that
the legislature has rejected Bishop's statement. This case certainly does not support
a felony-arson rule.
It should be noted that in addition to the absence of cases which clearly support
a felony-arson rule (except, perhaps, for Colbert), each of the cases discussed by
these commentators refers only to arson-arson situations (with the exception of Bish-
op's wholly unsupported first statement). Other than Bishop's unsupported statement
about unlawful acts, there is no authority that I can find which even remotely suggests
that any felony other than arson will do. Thus there is not the slightest hint of a
murder-arson rule, or a burglary-arson rule, or a rape-arson rule, etc.. If there was
a special rule for arson, it was not a felony-arson rule, but a rule which stated that
if one commits arson of building A, she will be liable in arson for all other buildings
burned as well. This is a very different statement.
In addition, in each of the arson-arson situations mentioned above, liability can
be based on the implied-in-fact malice theory, the theory of wanton arson discussed
below. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
104. E.g., Isaac's Case, 2 E. EAsr, supra note 18, at 1031; Proberts' Case,
id., at 1030 (dictum); Regina v. Harris, 15 Cox C.C. 75 (1882); State v. Laughlin,
53 N.C. 354 (1861); Fox v. State, 179 Ind. App. 267, 384 N.E.2d 1159 (1979) (dictum);
DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981); R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, supra note 2, at 276-77; 3 TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 270 (14th ed.
1980); see also United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983).
105. See quote supra note 97.
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Perhaps it was because of the need for these additional facts that Lord Coke
said that liability is "sometimes" implied. In any event, wantonness became
the accepted common law theory for imposing arson liability on an actor
who unintentionally burned a dwelling. °6 It should be noted here, however,
that wantonness was not limited to situations in which the fire was started
under circumstances amounting to arson.207 Assuming all of the other ele-
ments of wanton arson were met, all the actor needed to do was perform
an intentional act which created a very high risk of the burning of a dwelling
house. Hence wanton arson might be predicted on the burning of one's own
dwelling house, 08 or the burning of grass on the actor's property, and similar
acts which would not themselves be arson at common law.
Although the mens rea of arson is generally described as "maliciously,"
accompanied by either "willfully" or "voluntarily,' 0 the latter words add
nothing to the concept of "malice." Hence it is entirely accurate to define
arson at common law as the malicious burning of the dwelling house of
another." 0 Of course, since either intentional burnings or wanton burnings
may be subject to legal justification or excuse, the mens rea of arson at
common law would exclude all forms of justification or excuse in the defi-
nition of the malicious state of mind."' To summarize, the mens rea of
arson, "malice", is composed of two distinct mental states:" 2 (I) intentional
burning without justification or excuse;" 3 and (2) wanton burning without
106. See authorities cited supra note 104.
107. In other words, wanton arson is not an arson-arson rule (see supra note
103) cloaked in different language. Neither is it coextensive with the doctrine of
transferred intent discussed supra note 101, for the doctrine of transferred intent
required an act and intent which would, except for the property actually burned,
otherwise quality for arson.
108. Isaac's Case, 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1031; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 10, at 221; 1 M. HALE, supra note 10, at 568;
109. See authorities cited supra note 10. In addition, many of the American
statutes have used similar phrases. United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1 (C.M.A.
1983) (listing the statutes).
110. Malice in the law of arson at common law is exactly the same as malice
in the law of murder. DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981);
accord R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 274.
111. E.g., United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983); State v.
Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 576 P.2d 1383 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); In re Appeal in Pima
County Juvenile Action No. J-37390-1, 116 Ariz. 519, 570 P.2d 206 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977); State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972); State v. White, 288 N.C. 44,
215 S.E.2d 557 (1975).
112. E.g., Lipschitz v. People, 25 Colo. 261, 53 P. 1111 (1898); Kellenbeck v.
State, 10 Md. 431 (1857); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 Mass. 378, 162 N.E. 733
(1928); Tuller v. State, 8 Tex. App. 501 (1880).
113. E.g., People v. Long, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 129 (N.Y. 1849); State v. Pisano,
107 Conn. 630, 141 A. 660 (1928) (malice means deliberately and without justification
or excuse); Dorroh v. State, 229 Miss. 315, 90 So. 2d 653 (1956); Commonwealth v.
Lamothe, 343 Mass. 417, 179 N.E.2d 245 (1961) (same, quoting Pisano); Jillson v.
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justification or excuse. '" 4 Later we will see how the common law notion of
malice for the law of arson has changed in some jurisdictions to accommodate
statutory changes in the law of arson." 5
III. THE EVOLUTION OF ARSON AS AN OFFENSE AGAINST PROPERTY
A. Statutory Development in England
As we have seen, arson at common law protected dwellers from the risk
of being killed or injured by a malicious burning of the dwelling house and
buildings within its curtilage. And to that extent arson protected the dwellers'
possessory property interest in these buildings as well. But the protection of
that property interest was purely incidental to the protection afforded the
dweller. In short, common law arson, like common law burglary, was class-
ified not as a crime against property, but as a special form of crime against
the person, an offense against the habitation of individuals."16 All other
property at common law, whether a nonqualifying building or any other type
of property whatsoever, was protected against injury or destruction from
malicious burnings by the common law offense against property known as
the misdemeanor of malicious mischief."7 But the crime of malicious mischief"8
Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) (semble); State v. White, 291
N.C. 118, 126, 229 S.E.2d 152, 157 (1976) (For a burning to be arson at common
law it had to be "willful and malicious" which meant "voluntarily and without excuse
or justification."); State v. O'Farrell, 355 A.2d 396 (Me. 1976); State v. Nelson, 17
Wash. App. 66, 69, 561 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1977) ("At common law, specific intent
to burn a particular thing or to injure a particular person was unnecessary, it being
sufficient to show thit there was a general malice or intent to burn some structure.");
State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 385, 576 P.2d 1383, 1385 (1978) ('Willfully' means
intentionally as distinguished from accidentally or involuntarily and 'maliciously'
means that state of mind which actuates conduct injurious to others without lawful
reason, cause, or excuse."); People v. Tanner, 95 Cal. App. 3d 948, 955, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 469 (1979) ("It has consistently been held, however, that 'when related to
the crime of arson, the word 'malice' denotes nothing more than a deliberate and
intentional firing of a building ... as contrasted with an accidental or unintentional
ignition thereof; in short, a fire of incendiary origin."' ); State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d
130, 135 (R.I. 1980) ("We adhere ... to the common law mandate that the mental
state for the crime requires only that the defendant intended to do the proscribed act
... ."); Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1983) (semble); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 276-77; 3 Torcia, supra note 104, at 270; see also DeBettencourt v.
State, 48 Md. App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981).
114. The authorities are cited supra note 104.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 574-91.
116. E.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 220; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 246.
117. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at 243; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 282, 405.
118. The misdemeanor of malicious mischief is commonly defined as the ma-
licious destruction of, or damage to, the property of another. E.g., W. CLARK & W.
MARSHALL, supra note 22, at 978; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 405.
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could be perpetrated by any means which caused property to be physically
damaged or destroyed, whether it be by the application of mechanical force,,"9
fire,' 20 or some other mechanism.' 2' Nevertheless, when the means used to
damage or destroy property is fire, there is frequently a very substantial risk
that nearby property will also be involved, and, as Blackstone pointed out
in connection with arson, 2 2 the destruction of property by fire deprives the
community of the further use of the property burned. 2 The question then
arises as to whether the misdemeanor sanction imposed by the law of ma-
licious mischief is an adequate deterrent and a just punishment for this form
of malicious behavior.
Long before the common law of England began to exert its influence
on the law of crimes in the New World, the English Parliament concluded
that a felony sanction was needed to protect certain property, property un-
protected by the law of arson, from being burned. Each offense was a felony
punishable by death. For example, in 1531, nearly a century before Lord
Coke wrote the Institutes, the burning of a barn containing corn or grain
was made a felony.' 24 Seventy years later it was made a capital offense to
willfully and maliciously burn, cause to be burned, or aid, procure, or consent
to the burning of any barn or stack of corn or grain in Cumberland, North-
cumberland, Westmorland, or Durham. 25 In 1670 the nocturnal burning or
destroying of any ricks or stacks of corn, hay or grain, barns or other houses
119. E.g., Funderburk v. State, 75 Miss. 20, 21 So. 658 (1897) (shooting a
bullet through the door of a house); Gill v. State, 85 Ga. App. 584, 69 S.E.2d 804
(1952) (denting the side of a car by throwing a rock against it); State v. Dawson,
272 N.C. 535, 159 S.E.2d 1 (1968) (accord).
120. See authorities cited supra note 117.
121. E.g., State v. Buckman, 8 N.H. 203 (1836) (polluting another's well).
122. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
123. Of course, property can be destroyed by means other than fire. But when
the risk to other property caused by fire is coupled with fire's tendency to destroy
the property (rendering it nearly a complete economic loss to society), in the context
in which the destruction of some forms of property (dwelling houses) is a felony
punishable by death, Parliament's response seems predictable.
124. 23 Hen. 8, ch. 1, § 3 (1531). This act imposed the death penalty without
benefit of clergy (except for persons in holy orders), for willfully burning any barn
containing any grain or corn, or for abetting, procuring, helping, maintaining or
counseling of or to any such offense.
The impact of this act on the doctrine of benefit of clergy is the subject of supra
note 11. And see supra note 50 for speculation that this act may have been the source
of Coke's statement that the burning of a barn containing "corn or hay within it,
the burning is felony, though the barn be not part of a mansion house." 3 E. COKE,
supra note 10, at 67.
Quite clearly this provision of the statute was aimed at the protection of the
subject property. The statute is probably the inspiration for the "barn burning"
statutes widely enacted in the United States in the last century.
125. 43 Eliz. ch. 13, § 2 (1601).
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or buildings or kilns was made a felony, 26 and in 1722, the infamous Wal-
tham Black Act was enacted by Parliament. Under the Waltham Black Act-
it was a capital offense for any person to set fire to any house, barn or
outhouse, to any hovel, cock, mow or stack of corn, straw, hay or wood.'
2
Other legislation followed which made it an arson-like offense to set the
following types of property on fire: "any mine, pit, or delph of coal or
cannel-coal,' ' 29 "mills,"' 30 ships of war, on float or in the process of build-
ing, arsenals, magazines, dock yards, victualing offices or any of the buildings
located therein or belonging thereto,'' and to any ship or vessel whatso-
ever.' In 1803, it became a nonclergyable felony to willfully set on fire,
with the intent to injure or defraud any person, any house, barn granary,
hop-oast, malthouse, stable, coach-house, outhouse, mill, warehouse, or
shop.'3 In 1812 the same punishment was provided for burning or setting
on fire any building, engine or erection used or employed in the carrying on
or conducting of any trade or manufacture.' 3
4
The 1803 Act was extremely important for it marked the first time in
the law of England that it became unlawful, indeed a nonclergyable felony,
to bum one's own house or other described building when done with the
specified purpose in mind. Until then, the statutes noted above had been
read as supplementing the common law crime of arson and, for the most
126. 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 7 (1670).
127. 9 Geo. I, ch. 22. The act is extensively discussed in I L. RADZINOWICZ,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 49-79 (1948).
In the course of that discussion, Sir Leon observed that the Waltham Black Act
greatly influenced subsequent legislation, and "it was directly responsible for the
enactment of a number of capital laws .... It remained in force for a whole century,
despite frequent attempts to abrogate it." Id. at 78.
All of the provisions of the Black Act, except those relating to setting fire to
property and to maliciously shooting at a person, which remained capital offenses,
were replaced in 1823. 4 Geo. 4, Ch. 54 (1823).
128. Despite the use of the language "set fire to," the Black Act, according
to Sir Leon, "did not go beyond the rules laid down by the common law." 1 L.
RADNOwicz, supra note 127, at 69-70 n.62. Thus, there had to be an actual burning
of the subject matter, and the burning had to be maliciously and willfully done. Id.
Quite obviously, however, the Act covered property not protected by the common
law crime of arson.
129. 10 Geo. 2, ch. 32, § 6 (1737).
130. 9 Geo. 3, ch. 29, § 2 (1769).
131. 12 Geo. 3, ch. 24 (1772).
132. 33 Geo. 3, ch. 67, § 5 (1793). This statute extended the provisions of the
1772 act, which applied only to war ships, to include any ship or vessel. In 1799,
Parliament also enacted a statute which made it a non-clergyable felony to set fire
to any of the works of the Port of London or to any vessel lying in the port. 39
Geo. 3, ch. IXIX (1799).
133. 43 Geo. 3, ch. 58 (1803).
134. 52 Geo. 3, ch. 130, § 1 (1812).
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part, the concepts of common law arson were used to interpret those acts.,3
Thus, despite the language of the various enactments, until the 1803 statute
one could burn her own dwelling and the buildings within its curtilage without
committing arson or a related felony offense so long as the fire did not
spread to another's buildings. 36 All of this was changed by the 1803 Act,
provided the dweller burned her house with the intent to injure or defraud
any person.
3 7
Thus by the beginning of the nineteenth century it was a capital felony
in England to maliciously burn a wide variety of property which was un-
protected by the common law crime of arson. Furthermore, unlike common
law arson which was primarily concerned with the safety of the dwellers in
their dwelling houses, these statutory offenses' 3 had as their goal the pro-
tection of property. Though these statutory offenses are not strictly arson,
for that term most appropriately applies to the common law felony, it was
common to refer to all crimes that protected property from injury or damage
by fire or explosion,3 9 as arson, and to think of these offenses collectively
as offenses against property.14' Thus, the English thinking about arson changed
drastically from a special offense against the person (by protecting the hab-
135. See 4 W. RUSSELL, supra note 10, at 1025-55; see also authority cited
supra notes 126-28.
136. E.g., Proberts' Case, 2 E. EAST, supra note 18, at 1030; The King v.
Spalding, I Leach 218, 168 Eng. Rep. 211 (1780); The King v. Breeme, I Leach 220,
168 Eng. Rep. 213 (1780).
137. Sir Leon analyzes the judicial interpretation of many of these enactments
in 1 L. RADziNowicz, supra note 127, at 688-94.
Many of these statutes are also commented upon in 4 W. RUSSELL, supra note
10, at 1025-55.
138. Indeed, most of the various "arson" offenses were consolidated into the
Malicious Damage Act of 1861. 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 97 (1861). But, of course, common
law arson remains a serious felony in every statutory scheme adopted in every common
law jurisdiction, and to that limited extent, arson remains a crime against "the
habitation," a special form of crime protecting the person of the dweller.
In 1971, most of the provisions of the Malicious Damage Act were replaced by
the elegant provisions of the Criminal Damage Act, 1971, ch. 48.
139. Damage or destruction of property by explosion was not within the scope
of arson at common law unless the explosion caused the building to burn. See supra
note 93. The Malicious Damage Act of 1861 covered injury or damage by explosion,
24 & 25 Vict., ch. 97, § 9, but in connection with the explosion offense, the primary
concern was with the safety of persons, unlike the fire provisions. Many American
jurisdictions include explosion with fire in their arson statutes and treat these means
in exactly the same way. See supra notes 317-24 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., 4 W. RUssELL, supra note 10, at 1024-25. Thus Turner, in
KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (19th ed. 1966), writes that "arson was at
common law the only case in which damage to property was a criminal offense."
Id. at 249. The book speaks of "Arson Under Statutes," id. at 250, and the entire
discussion of arson at common law and under the statutes appears in the chapter
dealing with "Offences Against Property." Id. at 237, 249-53.
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itation and buildings within the curtilage) to an offense which principally
protected property. Furthermore, as one would expect, except for the reten-
tion of common law arson, the statutes were drawn in such a way as to give
little or no consideration to the human risks involved with fire, for they
were, after all, now property offenses.
B. The American Arson and Related Statutes at the Middle
of the Twentieth Century.
The English experience with common law arson and its statutory vari-
ations heavily influenced the development of the law of arson in the United
States.' 4' Indeed, many, if not most, American states at one time, with the
exception of the statutory equivalent of common law arson, considered arson
an offense against property; and though there was considerable variation
among the states, the property protected by the arson statutes was frequently
similar to the property protected under the English statutes enacted in the
first half of the nineteenth century. 42
141. In many of the American cases cited in Part I of this paper, English
authority is relied on to resolve the issue pending before the court.
142. See, e.g., the statutes of the following American jurisdictions:
(1) Alaska. In 1913 the territorial laws of Alaska concerning arson consisted of
6 sections. Section 1911 essentially covered common law arson. Section 1912 prohib-
ited the willful and malicious burning of specified public buildings, steamboats, ships,
or vessels, and certain named commercial buildings. All other buildings, together with
certain other specified structures were covered by Section 1913. Section 1915 made
it a felony to willfully and maliciously burn certain named personal property (e.g.,
a pile of lumber, a stack of hay, growing grass, etc.) And Section 1916 prohibited
insurance fraud in connection with "any property whatever" which was insured. Only
the first two sections actually classified the crime as arson, but each of these sections
imposed a felony sanction. None of the sections purported to protect people rather
than property from the risk of injury or destruction of fire. Compiled Laws of the
Territory of Alaska, 1913 (Gov't. Printing Office, 1913) (This statute is reproduced
infra App. C.)
(2) Colorado. In 1883, Colorado had a single arson provision. It was a felony,
and it treated common law arson exactly the same as the burning of any other
building, including other houses, specified public buildings, boats and other water
craft, and bridges (when the bridge was of the value of fifty dollars). The General
Statutes of the State of Colorado, Section 749 (1883). Although the Colorado statute
did not include a wide variety of property, by formally treating common law arson
as the equivalent of the burning of a boat or a bridge (valued at $50.00), Colorado
was principally concerned with the preservation of the property, not the protection
of persons.
(3) Indiana. The Indiana statutes in effect in 1881 were some of the most extreme
examples of the statutory conversion of arson into an offense exclusively against
property. There was a single felony offense which encompassed common law arson
and many of the statutory variants adopted by the English Parliament. There was
also a misdemeanor offense which applied to persons who "maliciously or wantonly"
34
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The arson laws of North Carolina best illustrate how closely some of
the American jurisdictions followed the common law of arson, and the gen-
set fire to any woods, grass, crops and the like (Section 1928). Unlike the territory
of Alaska which essentially preserved common law arson as the most serious arson
offense (see infra App. A) Indiana thus formally treated common law arson in the
same manner as it did the burning of named items of personal property of the value
of $25.00 or more. Although the last sentence of the statute was addressed to the
situation in which a person is killed as a result of the arson, this provision amounted
to nothing more than a restatement of the felony-murder rule which specified that a
killing of any human being during the crime of arson was murder in the first degree.
Revised Statutes of Indiana, § 1904 (1881).
Since the Indiana statute is such a clear illustration of the transformation of
arson into an offense primarily against property, its provisions are worth quoting:
1927. Arson. 26. Whoever willfully and maliciously burns or attempts to
burn any dwelling-house or other building, finished or unfinished, occupied
or unoccupied, whether the building be used or intended for a dwelling-
house or for any other purpose; or any boat, wharf-boat, watercraft, or
vessel, finished or unfinished; or any bridge, whether wholly within this
State or not; or any cord-wood in a pile; or any rick, stack, or shock of
grain, hay, or straw; or any grain not severed from the ground; or any
fence, or whatever material constructed; or the material intended for the
construction of any such hose, building, boat, bridge, or fence; or any tan-
bark, tree, timber, or lumber; or any railroad-car or a water-tank connected
with a railroad-the property so burned being of the value of twenty dollars
or upwards, and being the property of another, or being insured against
loss or damage by fire; and the burning or attempt to burn, being with
intent to prejudice or defraud the insurer,-is guilty of arson, and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the State prison not more than
twenty-one years nor less than one year, and fined not exceeding double the
value of the property destroyed. And should the life of any person be lost
thereby, such offender shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree,
and shall suffer death or be imprisoned in the State prison during life.
1928. Burning woods, prairies, etc. 27. Whoever maliciously or wan-
tonly sets fire to any woods, or to any thing growing or being upon any
prairie or grounds, not his own property; or maliciously or wantonly permits
any fire to pass from his own prairie or grounds, to the injury or destruction
of the property of any other person,-shall be fined not more than one
hundred dollars nor less than five dollars, to which may be added impris-
onment in the county jail not exceeding thirty days.
It should be noted, however, that the Indiana statute was not faithful to the
early nineteenth century English scheme, for common law arson remained an offense
against the person in England under those statutes. Not so in Indiana.
(4) The Territory of Iowa. The arson statute in effect in the Territory of Iowa
in 1839 (the statute was passed at the first session of the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory) was very similar to the Indiana statute and thus provides nearly as good
an example of the treatment of arson as an offense against property. There was a
single section covering arson, and it applied to the willful and malicious burning of
any
dwelling house, malt house, office, shop, barn, stable, storehouse, stillhouse,
factory, mill, pottery, or other building, the property of any other person,
or any church, meeting house, school house, state house, courthouse, work
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eral pattern of the English statutory arson offenses.'4 3 Although other Amer-
house, jail, or other public building, or any boat or other water craft, or
any bridge on any public highway ....
The Statute Laws of the Territory of Iowa, Code of Criminal Jurisprudence, Section
26 (1839).
(5) North Carolina. See infra note 143.
(6) Washington Territory. In 1862, Washington Territory had three sections
relating to unlawful burnings. Section 40 covered not only common law arson, but
nearly the same buildings and vessels specified in Sections 1911, 1912 and 1913 of
the statutes of the Territory of Alaska. Section 41 covered essentially the same per-
sonal property enumerated in Section 1915 of the Alaska territorial statute. Section
42 covered situations in which a dwelling house or building was burned by the owner
and the dwelling house or building of another was burnt or injured by fire. Unlike
Alaska, Washington did not include an insurance fraud section in the chapter dealing
with offenses against property. In addition, under Section 40 "should the death of
any person ensue therefrom, known to be occupying or present on said premises, at
the time such premises are willfully set fire to, the offender, on conviction thereof,
shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree." This provision is a special
application of the felony-murder rule, and had little to do with the crime of arson
other than to make explicit in the arson statute what was already provided for in the
statute defining murder in the first degree in Section 12 of the Territorial Laws.
Statutes of Washington Territory, §§ 12, 40, 41 and 42 (1863).
(7) Wyoming. The 1931 Wyoming arson statute appears to be patterned upon
the Indiana statute. There is some slight difference in the language of the two statutes.
The Wyoming statute embraces more property on the subject of arson than the
Indiana statute, and thus it too represents an extreme example of the treatment of
arson as an offense against property:
32-301. Arson defined. Whoever willfully or maliciously burns or attempts
to burn any dwelling house or other building or any structure, finished or
unfinished, occupied or unoccupied, whether the same be used or intended
for a dwelling house or other purpose; or any bridge, or any cord wood in
a pile; or any rick, stack or shock of grain, hay or straw; or any grain not
severed from the ground; or any fence of whatever material composed; or
the material for the construction of any such house, building, structure,
bridge or fence; or any timer or lumber; or any railroad car or water tank
or windmill; or any sheep wagon or tent, whether used for a dwelling place
or other purpose; or any oil derrick or rig; or any threshing machine, farm
machinery, automobile or motor trucks, implements; the property so burned
being of the value of twenty dollars or upwards, and being the property of
another; or being insured against loss or damage by fire, and the burning
or attempting to burn being with the intent to prejudice or defraud the
insurer, is guilty of arson, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not
more than twenty-one years, and should the life of any person be lost thereby
such offender shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree and shall
suffer death but the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto "with-
out capital punishment," and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qual-
ified as aforesaid the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment
at hard labor, for life.
Wyoming Revised Statutes, 1931, Section 32-301 (1931).
143. There are twelve arson offenses (excluding the typical special attempt
statutes which also appear in the North Carolina scheme) in Article 15 ("Arson and
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ican states continue to conceive of arson as an offense against property' 44
(except, perhaps, for common law arson), North Carolina alone continues
to adhere to the early nineteenth century English model.
45
Other Burnings") of Chapter 14 ("Criminal Law") of the General Statutes of North
Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-1.1, -58 to -63, -66 (1981). Section 14-58 provides
that "there shall be two degrees of arson as defined at the common law." The
distinction between first and second degree arson is made on the basis of whether
the dwelling house was "occupied" or "unoccupied" at the time of the burning.
Sections 14-58.1 and 14-58.2 extended first degree arson to the willful and malicious
burning of any mobile home or manufactured-type house or recreational trailer home
which is likewise occupied at the time of the burning. (As to the need for this statute
to clarify the common law, see supra note 20.) And it is a Class E felony, which
carried a punishment of imprisonment up to 30 years, or a fine or both (§ 14-1.1)
to "wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn or caused to be burned" the following
buildings or structures: (1) specified public buildings owned or occupied by named
governmental entities (§ 14-59); (2) school buildings owned, leased or used by public
or private schools, colleges or educational institutions (§ 14-60); (3) various types of
bridges, "fire-engine" houses, and rescue squad buildings (§ 14-61); (4) uninhabited
houses, church buildings, various private buildings used for specified purposes of any
building, structure or erection used or intended to be used in carrying on any trade
or manufacture, "whether the same or any of them respectively shall then be in the
possession of the offender, or in the possession of any other person" (§ 14-62); (5)
buildings and structures in the process of construction which are intended to be used
for indicated purposes (§ 14-62.1); (6) ginhouses or tobacco houses (§ 14-64); and (7)
a dwelling house set fire to or burned by the dweller (whether that person is the
owner or not) or a building designed or intended as a dwelling house set fire to or
burned by the owner "for a fraudulent purpose." (§ 14-65). In addition, it is a class
H felony (punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years, or a fine or both - as of
January 1, 1985) (§ 14-1.1) to "wantonly and willfully set fire to or burn or cause
to be burned" (1) any boat, barge, ferry or float, without the consent of the owner
thereof, unless the consent is given for an unlawful or fraudulent purpose (§ 14-63);
and (2) specified types of personal property and "personal property of any kind,"
whether insured or not, when done "with intent to injure or prejudice the insurer,
the creditor or the person owning the property, or any other person, whether the
property is that of such person or another." (§ 14-66).
144. See infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.
145. Although the North Carolina courts have recognized that common law
arson (§ 14-58) protects against danger those who might be in the dwelling house
which is burned, State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978); State v. Wyatt,
48 N.C. App. 709, 269 S.E.2d 717 (1980), (quoting Jones 296 N.C. at 77-78, 248
S.E.2d at 860), they have acknowledged that the statutory arson offenses protect
property. See State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982); State v. White,
288 N.C. 44, 215 S.E.2d 557 (1975), vacated on other grounds, 291 N.C. 118, 229
S.E.2d 152 (1976); One might be tempted to argue that the division of common law
arson into two degrees on the basis of whether "the dwelling burned was occupied
at the time of the burning," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58, reflects concern for the
protection of lives rather than the protection of property and thus North Carolina
should be classified as a jurisdiction in which persons as well as property are protected
by the law of arson. But my criteria for deciding whether the offense if designed
primarily to protect persons over property is whether the offense has been expanded
19861
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The apex of arson as a property crime in America was reached in the
middle years of the current century. Drawing upon the English and American
experience with arson as a property offense, in 1948 the National Board of
Fire Underwriters published the "Model Arson Law."' 46 The "Model Arson
Law" was the most influential factor in the development of the law of arson
before the publication of the Model Penal Code.' 47 By the 1960's the arson
law of 44 states was either patterned upon the Model Arson Law or contained
many of its salient features. 48
to protect against risks to people that were not protected at common law. Since North
Carolina gives no more recognition to the person endangering aspects of arson than
did the common law, I classify North Carolina as a property protecting jurisdiction.
146. The "Model Arson Law" was published in 1948. See INSURANCE COM-
MITTEE FOR ARSON CONTROL, CURRENT ARSON ISSUES: A POSITION PAPER 7 (1983)
(not 1953 as is suggested in MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.1 comment
1, at 7 (1980)).
147. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.1 comment 1, at 7 has
been expanded to take into account the risks to people. North Carolina gives no more
recognition to the person endangering aspects of arson than did the common law.
Here North Carolina is classified as a property protecting. jurisdiction.
148. Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 13-2-20 to -2-28 (1977) (repealed 1978)); Alaska
(ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.20.010-.070 (1977) (repealed 1978); Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-231 to -235 (1956) (repealed 1978)); Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-
501 to -507 (1964) (repealed 1975)); California (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 447a-450a (West
1955) (repealed 1979); Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 40-3-1 to -3-4 (1963) (repealed
1971)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-82 to -87 (West 1958) (repealed
1969)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 351-357 (1953) (repealed 1971)); Florida
(FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 806.01-.06 (West 1965) (amended 1974)); Georgia (GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-2208 to -2211 (1933) (amended 1968)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 18-801 to
-804 (1948) (repealed 1971, but re-enacted 1972)); Illinois (Criminal Code of 1961,
tit. Ill, art. 20, § 20-1 (Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964)
(amended 1967, supplemented 1977)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 10-301 to -306
(Burns 1956) (repealed 1976)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.1-.4 (West 1946) (re-
pealed 1978)); Kansas (Act of March 13, 1935, ch. 157, 1935 Kan. Sess. Laws 240
(repealed 1969)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 433.010-.040 (Baldwin 1963)
(repealed 1974)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 151-153, 155-157 (1964)
(repealed 1967)); Maryland (MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 6-10 (1957)); Massachusetts
(MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 1, 2, 5, 5A (West 1959)); Michigan (MICH.
CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.71-.77 (1979)); Minnesota (Act of Apr. 21, 1953, ch. 602, 1953
Minn. Laws 705) (repealed 1976); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-17-1 to -17-
11 (1972)); Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 560.010-.035 (1959) (repealed 1977)); Mon-
tana (MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 94-502 to -506 (Smith 1947) (repealed 1974));
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-504.01 to -504.05 (1943) (repealed 1979)); Nevada
(NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.010-.030 (1963) (amended 1975)); New Hampshire (N.H.
REV, STAT. ANN. §§ 584:1-:5 (1968) (repealed 1971)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:89-1 to :89-4 (1953) (repealed 1979)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-
501 to -505 (1941) (repealed 1963)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-58 to -
67.1 (1981)): North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-34-01 to -34-04 (1960) (repealed
1973)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02-.06 (Page 1953); Oklahoma (OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1401-1404 (West 1983)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.010-
38
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Since the Model Arson Law was prepared by an organization which
represented the fire insurance industry, not surprisingly it treats arson as an
offense against property though it also includes common law arson within
its terms. 49 Hence it does not make explicit reference to the life-endangering
qualities of the burning, nor does its classification scheme implicitly recognize
the importance of such risks. Instead, it divides the burning offenses into
four categories depending upon the type of property burned. Except for the
insurance fraud section, an offense is committed when "Any person ...
willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned" the
property described in the section.' 50 Section 1 covers dwelling houses and
buildings within its curtilage, though the phrase used by the statute refers to
specified buildings "or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or belonging
to or adjoining thereto."'' Thus far Section 1 codifies common law arson,
but the section makes an important modification by adding "whether the
property of himself or another."' 152 This latter phrase casts aside one of the
criteria by which common law arson assured that it was an offense against
the security of the habitation.'53 Section 1 of the Model Arson Law thus
prevents the dweller from burning his or her dwelling house though the person
lives in the house alone. By eliminating the "of another" requirement of
common law arson, the Model Arson Law gives at least equal importance to the
protection of the property interest in the dwelling (e.g., the property rights
of the landlord when the tenant burns a house occupied by the tenant alone).
A violation of Section 1 carries a sentence of imprisonment for not less than
.080 (1965)); Pennsylvania (PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4905-4908 (Purdon 1963)
(repealed 1972)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-4-2 to -4-6 (1956) (amended
1980)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-311 to -314, 16-319 to -320 (Michie
1962) (amended 1982)): South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 22-33-1 to -33-
7 (1967) (amended 1972)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-501 to -506 (1955)
(amended 1967)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-1 to -6-5 (1953) (repealed 1973));
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 502-506 509 (1974)); West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-3-1 to -3-5 (1984)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.02-.05 (West
1958)); Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-121 to -125 (1957) (renumbered as §§ 6-7-101 to
-7-105 (1977) (repealed 1982)).
149. Although there was some variation in the arson statutes of the states listed
supra note 148, all of those states (with the frequent exception of common law arson)
treated arson as an offense against property. In other words, the statutory scheme
did not contain provisions (either explicit or implicit) which sought to protect persons
in situations in which they were not protected by common law arson.
150. Sections 1, 2, 3 of the Model Arson Law are so worded. The "insurance
fire" section, Section 4 of the Model Arson Law, makes it a crime for "any person"
to "willfully and with intent to injure or defraud the insurer set[] fire to or burn[]
or cause[] to be burned" the subject personal property. MODEL ARSON LAw §§ 1-4
(1948) (reprinted infra App. A).
151. Id. § 1.
152. Id.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 468-90.
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two nor more than twenty years. 5 4 Section 2, in nearly comprehensive terms,
prohibits the burning of other buildings not covered by Section 1 and a
"public bridge."' 5 Like Section 1, the subject matter of the section is a
building or bridge "whether the property of himself or of another.' ' 56 A
violation of Section 2 is punishable by imprisonment from not less than one
nor more than ten years.'- Section 3 prohibits the burning of specified per-
sonal property "or any other personal property not herein specifically named"
when it is of the value of "twenty-five dollars or more and the property, in
whole or in part, of another person." '" A violation of Section 3 is punishable
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than three years.'5 9 Finally,
Section 4 punishes any person who "willfully and with intent to injure or
defraud the insurer" sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned specified
classes of personal property and "personal property of any kind, whether
the property of himself or another, which is insured against loss or damage
by fire."'16 A violation of Section 4 is punishable by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than five years.' 6'
The Model Arson Law thus prohibits (a) the burning of all buildings or
any public bridge, whether the property of the arsonist or another, (b) the
burning of any personal property of the value of $25 or more and the
property, in whole or in part, of another, and (c) the burning of all insured
personal property, whether it is the property of the arsonist or another, when
done with the intent to injure or defraud the insurer.
Compared to the common law offense, the Model Arson Law was similar
and different in the following ways:
1. It apparently retains the common law mens rea requirement for all
arson except the insurance fraud offense. 62
2. It arguably also retains the common law notion of burning. 63
154. MODEL ARSON LAW § 1.
155. Id. § 2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 3.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 4. The Model Arson Law, as do many of the contemporary statutes,
also classified persons who aid, counsel or procure the prohibited burning as principals
rather than as accessories before the fact. It also contained a special attempt provision
which provides, in principal part, that a person who prepares the subject property
for burning is guilty of attempted arson. Id. § 5. Similar provisions are common in
contemporary arson legislation. A discussion of the law of parties and the law of
attempt pertaining to arson is beyond the scope of this paper.
161. Id. § 4.
162. Id. §§ 1-3. Problems with the mens rea requirement under the Model
Arson Law and similar statutes are discussed infra text accompanying notes 574-91.
163. Id. 88 1-4. For a discussion of the meaning of the terms "set fire to or
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3. It greatly expands the subject matter of arson from dwelling houses
and buildings within the curtilage to all buildings (regardless of the property
interest the arsonist may have in the building) and all personal property of
another valued at $25 or more;"61 and with reference to the insurance fraud
offense, any insured personal property.6 5 It contains a provision relating to
insurance fraud.' 66
4. It abolishes the common law "of another" requirement for dwelling
house and buildings within the curtilage.' 67 And while it does not use that
concept for other buildings, 68 it is used in modified form in the general
personal property provision. 69 The insurance fraud section, of course, abol-
ishes the "of another" requirement as well.' 70
5. It divides the arson offenses into four categories for the purpose of
assessing different punishments (a term of years) applicable to each category
whereas common law arson was not divided into different categories. All
arson was thus punishable by death at common law.' 7'
6. Finally, while common law arson protected dwellers from the human
risks associated with fire, the Model Arson Law is primarily designed to
protect property. Hence it makes no explicit reference to life-endangering
circumstances and, except for the preservation of the common law offense,
its architecture does not implicitly recognize the importance of such human
risks. Instead, arson is graded in severity according to the type of property
burned.
IV. THE MODERN SYNTHESIS: ARSON AS AN OFFENSE
AGAINST PERSONS AND PROPERTY
A. Developments before the Model Penal Code
During the middle years of the current century not all American juris-
dictions adopted the prevalent view that arson was essentially and, except
for common law arson, only an offense against property. A small minority
164. MODEL ARSON LAW §§ 1-3.
165. Id. § 4.
166. Id.
167. Id. § 1.
168. Id. § 2.
169. Id. § 3. It is modified by providing that the subject matter is property,
in whole or in part of another person. This would mean that an automobile which
is subject to a security interest could be the subject of arson under the statute. See
People ex rel. Van Meveren v. District Court, 619 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1980) (en banc).
170. MODEL ARSON LAW § 4.
171. Id. §§ 1-4.
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of states, six in number, 172 remained, in varying degrees, more faithful to
the common law's conception of arson as an offense which protected people
(albeit a small class of people) from the risk of death or injury by fire. 7 1 In
each of these states, in addition to protecting property (as was done in the
great majority of American jurisdictions) the arson laws expanded the class
of people protected against the risk to life or limb caused by an unlawful
burning of property beyond that afforded by the common law. In other
words, they extended the common law's protection to those who would not
have been so protected by the common law offense and by so doing they
furthered the concept of arson as a crime designed to protect people while
also adopting the majority's conception of arson as a property offense.' 74 In
172. The states were Hawaii, Louisiana, New York, Texas, Virginia and Wash-
ington. The law of each of these states is discussed infra text accompanying notes
175-88.
173. The small class of people designed to be protected by common law arson,
of course, were the inhabitants of a dwelling house.
174. The property protected by the arson statutes of these jurisdictions was
similar to the classes of property protected in the majority of American states. For
example, in 1955 the statutes of Hawaii divided the "burning offenses" into four
categories. First and second degree arson dealt with common law arson, that portion
of the common law offense which was committed in the nighttime (which implicitly
suggests that there is an increased danger to persons asleep in the dwelling house at
night for the fire may spread before protective action can be taken) and when "there
is at the time of the burning any occupant or inmate" in the dwelling house (an
implicit requirement which more closely assures that people may actually be at risk
by the fire). First degree arson was punishable by life imprisonment with or without
the possibility ofparole. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 263-2, -3 (1955) (repealed 1972) (1972
Hawaii Sess. Laws ch. 9, § 1.) Second degree arson was all other common law arson
and was punishable by imprisonment for life or for any number of years. HAWAn
REv. STAT. § 263-4 (1955). Although first and second degree arson in Hawaii, taken
together, simply cover common law arson, the division of that offense into two
degrees depending upon the implicit risk demonstrates this state's concern for the
protection of people. But it is in the "malicious burning" offense (an offense which
is not called arson, but differs only in the subject matter of the crime) where the
concern for the personal safety of persons other than the inhabitants of dwelling
houses was extended beyond the scope of the common law. A person who burned
a thing, whether that of the offender or of another person, with intent to
injure another, or without any legal or justifiable motive or object, and with
a reckless disregard of the life, or personal safety, property, or legal rights,
or interests of another, where the same are obviously, immediately and
imminently endangered by the burning
was guilty of malicious burning. Id. § 263-5 (emphasis added). In turn, the malicious
burning offense was divided into three degrees. A nighttime burning of any building,
vessel or structure whatsoever," or its contents,
or any portion thereof, whether partly or wholly his own or that of another,
by the burning of which another might be injured, where the building, vessel
or structure with the contents of the building, vessel or structure is of the
value of $1,000 or more, is guilty of malicious burning in the first degree,
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these jurisdictions arson was a more complex crime than in the majority of
American states. These minority states synthesized the two views of arson,
the common law concern for personal safety and the statutory concern for
property, into a new offense which protected both persons and property in
various circumstances. Arson protected against expanded human risks and
property risks caused by the unlawful burning of property in various cir-
cumstances. And as we shall see later, this view prevails in most American
states today.
Before examining those these states that expanded the protection of
people from the risks of injury or death by their arson statutes, it is worth
summarizing how the common law protected people from the hazards of
unlawful burnings. The common law did not use criteria which explicitly
referred to life or limb endangering circumstances as an element of the crime.
For example, the common law did not explicitly prohibit unlawful burnings
in situations in which it was foreseeable that human life might be endangered.
Instead, the danger to the inhabitants of dwelling houses was implicit in the
common law's definitions of "dwelling house" and "of another." These two
elements generally worked in tandem to assure that arson protected the in-
habitants of a place of human habitation from the risks associated with
burning the building.
Rather than using implicit criteria alone to extend the protection of the
common law offense, each of the six minority jurisdictions (in varying de-
grees) relied upon explicit criteria as well. Hawaii expanded the scope of
human protection by criminalizing a malicious burning of any building, vessel
or structure, or its contents, whether wholly or partially owned by the arsonist
or another, when "by the burning of which another might be injured."'75
Louisiana's statute, which was a model of simplicity, punished as aggravated
arson the intentional setting fire to "any structure, water craft, or moveable,
and shall be imprisoned for life at hard labor, or any number of years.
Id. § 263-7 (emphasis added).
A daytime burning under the same circumstances, or when the value of the
building, vessel or structure together with its contents valued at between $500 and
$1,000, was second degree malicious burning. Id. § 263-8. Third degree malicious
burning was a burning which would have been either first or second degree except
the total value of the property was less than $500, or where certain other property
was burned when the burning did not endanger another person. Third degree malicious
burning was punishable by fine or imprisonment at hard labor for not more than
five years. Id. § 263-9. The fourth burning offense, which was divided into degrees,
was an insurance fraud provision. Id. § 263-10.
The Hawaii statutes thus covered nearly all property protected in majority view
jurisdictions and, in addition, expanded the scope of the class of people protected
far beyond that provided by the common law offense (essentially, people endangered
by the burning of any "building, vessel, or structure or its contents). In addition,
see infra text accompanying note 175.
175. Id. §§ 263-7 to -8.
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whereby it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered." 76 A second
offense, called simple arson, prohibited the intentional setting fire to "any
property of another, without the consent of the owner" (unless the burning
constituted aggravated arson). 77 New York divided arson into three de-
grees. 7 8 What would have been arson at common law was arson in the first
or second degree depending upon the time of the burning and the presence
of a human being in the dwelling when it was burned. If the burning was
in the nighttime and there was a person in the dwelling when it was burned,
it was first degree arson, otherwise it was arson in the second degree. 79 But
New York also sought to protect persons from the risks of fire who were
not in dwelling houses by providing that it was arson in the first degree to
willfully burn or set on fire, in the nighttime "a car, vessel, or other vehicle,
or a structure or building other than a dwelling house, wherein to the knowl-
edge of the offender, there is, at the time a human being." If the burning
occurred in the daytime or if the property in question was ordinarily occupied
at night by a human being, although no human being was present when it
was burned, it was second degree arson.'80 In Texas arson was "the willful
burning of any house." '' 8' Owners were generally permitted to burn their
house except when the house was within a town or city, "or when there is
176. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51 (West 1986). Section 14:51 also applied to
intentional damage by explosion, and aggravated arson was punishable by impris-
onment at hard labor for not less than six nor more than twenty years. Id.
177. Id. § 14:52. "In aggravated arson, danger to human life is the essential
element, whereas in simple arson it is damage to property. The usual enumerations,
classifications and definitions have been curtailed. Distinctions between dwellings and
non-dwellings, night and day, and movable and immovable property have been elim-
inated." Id. (reporter's comment); accord Morrow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of
1942-Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17 TUL. L. REv. 1, 13, 20(1942). Not surprisingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court has so held. State v. Murphy,
214 La. 600, 38 So. 2d 254 (1948).
In addition, arson with intent to defraud was prohibited by LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:53.
178. N.Y. PENAL LAW OF 1909 §§ 220-24 (McKinney 1944).
179. Id. §§ 220-21.
180. Id. Burning to prejudice or defraud an insurance company was also second
degree arson, as well the nocturnal burning of an uninhabited building adjoining or
within the curtilage of an inhabited building in which there was a person present. (It
is not clear whether this provision did more than restate the common law curtilage
rule varied by the time of the burning and the presence of a person in the building
when it was burned. If either of these two factors were missing, it was third degree
arson.) Id. §§ 222-23. The burning of any other "vessel, car, or other erection" which
was not arson in the first or second degree, or the burning of any personal property
of another of the value of $25.00 or more was also arson in the third degree. Id. §
223.
181. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1304 (Vernon 1953). A house was defined
as "any building, edifice, or structure enclosed with walls and covered whatever may
be in the material used for building." Id. art. 1305.
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apparent danger by reason of the burning thereof, that the life or person of
some individual . . . will be endangered."'' 12 Like most American jurisdic-
tions, Texas also extended arson (called "other willful burning") to cover a
wide variety of property. 8 3
In Washington it was first degree arson to burn "or set on fire in the
nighttime the dwelling house of another, or any building in which there shall
be at the time a human being,"'' 4 or "to set any fire manifestly dangerous
to any human life."'"5 The Washington statues also expanded the subject
matter of arson to protect property unprotected by the common law of-
fense. 8 6 Finally, although the Virginia statutes protected persons from fire
risks who were not protected by common law arson, this expanded protection
was achieved by means somewhat less explicitly related to life or limb en-
dangering circumstances than the criteria used in the other five minority
jurisdictions. Arson was divided into three levels of severity. The criteria
used to distinguish among these three categories were (1) the type of property
burned (e.g., any dwelling house or house trailer, any hotel, asylum, or other
house in which persons usually dwell or lodge, and any railroad car, boat
or vessel, or river craft in which persons usually dwell or lodge, or any jail
or prison as opposed to other specified property); (2) the time of the burning
(nighttime as opposed to daytime); and (3) whether there was a person ac-
tually present in the property when it was burned.'18 Virginia also followed
the English legislative developments of the nineteenth century and expanded
arson to protect a wide variety of property as well.' 8
Thus by the middle of the Twentieth Century all American states used
the crime of arson to protect property, whereas the common law offense
protected only the dwelling house and buildings within its curtilage purely
as a consequence of the protection afforded the dweller. And though all
American states protected against essentially the same human risks covered
182. Id. art. 1312. There were other exceptions as well which are not pertinent
to this inquiry. This exception expanded the common law's protection because (1)
one could burn her own dwelling house at common law without felony liability, even
if it endangered the life or person of someone as long as the dwelling house of another
was not burned (or a building within the curtilage); and (2) it expanded the subject
matter so that the burning of any building, not just dwelling houses, could invoke
liability under these circumstances.
183. E.g., Article 1318 (burning buildings other than houses, hay, grain, lumber
and the like of another); Article 1319 (ships, vessels and boats in which another has
an interest); Article 1320 (bridges); Article 1321 (a woodland or prairie of another);
Article 1321a (woods, forest, cut over, brush, range or grassland belonging to an-
other); Article 1322 (insured personal property). Id. arts. 1318-22.
184. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.09.010(1) (1961).
185. Id. § 9.09.010(2).
186. Id. §§ 9.09.020, .050.




Poulos: Poulos: Metamorphosis of the Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
by common law arson, six states expanded the scope of the arson offense
to protect persons other than the occupants of a dwelling house or of a
building within its curtilage. In these six states, arson was an offense against
both persons and property, but in the remaining forty-four arson was a crime
against the habitation and property alone. This was the context in which the
Model Penal Code was drafted and finally published. 8 9
B. The Model Penal Code
The fire provisions of the Model Penal Code were patterned upon the
minority view, the view that statutory arson should protect people from the
risk of death or injury beyond that afforded by common law arson. Indeed,
we are told that the drafters of the Code selected "a course intermediate
between the New York and Louisiana approaches" in the drafting of the Model
Penal Code offense. 19° But unlike that minority, which also protected various
types of property from damage or destruction by the felony sanction of sta-
tutory arson, 19' the Model Penal Code treats the destruction or damage of the
tangible property of another which does not implicitly or explicitly endanger
people as a felony (called criminal mischief) only if the actor purposely causes
pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000.00, or a substantial interruption or impair-
ment of specified public services. 92 The destruction or damage of all other
tangible property of another by fire is a misdemeanor under the Code similar
to the common law misdemeanor of malicious mischief. 93 To the extent that
the Code protects property by the misdemeanor sanction, the Code more
closely resembles the common law scheme than the statutory plans then existing
in Hawaii, Louisiana, New York, Texas, Washington and Virginia (the mi-
nority view states), though they are all deeply rooted in the rationale of com-
mon law arson.
There are three felony fire provisions of the Model Penal Code,' 94 although
only the most egregious offense is called. "arson."' 95 The other two are known
189. Section 220.1 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code was
initially considered at the Institute's May 1960 meeting. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 431-46
(1960). It was approved at that meeting, id. at 446, and again as part of the Proposed
Official Draft at the Institute's May 1962 meeting. A.L.I. PROCEEDINOS 226-27 (1962).
190. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.1 comment 2, at 9.
191. See supra text accompanying note 174.
192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(2) (1962).
193. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.3 comment 1, at 41 ("this
offense is derived from the common law misdemeanor of malicious mischief").
194. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 220.1(1) (a felony of the second degree), 220.1(2)
(a felony of the third degree), 220.3(1)(a), (2).
195. Id. § 220.1(1).
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as "reckless burning or exploding,"' 96 and "criminal mischief."' 97 "Arson"
and "reckless burning" occur only when the fire (or explosion) (1) is ignited
for the purpose of destroying a "building or occupied structure of another;"
(2) is ignited for the purpose of destroying or damaging any property, whether
his own or another's, to collect insurance for such loss (but it is an affirmative
defense that "the actor's conduct did not recklessly endanger any building or
occupied structure of another or place any other person in danger of death or
bodily injury"); 98 or (3) places another person in danger of death or bodily
injury, or which places a building or occupied structure of another in danger
of damage or destruction regardless of where the fire is started.199 In view of
the affirmative defense to the insurance fraud-arson offense, "arson" and
"reckless burning" achieve their goal of protecting persons by limiting the
object of the fire to either a building or occupied structure of another, or by
seeking to prevent fires which are proved to endanger such buildings or oc-
cupied structures, or the life or limb of another person.
The "building or occupied structure" criteria, like the common law analog
- the definition of "dwelling house," is based on the belief that there is a
substantial probability that these structure will be occupied at the time of the
fire and thus life and limb will thereby be endangered. 20 In addition, extraor-
dinary rescue efforts may well be undertaken when the fire endangers a place
where people might be present.20' There are, of course, equivalent risks at-
tendant upon any fire though the probability that the risk will materialize into
actual death or bodily injury is lower with other categories of property. Un-
willing to use the second degree felony sanction to suppress or punish such
low risk behavior, the line was drawn between buildings or occupied structures
and all other types of tangible property. 2°2 There was an additional reason for
drawing this line; it also functioned to protect "specially cherished property"
as opposed to all property. 23 On the other hand, since the essence of the
offenses of "arson" and "reckless burning" under the Code is the suppression
of and punishment for such risk taking behavior, 2°4 the Code also makes it a
felony to start a fire (with the requisite mens rea) which endangers the life or
limb of another person or endangers a building or occupied structure of an-
196. Id. § 220.1(2). Today most American jurisdictions use the law of arson
to protect against risks associated with the burning or exploding of certain property.
See infra text accompanying notes 317-24. The Model Penal Code follows the same
approach. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1).
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3(1)(a), (2).
198. Id. § 220.1(1)(a)-(b).
199. Id. § 220.1(2)(a)-(b).
200. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.1 comment 5, at 18-19.
201. Id. at 19.
202. Id. comment 2, at 9-10.
203. Id. comment 5, at 18-19. The common law definition of dwelling house
functioned in essentially the same way.
204. See id. Part II §§ 220.1-230.5, at 1.
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other. 05 Here the criteria is explicit rather than implicit. And with this explicit
criteria the fire may be started on any property whether the actor's or not.
Of course, the fire must actually endanger people or the specified property to
suffice.
Quite obviously the Model Penal Code provisions extend personal pro-
tection from the risks associated with fire well beyond the common law offense.
This was achieved by the use of an expanded definition of the object of the
fire (a building or occupied structure as opposed to a dwelling house), and by
criminalizing the starting of any fire which recklessly endangers another person
or a building or occupied structure. On the other hand, it differed from the
arson laws of most American states which were in force at the time the Code
was promulgated in the following respects.
(I) The principal purpose of the crimes of "arson" and "reckless burning"
under the Code is to protect people from the risk of death or bodily injury
caused by fire, whereas the majority of American states did not materially
expand such personal protection beyond that afforded by common law arson.206
The six minority view states did expand such personal protection but not to
the same extent as did the Model Penal Code's provisions. 20
- (2) The burning of property which was not a building or occupied structure
and which did not recklessly endanger the life or limb of another person or
a building or occupied structure is a misdemeanor under the Code called
"criminal mischief." This offense is similar to the misdemeanor of malicious
mischief at common law, with two narrow exceptions: when the actor purposely
causes pecuniary loss in excess of $5,000.00, or the fire (or explosion) causes
a substantial interruption of specified public services. If either of these excep-
tions is present, the offense is a felony of the third degree (the same degree
of felony as "reckless burning" under the Code). Otherwise it is a misde-
meanor, petty misdemeanor or infraction depending upon other circumstan-
ces.0 The offense of "criminal mischief," like malicious mischief at common
law,0 is not limited to damaging tangible property of another by fire. Other
means will do as well. 210 All American states at the time the Code was pro-
mulgated protected a wide range of property with their arson laws and related
felony offenses. In the majority of states arson was a crime against the hab-
itation and against property. 2t' In the minority of states, arson was a crime
against persons and property,12 but, like the majority, the arson laws and
related felony offenses which had as their goal the protection of property also
205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 146-61.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 172-88.
208. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 68, 117-21.
210. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 146-61.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 172-88.
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protected a wide range of property. Not so with the Model Penal Code.
(3) The "arson" and "reckless burning" provisions of the Model Penal
Code abandon the common law conception of arson as requiring that the
subject matter of the offense be actually burned.2 13 Instead, under the Code
"arson" or "reckless burning" is committed when a fire is started with the
requisite mens rea. The Code thus makes "arson" and "reckless burning"
into a type of inchoate offense which would have been punishable at common
law as an attempt, which was a misdemeanor. 2 4 No American state treated
arson and its related crimes as a type of inchoate offense at the time the Code
was published. Instead, the common law requirement of a "burning" was used
in the vast majority of states.2 5 The principal conduct prohibited by the modern
arson statutes and the Model Penal Code is discussed in Section V below. 2'6
(4) Finally, the mens rea of "arson" and "reckless burning" under the
Code substantially differs from the common law's requirement of malice. And
the arson and related laws of the great majority of states at the time the Code
was published used, for the most part, the common law mens rea requirement
of malice, although there was some variation in the wording of the statutes.217
The mens rea requirement of arson and the related felony offenses in the
modern statutes and the Model Penal Code is discussed in section V below.2 8
C. The Modern Synthesis After the Publication of the Code
One of the principal purposes for the Model Penal Code project was to
stimulate the systematic re-examination of the substantive criminal law in the
United States. 2 9 The Code has been "stunningly successful" in accomplishing
this goal.22 Although no American state has adopted the Model Penal Code's
provisions on arson, reckless burning, and criminal mischief, the procesg of
rethinking the substantive criminal law which the Code fostered has resulted
in a dramatic change in the arson statutes between mid-century and the close
of the 1984 legislative sessions in the states. What was the minority position
is quite clearly the majority position today, for forty-one American states have
213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)-(2); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMEN-
TARES § 220.1 comment 1, at 9 & comment 3, at 14-15.
214. See supra note 213.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 146-61; infra text accompanying notes
276-94; infra Appendix A.
216. See infra text beginning at note 278.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 95-115; supra text accompanying notes
146-61; infra text accompanying notes 574-91.
218. See infra text beginning at note 571.
219. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1097
(1952).
220. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler's Predecessors, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1098, 1140 (1978).
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now expanded the personal protection of their arson statutes well beyond that
afforded by the common law while at the same time (unlike the Model Penal
Code provisions) they generally also protect a wide range of property. 221 Con-
221. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-41 to -7-43 (1982 & Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. §§
11.46.400, .410 (1978); Aiuz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1703 to -1704 (Supp. 1985); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902 to -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451-452
(West Supp. 1986); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-4-102 to -4-105 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 53a-111 to -114 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 801-803 (1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1401 to -1403
(1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to -821 (1976); Criminal Code of 1961, tit.
III, art. 20, §§ 20-1 (Arson), 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§
20-1, 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 712.1-.3 (arson in the third degree, the residuary arson
offense in Iowa, is an aggravated misdemeanor, § 712.4) (West 1979 & Supp 1986);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3718 to -3719 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 513.020-.060 (1985);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51-:53 (West 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.561-.563, .576 (West Supp.
1985); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 569.040-.055 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-6-102 to -
6-103 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-502 to -505 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.010-
.030 (1985). Though the Nevada arson statutes are patterned upon the Model Arson
Law, amendments have extended the protection to persons, though modestly, beyond
that afforded by the Model Arson Law. Accordingly, Nevada is included with these
states for this purpose though elsewhere in this paper Nevada remains classified as
a Model Arson Law state. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:17-l (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-17-5 to -17-6 (1984); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 150.00-.20 (Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21-01 to -21-02 (1985);
Onto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02-.03 (Page Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1401 (West 1983). Oklahoma, like Nevada, adopted the Model Arson Law and then
amended the arson provisions to extend the personal protection of its arson statutes
beyond that afforded by the Model Arson Law. Accordingly, Oklahoma is included
in this list of states. Nevertheless, because of its basic adherence to the provisions of
the Model Arson Law, Oklahoma is also classified as a Model Arson Law State
elsewhere in this paper. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.315, .325 (1985); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. § 3301 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-4-2 to -4-7 (Supp.
1985). Rhode Island also has a misdemeanor offense which is called "Arson-Seventh
degree." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-8 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-110, -125, -130,
-140, -150 (a felony for a second offense), -170 (a felony/misdemeanor), -190 (Law.
Co-op. 1985). South Carolina adopted most of the provisions of the Model Arson
Law, along with a number of other unique provisions. Like Nevada and Oklahoma,
South Carolina has, however, extended the personal protection of its arson statutes
well beyond that afforded by the Model Law. Nevertheless, since it yet maintains
many of the salient features of the Model Law, South Carolina is classified with the
Model Arson Law states elsewhere in this paper. S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 22-33-
1 to -33-4, -33-10 (1979 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-201 to -3-206
(1982). Tennessee adopted the Model Arson Law. Although Tennessee still uses many
of the salient features of that Model Law, it has been substantially altered by amend-
ments and supplemented with more modern provisions. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-102 to -6-103 (1978); VA. CODE
§§ 18.2-77 to -82, -86 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.48.020-.48.040, .48.060
(West 1977 & Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-101 to -3-103 (1983). Wyoming also
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versely, at the midpoint of the current century, forty-four states had either
adopted the Model Arson Law or had statutes which contained most of its
salient provisions.' By 1984, only eight states remained fully committed to
the principles set forth in the Model Arson Law. These states are Idaho, 2 3
Maryland,2 4 Massachusetts,m Michigan, 226 Mississippi, 227 North Carolina, 28
Vermont,229 and West Virginia. 0 In addition, although not apparently pat-
terned upon the Model Arson Law, the arson statutes of Wisconsin similarily
do not extend the personal protection of their arson offenses beyond that
afforded by the common law, while extending protection from fire damage to
any building of another or any property of another over the value of $100,
and any property of another from damage by explosion regardless of its value."'
Before analyzing the general contours of the modern statutory law of
arson, it is worth noting how the new American majority of states expanded
personal protection beyond that afforded by the common law. Three of the
forty-one states, Arizona, 2 2 Nevada,233 and Oklahoma,2 3 4 do so by defining
has a misdemeanor provision which is known as fourth degree arson. Id. § 6-3-104.
These forty-one states also include the six states which comprised the minority at
mid-century. These six minority states (Hawaii, Louisiana, New York, Texas, Virginia
and Washington) adhere to this position today, although there have been amendments
to their statutes in some instances.
222. See supra note 148.
223. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-801 to -804 (1979).
224. MD. Cnmi. LAw CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 6-11 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
225. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266, §§ 1 to 13A (1970).
226. MICH. CoAip. LAws §§ 28.266, .275 (1981).
227. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-17-1 to -13 (1973).
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-58 to -67.1 (1981). Although North Carolina
adheres more closely to the common law as modified by the English legislation of
the Nineteenth Century than any other American jurisdiction (see supra text accom-
panying note 143), its legislative scheme is sufficiently similar to the Model Arson
Law as a pattern for their arson legislation. Indeed, the Model Arson Law itself was
patterned upon the English statutory development of arson in the Nineteenth Century
and the statutes of North Carolina were faithful to the English tradition.
229. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 501-509 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
230. W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3-1 to -8 (1984).
231. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.02-.03 (West 1982). The statutes also contain
insurance fraud provisions. Id. §§ 943.02(1)(b), .04. The difference in the treatment
of the means used to damage personal property, fire or explosion, arguably does
reflect a concern for personal risks, but not so in connection with fire.
232. AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1704(A) (Supp. 1985).
233. NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 205.010 (1985). First degree arson is committed
when a person "willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns. .. any dwelling house
or other structure, whether occupied or vacant, or any mobile home or other personal
property which is occupied by one or more persons ... ." Id. (emphasis added).
234. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1401 (West 1983) ("Any person who willfully
and maliciously sets fire to or burns or by the use of any explosive device or substance
destroys ... any building or structure or contents thereof, inhabited or occupied by
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the subject matter of the offense in such a way as to implicitly include risks
to people. For example, Arizona's most serious arson offense is committed
when a person "intentionally and unlawfully" damages "an occupied structure
by knowingly causing a fire or explosion. ' 235 In turn, an occupied structure
is defined as "any structure ... in which one or more human beings either
is or is likely to be present or so near as to be in equivalent danger at the
time the fire or explosion occurs. The term includes any dwelling house, whether
occupied, unoccupied or vacant. ' 2 6 Furthermore, the Arizona statute gives a
broad definition to the term "structure. ' 2 7
A second group of states, twelve in number, extend the scope of personal
protection afforded by their arson laws with the use of criteria which more
explicitly define person endangering circumstances associated with the fire, but
do not expand the subject matter of the person protecting provisions beyond
the subject matter of the property protecting provisions.2 8 Although there is
235. AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1704 (West Supp. 1985).
236. Id.
237. "'Structure' means any building, object, vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, or
place with sides and a floor, separately securable from any other structure attached
to it and used for lodging, business, transportation, recreation or storage." Id. § 13-
1701(4).
The South Dakota statute comes very close to the approach used by Arizona,
Nevada, and Oklahoma. It is first degree arson in South Dakota to intentionally set
fire to or burn "any occupied structure, knowing the same to be occupied at the
time .... ." S.D. Comop. LAws ANN. § 22-33-1 (1979) (emphasis added). Had the
italicized language been omitted, the South Dakota statute would have been included
here. But I have treated the italicized language as requiring the structure to be actually
occupied at the time it is burned, and this additional requirement aligns South Dakota
with the majority discussed below. See infra notes 245, 249, 256, and accompanying
text.
238. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-41 to -7-43 (1982 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 801-803 (1979); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to -821 (1976); Criminal
Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, §§ 20-1 (Arson), 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 20-1, 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & 1986); IowA CODE §§ 712.1-.3
(1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3718 to -3719 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 513-020 to
-060 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:15-:53 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-
110, -125, -130, -140, -150, -170, -190, -200 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-3-201 to -3-206 (1982).
In addition, the provisions of the Alaska arson statutes fall into this same pattern
if the major portion of the property protecting provisions in that state are taken into
consideration. Alaska protects only "buildings" as property by the law of arson.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.400, .410 (1983). Other property is protected from damage
from the use of "widely dangerous means" or by any means (including fire) by the
felony provisions of the criminal mischief statutes. Id. §§ 11.46.480 ("criminal mis-
chief in the first degree"); 11.46.482 ("criminal mischief in the second degree"). In
this respect, Alaska falls somewhere in between Hawaii and the remaining eleven
states cited in the first paragraph of this note.
Hawaii differs from all of the other states in that it does not protect either
52
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/1
1986] ARSON LAW 347
considerable variation in the wording of the individual statutes, these person-
endangering circumstances fall into three categories. The first is the actual or
probable presence of another person in the property at the time of the occur-
rence. Seven states use this person-endangering circumstance. 2 9 The second is
the risk of death, bodily injury, or property damage created by the actor's
conduct. Six states use this circumstanceY0 The third and final explicit criterion
is the fact that some other person was injured or killed by the actor's conduct.
Four states use this criterion.24' The first of these person-endangering circum-
person or property from injury or damage from fire or explosions alone. See supra
note 8. HAwAII Rv. STAT. §§ 708-820, -821 (1976). The Alaska property protecting
provisions, except for "buildings," are thus similar to the property protecting pro-
visions (and the person protecting provisions as well) used by Hawaii.
239. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41 (1982) ("(1) Another person is present in such
building at the time, and (2) The actor knows that fact, or the circumstances are
such as to render the presence of a person therein a reasonable possibility."); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 803 (1979) ("(1) He knows that another person not an accomplice
is present in the building at the time; or (2) He knows of circumstances which render
the presence of another person not an accomplice therein a reasonable possibility.");
Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, § 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) ("he knows or reasonably should
know that one or more persons are present therein . . . ."); Iowa CODE § 712.2
(West) ("is property in which the presence of one or more persons can be reasonably
anticipated"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3719 (1981) ("committed upon a building or
property in which there is some human being"); KY. REv. STAT. § 513.020 (1985)
("(a) The building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to believe the
building may be inhabited or occupied ... ."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201 (1982)
("(1) He knows or reasonably should know that one or more persons are present
therein . . ").
240. Six states use this criterion, either in addition to another criterion or alone.
ALA. CODE § 13A-7-42 (Supp. 1985):
(d) A person commits the crime of arson in the second degree if he inten-
tionally starts or maintains a fire or causes an explosion which damages
property in a detention facility or a penal facility ... with reckless disregard
(because of the nature or extent of the damage caused or which would have
been caused but for the intervention of others) for the safety of others.
Id.; ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400 (1983) ("and by that act recklessly places another
person in danger of serious physical injury. For purposes of this section, 'another
person' includes but is not limited to fire and police service personnel or other public
employees who respond to emergencies, regardless of rank, functions, or duties being
performed."); HAwAu REv. STAT. § 708-820 (1976) ("if he intentionally damages
property and thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily
injury"); IOWA CODE § 712.1 (1985) ("Provided, that where a person owns said
property which the defendant intends to destroy or damage, or which the defendant
knowingly endangers ... where the act was done in such a way as not to unreasonably
endanger the life or property of any other person the act shall not be arson."); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:51 (West 1974) ("whereby it is foreseeable that human life
might be endangered"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp.
1985) ("which recklessly endangers any person or the property of another").
241. Four states use this criterion either alone or in conjunction with one of
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stances, of course, explicitly achieves essentially the same result as the person
endangering subject matter definition used by Arizona, Nevada and Oklahoma
(the states that use implicit criteria alone). As we have seen, these three states
define the subject matter of the offense or the target of the actor's conduct
with reference to the probable presence of persons within the property when
it is burned. The idea is, of course, that it is dangerous to people who may
be in such property if the property is burned. When the person endangering
circumstance of the actual or probable presence of a person in the property
is used, it does not define the subject matter or the target of the actor's conduct,
but describes a circumstance which must be proven to establish guilt. Although
the person endangering subject matter and the person endangering circum-
stances relate to essentially the same concept, there is a difference in the way
they function depending, of course, on their respective provisions. 242 On the
other hand, they can function in precisely the same way.2 43
The final and largest group of states use both person endangering subject
matter similar to the criteria used by Arizona, Nevada, and Oklahoma (which
the other two criteria. Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, § 20-1.1 (Aggravated
Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) ("(2) any person
suffers great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement as a result of the
fire or explosion or (3) a fireman or policeman who is present at the scene acting in
the line of duty, is injured as a result of the fire or explosion."); Ky. REV. STAT. §
513.020 (1985) ("Any other person sustains serious physical injury as a result of the
fire or explosion or the firefighting as a result thereof."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
110 (1985) ("which results, either directly or indirectly, in death or serious bodily
injury to any person"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201 (1982) ("(2) Any person suffers
serious bodily injury as a result of the fire or explosion; or (3) A fireman or policeman
who is present at the scene acting in the line of duty suffers serious bodily injury
... 1 •9).
242. For example, California uses a person endangering subject matter, in part,
to differentiate the person protecting offenses from the property protecting offenses.
See infra note 247. Under the California definition, a "structure" need not be actually
occupied if it is currently being used for dwelling purposes. Under such a provision,
the proof would be similar to the proof required for the common law offense. On
the other hand, the person endangering circumstance in Alabama requires: (a) that
a person actually be present in the building and (b) that the actor either knew that
fact or "the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person therein a
reasonable possibility." See supra note 239. Obviously this explicit person endangering
circumstance is far narrower than the implicit criterion used in California. The Cal-
ifornia statute is aimed at a broader range of risks which may or may not materialize,
whereas the Alabama statute addresses an actual risk when the actor has culpable
mental state with respect to that risk.
The culpable mental states required by these statutes are discussed infra begin-
ning with the text accompanying note 573.
243. For example, the person endangering circumstance used in Louisiana (when
it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered, see supra note 240) would
seem to cover the burning of every "inhabited structure" within the California def-
inition (see infra note 247), if not more. The limitations are imposed by the scope
of protection afforded and the means used to extend that protection.
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define the subject matter of the offense or the target of the actor's conduct
in such a way as to be aimed at the protection against human risks caused by
fire)2" and person endangering circumstances similar to the twelve states that
only use those criteria to extend the personal protection of their arson statutes.
Twenty-six of the forty-one states use this technique. 245 In these states, the
actual or probable presence of a person in the property at the time of the
occurrence is used to define the person endangering subject matter. For ex-
ample, in Arkansas it is arson for a person to start a fire or cause an explosion
with the purpose of destroying or otherwise damaging "an occupiable structure
that is the property of another person." 2" In California "arson that causes
an inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn" is a middle level felony
in the arson scheme. 247 The examples from the Arkansas and California statutes
244. See supra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
245. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902 to -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 451, 452 (West Supp. 1986); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-102 to 4-105 (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-1 11 to -114 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 806.01,
.031 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1401 to -1403 (1983); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-43-1-1 (Bums Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.561 to .563 (West Supp.
1985); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 569.040, .055 (1979); Mor. CODE ANN. § 46-6-103 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-502 to -504 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1 (1974 &
Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-17-
5, -17-6 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.00-.20 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21-01 to -21-02 (1985); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02, .03
(Page Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.315, .325 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3301 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 to -4-8 (1981 & Supp. 1985);
S.D. CODIHIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-33-1 to -33-4, .33-10 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-102, -6-103 (1978);
VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77 to -82, -86, -87 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.48.020-
.48.060 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-101 to -104 (1977).
246. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(1)(a) (Supp. 1983). In turn, an "occupiable
structure" is defined as follows:
(1) "Occupiable structure" means a vehicle, building or other structure:
(a) where any person lives or carries on a business or other calling; or(b) where people assemble for purposes of business, government, ed-
ucation, religion, entertainment, or public transportation; or
(c) which is customarily used for overnight accommodation of persons;
whether or not a person is actually present. Each unit of an occupiable
structure divided into separately occupied units it itself an occupiable struc-
ture.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1901(1) (1977).
247. CAL. PENAL CODE § 451(b) (West Supp. 1986). The California arson stat-
utes also contain the following definitions:
In this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) "Structure" means any building, or commercial or public tent, bridge,
tunnel, or powerplant.
(c) "Property" means real property or personal property, other than a struc-
ture or forest land.
(d) "Inhabited" means currently being used for dwelling purposes whether
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illustrate the use of the person endangering subject matter approach. This
approach is used to protect against the risks of death or injury to persons
within the target or damaged property in eighteen of the twenty-six states using
both the person endangering subject matter and circumstances approaches. In
these eighteen states the actual or probable presence of people within the
property in question is dealt with only by the use of this implicit criteria. 248
Person endangering circumstances are then used to protect persons not con-
nected with the subject matter of the offense. In the remaining eight states,
the actual or probable presence of people within the target or damaged property
are protected by the use of both approaches. 249
In the eight states which use both approaches for the protection of people
within the building burned two patterns emerge. In the first scheme, the person
endangering subject matter approach is used to protect people in one subsection
of the statute. With reference to property in which people are not normally
present, person endangering circumstances are then used. The Florida statutes
provide a good example. In Florida it is arson in the first degree to "willfully
and unlawfully, by fire or explosion" damage "(a) [a]ny dwelling, whether
occupied or not, or its contents; (b) [a]ny structure, or contents thereof, where
persons are normally present, such as: jails, prisons, or detention centers, [or]
hospitals ...; or (c) [a]ny other structure that he knew or had reasonable
grounds to believe was occupied by a human being."' ' 0 In addition to Florida,
Utah52 and Washington02 use a similar scheme.
occupied or not. "Inhabited structure" and "inhabited property" do not
include the real property on which an inhabited structure or an inhabited
property is located.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 450(a), (c), (d) (West Supp. 1986).
248. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902 to -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 451-452 (West Supp. 1986); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-102 to -4-105 (1978);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1401 to -1403 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns
1985); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 569.040 -.055 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-
103 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-502 to -505 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1
(1974 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
30-17-5 to -17-6 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21-01 to -21-02 (1985); OIo REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02-.03 (Page Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.315,
.325 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-
4-2 to -4-8 (1981 & Supp. 1985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp.
1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-101 to -3-103 (1977).
249. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-111 to -114 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 806.01, .031 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.561-.563, .576 (West
Supp. 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.00 -.20 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-1 to -33-4 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-102 to -
6-103 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77 to -82, -86 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
9A.48.020-.060 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
250. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01(l)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1986).
251. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-103(1), 76-6-104(1)(a)-(b) (1978).
252. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020(1)(a) (Supp. 1986).
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In the second scheme used in the remaining five states (Connecticut, 53
Minnesota,2 New York,715 South Dakota2 6 and Virginianl') the subject matter
of the person protecting provisions are defined in person endangering terms,
but person endangering circumstances, which are more specific, aggravate that
offense. Connecticut uses this approach. The subject matter of arson in the
first and second degree is the same. A "building" is defined as "in addition
to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car,
railroad car, other structure or vehicle, or any building with a valid certificate
of occupancy."2' 8 But for first degree arson the building must be "inhabited
or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited
or occupied."2' 9
The second person endangering circumstance, the risk of death or injury
to persons or property created by the actor's conduct, is used in eighteen of
the twenty-six states to expand the scope of personal protection. 2W This cri-
terion, though differently worded in the statutes, is used essentially in the same
way as in the states which only use the person endangering subject matter.26 '
Finally, nine of these twenty-six states use a variant of the person endan-
gering circumstance, a risk that has indeed materiaiized: whether a person has
been injured or killed by the actor's conduct. 262
Looking back over the forty-one states that have expanded the personal
protection of their arson laws, they may be summarized as follows:
253. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-111(a)(1) (West 1985).
254. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561(2)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1986).
255. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.15(a)-(b), .20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
256. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 22-33-1 (1979).
257. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77 to -80 (1982).
258. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-100(A)(l) (West 1985).
259. Id. § 53a-lll(A)(1).
260. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(1)(c) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-
4-105 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-111(aX4) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1401(a)(5) (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a)(2) (Burns 1985); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 569.040(1) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-102(1)(a)-(b), 103(1)(b) (1985);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-502(l)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1984); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(III)(b)
(1974 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(a)(1), -(b)(1) (West 1982); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02(1)(a), -21-02(2) (1985); Omo REv. CODE ANN § 2909.02(A)(1),
.02(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.325(1)(b) (1985); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 (Supp.
1985); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.48.020(1)(a) (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-103(a)(i) (Supp. 1985).
261. The jurisdictions are cited supra notes 232-37.
262. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(a), 452(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-l1I(aX2) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1401(a)(5) (1983); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a)-(b) (Burns 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.576(a) (West
Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-17-5(B), -17-6 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
150.20(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 to -4-4 (Supp. 1985);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
1986]
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1. Criterion One. The actual or probable presence of a person in the
property burned. Thirty-six of the forty-one states use this criterion alone or
in conjunction with other criteria.2 6 Of these thirty-six, twenty-nine use it as
either an implicit criterion by using it to define the person endangering subject
matter, or as partly a subject matter definition and partly explicit, as a person
endangering circumstance. 264 The remaining seven states use it only as a person
endangering circumstance. 265 Five of the forty-one states do not use this cri-
terion at all.2 6
2. Criterion Two. The risk of death or bodily injury created by the actor's
conduct. Twenty-four of the forty-one states use this criterion as a person
endangering circumstance.2 67 Four of these twenty-four use it as the sole person
263. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1704 (Supp.
1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902 (Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451452 (West
Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-102 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
S11 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 803 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01
(West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1401 (1983); Criminal Code of 1961, tit.
III, art. 20, § 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §
712.2 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3719 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §
513.020 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
569.040-.050 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-103 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-502
(Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.010 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1
(1974 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
30-17-5 to -17-6 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.15-.20 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.02 (Page Supp. 1984);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1401 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.325 (1985);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 (Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-1 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201
(1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-6-103 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77 to .2-80 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.48.020 (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-101 (1977).
264. These states are cited supra notes 232-34, 245.
265. These states are cited supra note 239.
266. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.400-.410, .430 (1983); HAWAI REV. STAT. §§ 708-
820 to -823 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:51-:53 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-10, -11-
110 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (the implicit criterion used is essentially the common law
definition of dwelling house and thus it does not enlarge the personal protection of
the common law).
267. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-42(d) (Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400 (1983);
Auc. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(1)(c) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-105 (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-II1(a)(4) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1401(a)(5)
(1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 708-820 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a)(2) (Burns
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 712.1 (West 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51 (West
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 569.040(1) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-102(1)(a)-(b), -6-103(1)(b) (1985);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-502(1)(a)-(b) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(III)(b)
(1974 & Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(a)(1), -(b)(1) (West 1982); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02(1)(a), (2) (1985); OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.02(A)(1),
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endangering criterion, 268 and the remaining twenty use it in conjunction with
a person endangering subject matter. 269
3. Criterion Three. Another person was injured or killed by the actor's
conduct. Twelve states use this criterion in the same way as a person endan-
gering circumstance. 20 Seven of these twelve use it in conjunction with criterion
one;27' four use it along with the other two criteria,272 and the state of South
Carolina uses it alone.273
In this manner the forty-one states that comprise the new American ma-
jority have expanded their arson laws to protect people from the human risks
associated with the conduct of the arsonist. 274
(A)(3) (Page Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.325(l)(b) (1985); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(l)(i) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 (Supp. 1985);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.48.020(1)(a) (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-103(a)(i) (Supp. 1985).
268. These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Maine. Their statutory
provisions are cited supra note 267.
269. Of course, these are all of the states listed supra note 267 with the ex-
ception of Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Maine. See supra note 268.
270. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(a), 452(a), (d) (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53A-11l(a)(2) (West 1985); Criminal Code of 1961, fit. III, art. 20, §
20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a)-(b) (Burns 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 513.020
(1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.576(a) (West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-
17-5(B), -17-6 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.20(1)(a)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1986); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2, -4-3, -4-4 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-110 (Law.
Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201(a)(2) (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE 28.02(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
271. These states are California, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Mexico,
New York, and Tennessee. Their statutory provisions are cited supra note 270.
272. These states are Connecticut, Indiana, Rhode Island, and Texas. Their
statutory provisions are cited supra note 270.
273. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
274. In addition, two states use a risk to property which is not inherently person
endangering. IOWA CODE ANN. § 712.1 (West 1979) ("endanger the ... property of
any other person"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802(1)(B)(2) (1983 & Supp.
1985) ("which recklessly endangers ... the property of another").
Arson for hire is an aggravating criterion in three states. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-112(a)(2) (West 1985) ("a fire or explosion was caused by an individual
nired by such person to start such fire or cause such explosion"); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-43-1-I(3)(b) (Burns 1985) ("A person who commits arson for hire commits a
class B felony."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02-.03 (Page Supp. 1985) ("through
the offer or acceptance of an agreement for hire or other consideration").
Finally, in New York, the means by which the fire or explosion is caused is one
of the criteria that distinguishes first from second degree arson. N.Y. PENAL LAW §
150.20(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986) ("when... such explosion or fire is caused by
an incendiary device propelled, thrown or placed inside or near such building or
motor vehicle").
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V. THE MODERN LAW OF ARSON
The metamorphosis of the law of arson from the common law's concep-
tion of the offense as a crime against the habitation, to a crime which also
widely protects property, and finally into a complex offense that protects
people as well as property, is not the only change wrought by most modern
statutes. There have been many other changes in arson as it was at common
law. Although the modern statutes vary considerably in their specific detail,
the basic elements of the offense are similar in the majority of American states.
For example, while all state except Hawaii2"7 and Massachusetts27 6 use the term
arson in the description of at least one of the felony burning offenses, the
other felony burning offenses are frequently called by another name. 277 Never-
theless, the substantive offenses, regardless of their name are generally similar
in many, if not most, of their important features. It is to these common features
that we now turn.
A. The Prohibited Conduct
1. Burning
The conduct prohibited by common law arson was the act of "burning,"
causing the actual ignition of any portion of the material of which the dwelling
275. In Hawaii all of the crimes which cause damage to property, and which
put people at risk, are lumped together in an offense called "criminal damage to
property." It is divided into four degrees. The term "arson" does not appear in the
statutes. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 708-820, -823 (1976).
276. The word "arson" never appears in the Massachusetts felony statutory
scheme. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 1 ("Dwelling houses; burning or aiding
in burning"), § 2 ("Meeting house; burning or aiding in burning"), § 5 ("Wood and
other property; burning or aiding in burning"), § 7 ("Woods; wanton or reckless
injury or destruction by fire"), § 8 ("Injury by fire; negligent use"), and §10 ("In-
sured property; burning with intent to defraud") (West 1970).
277. E.g., Alabama: The felony burning offenses are divided into arson in the
first and second degree. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-41 to -7-42 (1982). Arson in the third
degree is a class A misdemeanor. Id. § 13A-7-43. Arkansas: The most serious burning
offense is called "[a]rson." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902 (1977 & Supp. 1983). The
remaining felony offense is called "[r]eckless burning." Id. § 41-1903. Illinois: The
two felony offenses are known as "arson," Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20,
§ 20-1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977) and "aggravated arson."
Id. § 20-1.1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). Indiana:
The felony offense of arson is divided into class A, B, C, and D felonies. IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1985). Montana: The felony offenses are "[n]egligent arson,"
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-102 (1983), and "[a]rson." Id. § 45-6-103. North Dakota:
The felony offenses are known as "arson," N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985),
and "endangering by fire or explosion." Id. § 12.1-21-02. Washington: The three
felony burning offenses are known as "[a]rson in the first degree," WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.48.020 (West Supp. 1985), "[a]rson in the second degree," Id. § 9A.48.030,
and "[r]eckless burning in the first degree." Id. § 9A.48.040.
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house was composed.278 Thus, a culprit who lights a fire in a dwelling by
burning items of personal property is not guilty of common law arson unless
the house itself is burned. 279 And this is true regardless of the high risk of
death or injury created by such a fire. Have the statutes modified this result?
Or to put it another way, have the statutes expanded the arson offense to
include such dangerous conduct?
a. The "Set Fire to or Burn" Statutes
This question initially arose under The Waltham Black Act, one of the
principle statutes in the development of statutory arson in England. 28° The act
provided that any person who "shall set fire to any house, barn or out-house,
or to any hovel, cock, mow, or stack of corn, straw, hay or wood ... shall
be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death as in cases of felony,
without benefit of clergy. ' 28 ' Surely the phrase "set fire to any house" can
be interpreted to include our culprit's conduct, 28 2 but that was not the inter-
pretation placed upon that phrase by the English judges. They held it to mean
nothing more and nothing less than the "burning" element of common law
arson. The English burning statutes which followed The Waltham Black Act
were given the same interpretation, 283 and thus our culprit committed no felony
under The Waltham Black Act or the subsequent English legislation.
As we have seen, the English experience with common law and statutory
arson heavily influenced the development of the law of arson in the United
States.21 Not surprisingly then the wording of The Waltham Black Act and
its progenitors found its way, albeit sometimes in modified form, into the
American statutes. Indeed, the Model Arson Law used the quite similar phrase
"sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned," and the Model Arson Law or
statutes that contained most of its salient provisions were in effect in forty-
four states at mid-century. 25 Despite the prevalence of this language, there is
a paucity of cases on the issue of whether the phrase "sets fire to" expanded
278. See supra notes 67-94 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 124-40.
281. 9 Geo. I, c.22, from 15 Pickering's Statutes At Large 88, 89 (1975).
282. The phrase "setfire to" may be interpreted, for example, to mean "apply
fire to" or "set fire against," depending upon which word one wants to emphasize,
without straining the language used in the phrase. Coupling either interpretation with
the word "burn," (which would signify the common law concept) by the use of the
disjunctive "or" could well lead to the interpretation that the legislative intent was
to expand the scope of the common law offense.
283. The authorities are cited supra notes 128, 136, and 137. In addition, see
the discussion in State v. Dennin, 32 Vt. 158 (1859) and A. CURTIS, THE LAW OF
ARSON 103-04 (1936).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 141-45.
285. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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the common law offense or was merely synonymous with the word "burn,"
which signified the common law requirement. Nevertheless, within these few
cases there was nearly an even division of authority during the middle years
of the current century. Alabama and Maine interpreted the phrase "sets fire
to" synonymously with "burn, ' 28 6 whereas Arkansas, North Carolina, and
Virginia held to the contrary. 87 There are Maryland cases adopting both po-
sitions.,"'
Since fifteen states still use the phrase "sets fire to or burns" in their
arson statutes, the issue remains alive today.219 In view of the ambiguity of
the phrase, and the conflicting canons of statutory construction which support
either view, 2 ° the choice must be made on some other basis.
Common law arson required that the actor's conduct inflict some harm
on the subject matter of the crime by means of fire. The harm required was
a "burning" of the dwelling house. But fire can inflict harm on buildings in
ways other than by burning. And the circumstances in which other types of
286. Graham v. State, 40 Ala. 659 (1867); Benbow v. State, 128 Ala. 1, 29
So. 553 (1900) (semble); State v. Taylor, 45 Me. 322 (1858).
Subsequent enactments in both Alabama and Maine have abandoned the law
announced in Graham, Benbow, and Taylor.
Alabama subsequently abandoned the old "set fire to or burn" provision, under
which Graham and Benbow were decided, for a "damage" provision. ALA. CODE §§
13A-7-41 to -7-43 (1982 & Supp. 1985). As to the modern damage provisions in
general, see infra text accompanying notes 297-311.
Maine abandoned the "set fire to or burn" provision for an inchoate offense
patterned upon the provisions of the Model Penal Code. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985). As to the modern inchoate offenses in general,
see infra text commencing with note 312.
287. Mary v. State, 24 Ark. 44 (1862); State v. Hall, 93 N.C. 571 (1885);
Howel v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 664 (1848).
288. Compare Cochrane v. State, 6 Md. 400 (1854) (not synonymous) and
Borza v. State, 25 Md. App. 391, 397, 335 A.2d 142, 146 (1975) (The use of 'sets
fire to' as an alternative to 'burns' frees this law from ancient rigidity of the arson
laws when it comes to the term 'burn."') (quoting from Cochrane) with Hines v.
State, 34 Md. App. 612, 368 A.2d 509 (1977) (the phrase "sets fire to or burns"
used in Article 27, Section 7 requires a burning as at common law).
289. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451-452 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
18-4-102 to -4-105 (1978); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-801 to -803 (1979); MD. CRIM. LAW
CODE ANN. §§ 6-9, 11 (1982 & Supp. 1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS AiNN. ch. 266, §§ 1,
2, 5, 10 (West 1970); MICH. CoMP. LAWs §§ 28.266 (definition of "burn"), 28.267-
.270, .275 (1981); Miss. CODE AN. §§ 97-17-1, -17-3, 17-5, -17-7, -17-11 (1973);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.010-.040 (1985) (defining "set fire to" to mean "whenever
any part thereof or anything therein shall be scorched, charred or burned"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 14-59 to -67.1(1981); OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1401-1403 (West
1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-110, -11-130, -11-140, -11-170 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-33-1 to -33-4, -33-10 (1979 & Supp. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 502-504, 506, 507 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-77, -79, -
81, -86 (1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3-1 to -3-3, -3-5 (1984).
290. See infra note 311.
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harm are inflicted by fire may be as endangering to persons and property as
the minimal ignition required by the common law standard. For example, if
our culprit's fire (which consisted of the burning of personal property within
the dwelling) caused extensive smoke which not only damaged the building
but endangered the lives of the dwellers, it would not amount to arson at
common law. Instead, the culprit would be guilty of attempted arson, a mis-
demeanor at common law. 29' Yet the dwelling was dam aged and the lives of
the dwellers were endangered in nearly the same way it would have been
damaged and lives would have been endangered if the dwelling's wallpaper
had actually ignited and the fire then went out. It may well have been fortuity,
blind luck, that made the difference between the felony of arson, and the
misdemeanor of attempted arson.292 One reaction, of course, would be to
change the law of arson to provide a like penalty for attempted arson in these
circumstances. In that event, our culprit would be given the same punishment
based upon a different characterization of the offense (attempted arson rather
than arson), but that option would not be available to a judge. That choice
belongs solely to the legislature in our American common law system. We
simply do not grant judges the power to change punishments set by the leg-
islature for a given crime. That is the province of the legislature alone. If the
two situations create the same risks, risks that the law of arson is designed to
suppress and punish, and if the result of the fire is essentially the same type
of injury to property that the law of arson seeks to suppress and punish, why
should we fail to treat these two instances the same? The better view would
reach the same result in both cases; it would treat like cases alike. This could
easily be accomplished by interpreting the phrase "sets fire to" as expanding
the conduct prohibited by the statute to include any damage to the building
caused by fire. The more recent cases do conclude that the phrase expands
the arson offenses to include situations in which the actor "starts a fire," but
there is an insufficient common law burning.293 Indeed, in the two states which
supported the view that the phrase was synonymous with the common law
requirement (Alabama and Maine), the rule has been abrogated by statute.29
Thus the only currently authoritative cases support the expansion view, and it
291. Attempt was a misdemeanor at common law. R. PERKINS AND R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 613.
292. I do not mean, of course, to suggest that fortuity is the only difference
between guilt of the target offense and an attempt to commit the offense. But it is
generally recognized that a culprit is guilty of an attempt if she has performed the
last act necessary to accomplish the target offense but the act is unsuccessful. See,
e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 431-38.
293. People v. Mentzer, 163 Cal. App. 3d 482, 209 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1985);
Lynch v. State, 175 Ind. App. 111, 370 N.E.2d 401 (1977); Borzo v. State, 25 Md.
App. 391, 335 A.2d 142 (1975). But cf. Hines v. State, 34 Md. App. 612, 363 A.2d
509 (1977).
294. See supra note 286.
63
Poulos: Poulos: Metamorphosis of the Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
358 MISSOURI LAWREVIEW [Vol. 51
is clearly the modern trend of authority today.295 But what type of conduct is
or should be prohibited in those jurisdictions which adopt an expansive view
of the phrase "set fire to or burns" will be discussed below.29
b. The Damage Statutes
During the modem metamorphosis of arson into a complex crime pro-
tecting against both human and property risks, both the traditional phrase
"sets fire to or burns" and the common law's "burning" requirement have
been abandoned in all but the above fifteen states.9 In the majority of the
remaining American states, twenty-three in number, the statutes have replaced
"sets fire to or burns" or simply "burns," with "damages," or sometimes
"damages or destroys," by means of fire. 29 Under these statutes the actor
295. See supra notes 287, 292.
Arkansas has also changed its statutory provisions in a way which makes Mary
v. State, 24 Ark. 44 (1862), irrelevant today, but in Arkansas the statutory change
clearly expands the protection well beyond that afforded by the common law. Hence
the spirit of Mary is carried forward by the statute. See infra note 313.
In Michigan, one of the fifteen states which still uses the "sets fire to" or
"burns" formulation, the statutory definition of the term "burn" seems to adopt
the modern trend. MICH. CotiP. LAws § 28.266 (1981).
296. See infra text accompanying notes 310-11.
297. See supra note 289. In eight of these fifteen states (Idaho, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia)
arson has remained largely as it existed in the majority of states at mid-century, an
offense against the habitation and against property as exemplified by the Model Arson
Law. These statutory provisions are cited supra notes 223-30.
The remaining seven states which still adhere to this formulation have all ex-
panded arson to protect both human and property risks. These states are California,
Colorado, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia. See
supra note 289 (for the statutes in these states). Two of these states (California and
Virginia) have adopted an expansive interpretation of the phrase so that the prohibited
conduct extends beyond the common law's burning requirement. See supra notes 287
and 293. In the remaining states I could find no authority on the subject. To be
consistent with the expansion of the offense to protect more human risks, one would
expect these states to adopt readily the modern interpretation of the phrase.
298. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-41 to -43 (1982 & Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. §§
11.46.400-.410 (1983); Amiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1703 to -1704 (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 801-803 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West Supp. 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-1401 to -1403 (1983); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to -821 (1976);
Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, §§ 20-1 (Arson), 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson),
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 20-1, 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3718 to -3719 (1981); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:51-:53 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
609.561-.563, .576 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 569.040-.055 (1979); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-6-102 to -103 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-502 to -505 (1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1 (1974 & Supp. 1983); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.00-
.20 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.315-.325 (1985);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-4-2 to -7 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (Rhode Island also has a
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must cause some physical harm to the subject matter of the crime by the use
of fire, 2" or to put it in more operational terms, the fire must cause some
change (injury) to the building which lowers its value or impairs its useful-
ness.10 Thus it is arson under the damage statutes if the fire "scorches" the
paint on the building,3 °0 or causes smoke damage to the building, 0 2 although
neither would suffice as a burning at common law.303 But, of course, any
burning at common law would constitute damage under the damage statutes
as well. 30 4 The principal effect of these damage statutes then is to extend arson
liability to those rather infrequent situations in which there is some actual
injury to the building which is caused by the fire but there is no "burning."
Thus in our hypothetical situation in which the culprit lights a fire (by burning
items of personal property) but no portion of the building is burned, there
would be guilt of arson under one of these damage statutes only if some actual
physical injury was caused to the building (i.e., smoke damage). If there was
no such "injury" or "damage" to the building, there would be no arson. 30
misdemeanor offense which is called "Arson-Seventh degree." R.I. GEN. LAws § 1 I-
4-8 (1981).); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-201 to -206 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-
6-102 to -103 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.48.020-.040, .48.060 (West 1977
& Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.02-.04 (West 1982). A statute which uses
"damages" alone should receive the same interpretation as a statute which uses the
phrase "damages or destroys" for quite obviously a building that has been destroyed
also has been damaged.
See infra note 313 for a discussion of the inchoate states with damage provisions.
299. Indeed, the Ohio statute uses the phrase "physical harm," instead of
damage. And the Arizona statute defines "damage" as "any physical or visual im-
pairment of any surface." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1701(1) (West 1978).
300. The Washington statute defines "damage" in the following terms: 'Dam-
ages', in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any charring, scorching, burning,
or breaking, or agricultural or industrial sabotage, and shall include any diminution
in the value of any property as a consequence of an act." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.48.010(l)(b) (1977).
It is not common to have a statutory definition of "damage." See, e.g., Bateman
v. State, 408 So. 2d 194, 197 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (dictum) ("[ilt appears that
[the arson statute] does require some actual harm or injury to the building which
diminishes or impairs its value.").
Although I can find no New York case on point, the Practice Commentaries to
the Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated state: "The arson sections of the
Revised Penal Law all speak of "damage" to a building, i.e., an injury that lowers
the value of the building or that impairs its usefulness." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.10,
Practice Commentaries at 89 (McKinney 1975).
301. State v. McVeigh, 213 Kan. 432, 439, 516 P.2d 918, 925 (1973) (the injuries
were "comparatively minor and largely restricted to smoke and scorching damage");
State v. Hohnstein, 213 Neb. 296, 328 N.W.2d 777 (1983).
302. See infra notes 305, 307-09 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
304. E.g., State v. Simmons, 680 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Kelso, 617 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
305. E.g., Bateman v. State, 408 So. 2d 194 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (dictum);
K.R.M. v. State, 360 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
65
Poulos: Poulos: Metamorphosis of the Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
The culprit's liability would be for attempted arson in one of these states.
At this point we should return to the states which give an expansive
interpretation to the words "set fire to," in their statutes which describe the
prohibited conduct as an actor who "sets fire to or burns" the subject property.
Although these states reject the "sets fire to" language as being synonymous
with the common law burning requirement, the cases all adopt a "damage"
standard similar to the twenty-three states that have adopted it by statute.
3 °
Thus, in one of these states, and actor is guilty of arson if he "sets fire to"
the building and the fire causes a scorching or blistering of paint which was
an integral part of the structure, 0 7 smoke damage, or even water damage
caused by extinguishing the fire,3c° and from damage caused to the building
by the heat from the fire.3°9 Thus in one of these jurisdictions, a person is
guilty of arson if the fire either "damages" or "burns" the subject property.
Why should the phrase "sets fire to" be limited to situations in which
the building is damaged? As we have seen, this language could be construed
to mean set fire against or in the building,310 and if the phrase is so interpreted
the conduct prohibited by the statute would be the setting of a fire in or against
the building and nothing more. No damage would be required. But no case
has embraced such an expansive interpretation of the phrase "sets fire to,"
for it is too great a departure from the common law conception of the crime.
Aside from the question of the actor's mens rea, the only distinction between
an attempt to commit arson and arson is the actual physical damage to the
building. If a fire is set, but there is no damage to the building, it would be
attempted arson both at common law and under the damage statutes. And
though it would be possible for a judge to interpret a "sets fire to" statute
so as to require.no damage to the building, that interpretation would inevitably
conflict with the state's attempt provisions. A judge simply cannot correlate
the law of arson with the law of attempt under that interpretation. And if
canons of statutory construction mean anything, the judge should construe the
statute so as to complement, not conflict with the state's attempt statutes.32 '
Furthermore, this interpretation would be a drastic departure from the prin-
ciples of the common law, too drastic to impute this change to the legislature
by the use of such an ambiguous phrase. If the law of arson is to invade the
province of the law of attempt in such a way, it is a matter better left to the
legislature.
306. See supra note 298.
307. Lynch v. State, 175 Ind. App. 111, 116, 370 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1977).
308. Borza v. State, 25 Md. App. 391, 335 A.2d 142 (1975).
309. People v. Mentzer, 163 Cal. App. 3d 482, 209 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1985) (the
heat from the fire caused discoloration and buckling, cracking and chipping of the
marble floor and plaster walls of the mausoleum, although they did not "burn"
under the common law definition).
310. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
311. E.g., 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
51.02 (4th ed. 1984).
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2. Arson as an Inchoate Offense
Although no case has interpreted an ambiguous statute so as to abolish
the requirement that there be some fire damage to property, the legislatures
in the remaining twelve states3'12 have so provided by statute.3 In these states
the conduct prohibited by their arson statutes is the starting of a fire with a
specified mens rea with respect to given property. The actor's conduct need
not cause any actual harm to the property which is the target of the actor's
incendiary acts.3"4 For example, "A person commits arson," in Arkansas, "if
he starts a fire ... with the purpose of destroying or otherwise damaging: (a)
an occupiable structure that is the property of another person; or ... (c) any
property, whether his own or that of another person, if the act thereby neg-
ligently creates a risk of death or serious physical injury to any person .... ,11.
In a jurisdiction following this statutory pattern, our culprit would be
guilty of arson provided the mens rea requirement is met. Under this same
312. Since the reader may have lost count, I will recount the positions of the
other thirty-eight states: fifteen states have "sets fire to or burns" statutes, see supra
note 289, and twenty-three states have damage statutes. See supra note 298.
313. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902 to -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-111 to -114 (West 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 712.1-.3 (West
1979); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 513.020-.060 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802
(West 1983 & Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1 (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-17-5 to -6 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21-01 to -02 (1985); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02-.03 (Page Supp. 1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301
(Purdon 1983); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 6-3-101 to -103 (1977).
Four states have both damage provisions and inchoate offenses in their statutory
arson scheme: Montana: The statutes use the damage approach for arson, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-6-103 (1983), but "negligent arson" is an inchoate offense. Id. §
45-6-102. New Mexico: Aggravated arson is a damage statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-17-6 (1984), but "arson and negligent arson" are inchoate crimes Id. § 30-17-5.
Ohio: Both aggravated arson, Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.02 (Page 1975 & Supp.
1984), and arson, Id. § 2909.03, use both approaches within the same section. Rhode
Island: The first degree arson statute uses the inchoate approach, at least in part,
R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-42 (1981 & Supp. 1985), whereas arson in the second degree,
Id. § 11-4-3, third degree, Id. § 11-4-4, fourth degree, Id. § 11-4-5, and sixth degree,
Id. § 11-4-7 are damage statutes.
New Mexico and Ohio are classified as inchoate states because more of their
provisions are inchoate in nature, whereas Montana and Rhode Island are classified
as damage states for the same reason. However, the traditional provisions in New
Mexico and Ohio use the modern "damage" approach to the description of the
prohibited conduct.
314. Commonwealth v. Garrison, 242 Pa. Super. 509, 364 A.2d 388 (1976);
see Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Romo v. State, 593
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hamilton v. State, 678 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984).
315. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(l)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1983).
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assumption, the culprit would be guilty of attempted arson 'in the remaining
thirty-eight states (harm states).
The abolition of the requirement that a "burning" or "damage" be caused
to the subject property by fire transforms arson into an attempt like offense.
Part of the law of "attempted arson" is thus converted into the offense of
arson. This is the position taken by the arson offenses in the Model Penal
CodeA' 6 And quite obviously the states that have turned arson into an inchoate
offense have been heavily influenced by its provisions. Like the Model Penal
Code's arson provisions, these states use the law of arson to suppress and
punish the use of fire to endanger people and property well beyond the pro-
tection afforded by the common law. And though nearly all of the "damage"
statutes have the same goal, the Model Penal Code and the states that follow
its inchoate approach seek to achieve that goal at the moment the fire is started
rather than when the fire causes damage to the property in question. On the
other hand, the damage statutes rely on their attempted arson law to achieve
that goal.
A legislature should make its choice between a damage statute and the
formulation of arson as an inchoate offense largely on the basis of whether a
person who risks harm should be treated precisely the same way as a person
who inflicts harm. Since this question goes to the very heart of the justification
for the distinction between "completed" and "inchoate" offenses, further dis-
cussion of this issue must await another day.
3. Exploding
At common law it was not arson to damage a dwelling house by means
of an explosion unless it caused the house to burn rather than first being torn
apart by the blast.1 7 This tradition was carried forward into the Model Arson
Law which was so influential during the middle years of the current century.
Yet explosions, like fires, entail the likelihood of extensive property damage
accompanied by extreme risks to human life and limb. Accordingly, the Model
Penal Code and the arson statutes of forty states now include explosions in
their arson statutes."' These forty states include the twenty-three that use the
316. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.1 comment 3, at 14-15.
317. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
318. MODEL PENAL CODE § 330.1. These forty states are Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Il-
linois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The
statutory provisions in each of these states are identified infra notes 319-21.
Accordingly, the only states that do not cover damage by explosion in their
arson laws are California, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, North
Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Vermont. See infra note 323.
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"damage" standard for fire inflicted injuries, 3 9 the twelve states that treat arson
as an inchoate offense,320 and five states that adhere to the traditional for-
mulation of arson, an actor who "sets fire to or bums" the subject property. 2 '
The inclusion of explosions within the concept of arson does not require a
change in the description of the prohibited conduct in either the "damage" or
the "inchoate" states. The concept of damaging and endangering by an explo-
sion is the same as damaging, or risk taking, by fire. Not so in the "sets fire
to or bums" states. In these five states, the prohibited conduct is described in
terms of an explosion causing "damage" or "destroying" the subject property.
These states thus adopt a "damage" approach with reference to the injury of
the subject property by explosions while adhering to the traditional formulation
for fires. 32 Nine of the ten states that do not include damage by explosion as
arson have retained their statutes which were patterned upon the Model Arson
Law. They are all states which use the "sets fire to or bum" formulation of
the conduct prohibited by their arson laws.32 Although the one remaining state,
319. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
321. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-102 to -104 (1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-
3 (1973) (There is, however, only one arson provision in Mississippi that includes
damage by an explosion, and that applies only to the damage of any "state-supported
school building" by an explosion. Id. The remainder of the Mississippi arson pro-
visions apply only to fire, and they are worded in accordance with the "sets fire to"
approach of the Model Arson Law. Id. §§ 97-17-1, -17-5, -17-7, -17-9, -17-11, -17-
13.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1401-1404 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
11-110 (1985) (However, the remainder of the South Carolina felony arson provisions
apply only to fires and are worded in terms of "sets fire to, burns, or causes to be
burned," the familiar language of the "sets fire to" approach of the Model Arson
Law. Id. §§ 16-11-130 to -11-150 (second offense), -11-190.); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77
to -81 (1982).
322. See supra note 321.
323. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-801 to -804 (1979); MD. Canm. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 6-
8 (1982) (Maryland has supplemented the Model Arson Law with additional provi-
sions. Id. §§ 9, 10A, 11.); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 1, 2, 5, 10 (West
1970) (The Massachusetts version of the Model Arson Law divides the sections dif-
ferently. There are minor changes in some of the provisions, and there is at least one
supplementary provision. Id. § 7.); MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 28.267-.270 (1984) (There
are also two clearly supplementary provisions. Id. §§ 28.273 (burning of woods and
prairies), 28.275 (setting fire to mines and mining materials); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
205.010-.030 (1985) (However, Nevada has modified its Model Arson Law provisions
to expand the personal protection afforded by its arson statutes. See supra note 221
and accompanying text.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-58, -58.2, -59 to -62, -62.1, -63 to
-66, -67.1 (1981) (Strictly speaking, North Carolina is not a Model Arson Law State.
See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, since the Model Arson
Law was based upon the English statutory development, as were the arson laws of
North Carolina, North Carolina is included here.); S.D. CODrFmD LAWS ANN. §§ 22-
33-1 to -4, -10 (1979 & Supp. 1985) (South Dakota, like Nevada, has altered the basic
structure of its arson laws, which were apparently patterned upon the provisions of
the Model Arson Law, to expand the personal protection afforded by its arson
69
Poulos: Poulos: Metamorphosis of the Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
California, has recently revised its arson provisions, it is the only state to enact
new arson legislation after the publication of the Model Penal Code which has
not included damage by explosion as arson. 24
Before moving on to the statutory changes in the subject matter of arson,
a summary of the conduct prohibited by the modem statutes may be helpful.
1. Fifteen states continue to describe the conduct prohibited by their arson
statutes with the phrase "sets fire to or burns. ' '32 Although there was a nearly
even division of authority at mid-century on the issue of whether the phrase
"sets fire to" was synonymous with "burns," the only viable remaining au-
thority, and the modern trend, holds that the phrase "sets fire to" means
"damages" by means of fire.a26 This judicial interpretation makes these statutes
mean essentially the same as the statutory scheme that prevails in the majority
of states, the "damage" by fire description of the prohibited conduct.
2. Twenty-three states have abandoned the traditional formulations of the
conduct prohibited by the arson statutes. These states describe the prohibited
conduct as an actor who "damages" or sometimes "damages or destroys"
specified property by means of fire. 32 7 Under these statutes, "damage" means
any physical injury to the property or, to put it differently, the fire must cause
some change or injury to the property which lowers its value or impairs its
usefulness.1 Thus injury to property caused by fire, which would not meet the
"burning" standard of the common law offense, such as scorching, smoke,
water (used to extinguish the fire) or heat damage, is sufficient for arson in
these states.2 9
3. The Model Penal Code converts arson into an inchoate offense by
abolishing the harm requirement.330 Under the Code, there is then no require-
ment that the actor's incendiary action cause any damage to property or, of
course, that the property "burns." The prohibited conduct is simply the starting
of a fire with a specified mens rea toward specified property. Twelve states
have followed the Model Penal Code by altering most of their statutes to convert
arson into an inchoate offense.3 ' Nevertheless, under the Code, and in these
twelve states, a fire must actually be started by the actor to incur arson liability.
If the actor does not start a fire, he is guilty, if at all, of attempted arson.
This approach to the law of arson emphasizes the risk taking aspects of the
statutes. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§
502-506 (Supp. 1985) (Vermont has at least one supplementary provision: Id. § 507
(burning forests).); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3-1 to -5 (1984).
324. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 450-452 (West Supp. 1986).
325. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 298.
328. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 301-03, 307-09 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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actor's incendiary (or explosive) conduct rather than the harm it caused. In
addition five states have at least one arson offense which is an inchoate offense.
4. Though it was not arson at common law to damage or destroy property
by an explosion unless the explosion caused the property to bum before it was
destroyed by the blast, the Model Penal Code and the majority of states prohibit
such conduct by their arson statutes.3a Except for the states that treat arson
as an inchoate offense, the states which include explosions in their arson laws
adopt a damage standard for that means of committing arson.33 In other words,
the conduct prohibited by those arson statutes is the actor's causing an explosion
which "damages," or "destroys" the subject property. In the "inchoate" states,
it is an actor who causes an explosion with the specified mens rea toward a
specified type of property.
B. The Subject Matter
At common law the subject matter of the law of arson was a dwelling
house (of another) or a building within its curtilage.31 But the modern statutes
have greatly altered this element of the law of arson in two respects. First, in
the states which define arson as an inchoate offense, there is technically no
subject matter of the crime, for these statutes have, of course, abolished the
physical harm requirement. The gravamen of these statutes is the risk to persons
and property created by the actor's use of fire (or explosives). Since the role
of property is somewhat different under these statutes, the states with inchoate
arson offenses will be discussed in section (b) below. 35 Significant changes have
been made, however, in the subject matter of the lav of arson in the remainder
of the states as well.
1. The Subject Matter of Arson in the Majority of States
(The Harm Jurisdictions)
As we have seen in the majority of the states, thirty-eight in number 36
the common law conception of arson as an offense which prohibits an actor
from inflicting harm on a subject matter has been retained. But the definition
of the subject matter of arson has been greatly expanded. The first change was
aimed at expanding the crime into an offense which protected property as well
as an offense against the habitation. Arson as an offense against property
reached its apex in the United States during the middle years of the current
332. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
334. See supra text accompanying note 10. The "dwelling house" and curtilage
rule at common law are discussed supra text accompanying notes 18-50.
335. See infra text beginning at note 378.
336. See supra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
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century when the statutes of forty-four states had either inacted the Model
Arson Law (which epitomizes arson as an offense against the habitation and
property) or most of its salient provisions. But following the publication of the
Model Penal Code, there was a flurry of legislative activity aimed at changing
the law of arson into an offense which also protected people from the risks
caused by fires and explosions. Today, forty-one states have arson statutes
which have metamorphosized arson into a complex offense against both person
and property. 37
The expansion of arson into an offense which protects property was achieved
by the simple expedient of expanding the subject matter of the offense by
statute. And, as we have seen above, the redefinition of the subject matter has
also been used to expand the personal protection of the arson offenses as well.
Though this technique, the use of a person endangering subject matter, is
frequently coupled with the use of other criteria, the person endangering cir-
cumstances, to achieve that result.338
These two distinct uses of the subject matter of arson, one for the purpose
of expanding the crime's protection of people against the risks of death or
injury caused by fire (or explosion) may cause a degree of confusion when the
arson statutes of one state are compared with the similar laws of another state.
An example is in order.
As we have seen, the common law of arson protected only dwellings and
buildings within the curtilage as an incident of the protection of the dwellers
within the habitation.3 9 The modern statutes, discussed below, generally extend
protection to all buildings.3' Their inclusion in the modern law of arson serves
two distinct, but related goals. The arson law protects buildings as a property
offense, and, with additional definitions of buildings (as when, for example,
the building is a "dwelling") or when certain circumstances exist with any
building (as when it is occupied and the fire endangers the occupants) the law
of arson also is an offense against persons. In either or both cases the common
law offense is expanded by the modern statutes. In all states except Maine, the
contemporary statutes contain several arson offenses which vary in the severity
of their punishment. 4 It is in these grading distinctions that one clearly sees
the difference between the arson provisions aimed at protecting property (which
are generally punished less severely) and the provisions which have as their goal
the protection of people from the risks of death or injury from fires or explo-
sions. For example, under Idaho's current version of the Model Arson Law,
it is first degree arson (punishable by imprisonment for not less than two nor
more than twenty years) to burn any "dwelling house" or any "kitchen, shop,
337. See supra note 221.
338. See supra notes 244-62 and accompanying text.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
340. See infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text.
341. See infra text accompanying notes 788-804.
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barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or belonging to or ad-
joining thereto .... ,,32 In essence this is the common law's protection of
dwelling houses and buildings within curtilage. On the other hand, the burning
"of any building or structure of whatsoever class or character... not included
or described in the preceding section" (the first degree arson provisions) is arson
in the second degree (punishable by not less than one nor more than ten years
imprisonment). 3 Under this scheme, the principal thrust of first degree arson
is the protection of the people whereas second degree arson primarily protects
the property interests in other buildings. Thus Idaho, aside from the protection
afforded to personal property, defines the subject matter of arson as dwellings,
buildings within the curtilage, and all other buildings.
In a state that uses its arson laws to give greater protection to people than
is provided in Idaho, mention of the dwelling house and the curtilage rule is
frequently omitted. Instead, for example, both the person protecting offense
(first degree arson) and the property protecting offense (second degree arson)
use the same subject matter description, a "building." The distinction between
first and second degree arson depends upon the life or limb endangering cir-
cumstances attendant upon the fire rather than the type of property which is
the subject matter of the two separate arson provisions, first and second degree
arson. Thus, in Alabama it is first degree arson to damage a building by fire
(or explosion) when: "(1) Another person is present in such building at the
time, and (2) the actor knows that fact, or circumstances are such as to render
the presence of a person therein a reasonable possibility."' But it is arson of
the second degree if those circumstances do not exist.141 In Alabama, it will
always be arson for another to burn a dwelling house or a building within its
curtilage, but whether it is first degree (the person protecting provisions) or
second degree (the property protecting provisions) arson depends upon the
existence of the additional circumstances. But if one were simply to compare
the Idaho statute with the Arkansas statute, dwelling houses are explicitly part
of the subject matter of arson in Idaho, but they are implicitly part of the
subject matter in Alabama. Further, while the burning of a dwelling house is
always first degree arson in Idaho, it is first degree arson in Alabama only if
the attendant circumstances are present (which they probably are in nearly every
case). Nevertheless, dwelling houses are part of the subject matter of arson in
both states.
But the problem which arises with the use of general or specific terms is
not the only ground for potential confusion. The definition of the same word
or phrase used in the arson statutes of different states may vary depending
upon whether it is used for purposes of expanding the personal protection or
342. IDAHO CODE § 18-801 (1979).
343. Id. § 18-802.
344. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41 (1982).
345. Id. § 13A-7-42 (Supp. 1985).
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the property protection of the crime, and with the extent of coverage to both
person and property afforded by the statute. For example, the highest arson
offense in Arizona is committed by "intentionally and unlawfully damaging an
occupied structure" by fire (or explosion).4 A "structure" is defined as "any
building, object, vehicle, watercraft, aircraft or place with sides and a floor,
separately securable from any other structure attached to it and used for lodg-
ing, business, transportation, recreation or storage."13 7 And an "occupied struc-
ture" means any structure (as so defined) "in which one or more human beings
either is or is likely to be present or so near as to be in equivalent danger at
the time the fire or explosion occurs. The term includes any dwelling house,
whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant."34
New Hampshire, like Arizona, defines its highest arson offense as dam-
aging an "occupied structure" by fire (or explosion),4 and an "occupied struc-
ture" is defined to mean "any structure, vehicle, boat or place adapted for
overnight accommodations of persons, or for carrying on business therein,
whether or not a person is actually present." 3" The damaging of any other
type of property (so long as the damage exceeds $1,000) by fire (or explosion)
with the requisite mens rea is a lesser arson offense in New Hampshire. 5 Quite
obviously the definition of the term "occupied structure" in Arizona varies
considerably from the definition used in New Hampshire. For example, it would
not be the highest arson offense in New Hampshire to place a bomb in a private
automobile and to blow it up while it is driven down the road (so long as it
was not "adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on
business therein," and surely most automobiles would not come within that
definition). However, the property interest in the car would be protected under
the concept of "the property of another" in New Hampshire, so the culprit
would be guilty of the lesser felony provided the act was committed with the
requisite mens rea.52 In Arizona, however, our bomber would be guilty of
arson in the first degree.33
Despite the fact that (1) different terms in the arson statutes may include
the same subjects (the comparison between the Idaho and the Alabama statutes),
and (2) the same terms may not include the same subjects (the comparison
between the Arizona and New Hampshire statutes), general patterns do emerge
from the statutes in these thirty-eight states. These general patterns are discussed
below.3 4
346. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1704 (Supp. 1985).
347. Id. § 13-1701(4) (1978).
348. Id. § 13-1701(2).
349. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(11) (1974).
350. Id. § 635:1(111).
351. Id. § 634:1(111).
352. Id.
353. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1701(2)-(4), -1704 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
354. Indeed, the remainder of this paper is devoted to this discussion.
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a. Dwellings, Buildings, Structures, and other Real Property
No American jurisdiction confines its arson laws to the burning (or
exploding) of dwelling houses or buildings within the curtilage. However, the
concepts of the dwelling house and the curtilage rule are still important as
grading concepts in several states today.3 55 Thirty-six of the thirty-eight states
expressly provide that "buildings" 356 or "'structures,'' 3 5 7 or sometimes
both35 8 are the subject matter of arson. Although the term "structure" is a
more general term than "building" (all buildings are structures, but not all
355. See infra notes 822-25 and accompanying text.
356. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-41 to -43 (1982 & Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. §§
11.46.400-.410 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 801-803 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21-3718 to -3719 (1981); MD. CgiM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 6-11 (1982 & Supp. 1986);
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.267-.270, .273, .275 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.561-
563, .576 (West Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-17-1 to -13 (1973); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-502 to -505 (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.00-.20 (McKinney 1975 &
Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-58 to -66 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.02-
.04 (West 1982).
357. ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1703 to -1704 (Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 451-452 (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West Supp. 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-1401 to -1403 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:51-:53 (West
1974 & Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-6-103 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
205.010-.030 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1 (1974 & Supp. 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-33-1 to -4, -33-10 (1979 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-6-102 to -103 (1978).
358. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-102 to -105 (1978); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-801 to
-804 (1979); Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, §§ 20-1 (Arson), 20-1.1 (Ag-
gravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 20-1 to -1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp.
1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10 (1970); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 569.040-.055 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1401-1404 (West 1983); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.315-.325 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-4-2 to -7 (1981 &
Supp. 1985) (Rhode Island also has a misdemeanor offense which is called "Arson-
Seventh degree." Id. § 11-4-8 (1981).); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-110, -11-125, -11-
130, -11-140, -11-150 (a felony for a second offense), -11-170 (a felony/misdemeanor)
-11-190 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-201 to -206 (1982); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 502-507 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77 to -82, .2-86 (1982);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.48.020-.040, .060 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-3-1-3, -5 (1984).
Neither Hawaii nor Indiana expressly use the terms "building" or "structure"
in their arson statutes. Hawaii uses the single term "property" over a given value.
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to -823 (1976). In turn, "property" is broadly defined
to include "any ... personal property, real property ... or article of value of any
kind." Id. § 708-800(15).
The Indiana statutes describe the subject matter of arson as a "dwelling of
another," "property of any person," or "property of another person ... if the
pecuniary loss is at least $250.00." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1984). Quite
obviously buildings and structures are the subject matter of "criminal property dam-
age" in Hawaii and of arson in Indiana if they are dwellings or worth more than
$250.00.
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structures are buildings) and is therefore capable of being construed to include
such objects as bridges, dams, powerplants and the like, objects would not
usually fall within the conception of a building under common law arson,
the statutory definition of the two words do not generally differ all that
much. Each is typically included within the statutory definition of the other,
and both frequently, though not invariably, include such items of personal
property as vehicles, trailers, railway cars, aircraft, watercraft, and tents,
either generally or under certain conditions.5 9 Although an occasional statute
359. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-40(1) (1982):
BUILDING. As used in this article, such term means any structure which may
be entered and utilized by persons for business, public use, lodging or the
storage of goods, and includes any vehicle, railway car, aircraft or watercraft
used for the lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein. Where
a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied,
each unit shall not be deemed a separate building.
Id. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(6)(3) (1983):
'[B]uilding,' in addition to its usual meaning, includes any propelled vehicle
or structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying
on business; when a building consists of separate units, including apartment
units, offices, or rented rooms, each unit is considered a separate building.
Id. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1701(2), (4) (West 1978):
'Occupied structure' means any structure as defined in paragraph 4 in which
one or more human beings either is or is likely to be present or so near as
to be in equivalent danger at the time the fire or explosion occurs. The term
includes any dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant ....
'Structure' means any building, object, vehicle, watercraft, aircraft or place
with sides and a floor, separately securable from any other structure attached
to it and used for lodging, business, transportation, recreation, or storage.
Id. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1901(1) (1977):
'Occupiable structure'means a vehicle, building or other structure: (a) where
any person lives or carries on a business or other calling; or (b) where people
assemble for purposes of business, government, education, religion, enter-
tainment, or public transportation; or (c) which is customarily used for
overnight accommodation of persons; whether or not a person is actually
present. Each unit of an occupiable structure divided into separately occupied
units is itself an occupiable structure.
Id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 450(a), (c)-(d) (West Supp. 1986):
'Structure' means any building, or commercial or public tent, bridge, tunnel,
or powerplant.
'Property' means real property or personal property, other than a structure
or forest land.
'Inhabited' means currently being used for dwelling purposes whether
occupied or not. 'Inhabited structure' and 'inhabited property' do not in-
clude the real property on which an inhabited structure or an inhabited
property is located.
Id. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 222(1) (1979):
'Building', in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, ve-
hicle or watercraft. Where a building consists of 2 or more units separately
secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.
Id. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01(3) (West Supp. 1986):
As used in this chapter, 'structure' means any building of any kind, any
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will include bridges, or dams, or powerplants either in the definition of a
"structure," 3 6 or as one of the subject matters set forth in the statute,3 6 the
more common practice is to include this type of real property by the use of
the generic phrases "any real or personal property," or "any property,"
both of which will be discussed below. 362
b. Personal Property
Although common law arson did not protect personal property from
being burned or damaged by fire, the arson statutes of twelve of the thirty-
eight states make any personal property the subject matter of arson so long
as the value of the property, or the amount of the damage inflicted, exceeds
a given amount (which ranges from a low of $25.00 to a high of $1,000.).13
enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances
thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, water-
craft, or aircraft.
Id. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.556(3) (West Supp. 1985):
'Building,' in addition to its ordinary meaning includes any tent, watercraft,
structure or vehicle that is customarily used for overnight lodging of a person
or persons. If a building consists of two or more units separately secured
or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.
Id. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-501 (1979):
As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires, building shall
mean a structure which has the capacity to contain, and is designed for the
shelter of man, animals, or property, and includes ships, trailers, sleeping
cars, aircraft, or other vehicles or places adapted for overnight accommo-
dations of persons or animals, or for carrying on a business therein, whether
or not a person or animal is actually present. If a building is divided into
units for separate occupancy, any unit not occupied by the defendant is a
building of another.
Id. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.010(a)(5) (West 1977):
'Building' has the definition in RCW 9A.04.110(5), and where a building
consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall
not be treated as a separate building. And § 9A.04.110(5): 'Building,' in
addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle,
railway car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of
persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit
of goods; each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately
secured or occupied is a separate building.
Id.
360. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 450(a) (West Supp. 1986), discussed supra note
359.
361. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 2 (West 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
61 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-203 (1982); Va. Code § 18.2-80 (1982).
362. See infra text following note 364.
363. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1403 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 18-803 (1979); MD.
CRnm. LAW CODE ANN. § 8 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 5 (West 1970);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-7 (1972); NEV. REv. STAT. § 205.020 (1985); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-4-5 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-3-203 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 504 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-81 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-3 (1984).
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In addition, North Carolina protects any personal property regardless of its
value if the actor burns that property with the intent "to injure or preju-
dice . . . the person owning the property or any other person.'"
3 64
c. Any Real or Personal Property or any Property
Each of the states considered in their section uses a comprehensive phrase,
such as "any real or personal property" or "any property," to describe the
subject matter of at least one of the felony arson offenses. Since there is no
overlap between these states and the thirteen states that use "personal prop-
erty" (together with "dwelling, building or structure"), the comprehensive
description states also provide similar protection to personal property. How-
ever, the comprehensive description of property used by these states also
includes "real property." In all, except for Hawaii, the term "dwelling,"
"building," or "structure" is also used to define the subject matter of arson
but that term is either used for emphasis, or as a grading distinction, to
distinguish between a greater and lesser arson offense.
3 65
There are eighteen states that use one or the other of these comprehensive
phrases to describe the subject matter of at least one of the felony arson
offenses. With reference to their personal property coverage, there is a mon-
etary minimum on the value of the personal property or the amount of the
damage caused to qualify as a felony in thirteen of the states.66 In the
remaining five states, any personal property regardless of its value or the
extent of the damage will do.3 67 Again with reference to personal property
only, if the thirteen states which include "any personal property" as the
364. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-66 (1981).
365. See infra notes 374-77.
366. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1703 (Supp. 1985) (more than $100 in value);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-103 (1978) (if damage is $100 or more); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 708-821(b) (1976) (damages in an amount exceeding $500); Criminal Code of 1961,
tit. III, art. 20 § 20-1 (Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977)
(personal property having a value of $150 or more); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1
(Burns 1985) (pecuniary loss of at least $250); MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 28.268-.269
(1981) (value of personal property is more than $50); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.563
(West Supp. 1986) (value of more than $300); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-504 (1979)
(damages of $100 or more); N.H. REV. STAT. Am. § 634:1 (III)(c) & (d) (1974 &
Supp. 1983) (pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1403
(West 1983) (personal property worth not less than $50); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-33-3 (1979) (of a value in excess of $25); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-102 (1978)
(if the damage exceeds $5,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.02-.03 (West 1982) (property
of any value by explosion, of the value of $100 or more by fire).
367. CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3718
(1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:52 (West 1986) (damage of $500 or more); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 569.055 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.030 (1977).
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subject matter of arson3 6 are added to the states that include personal prop-
erty in a comprehensive phrase such as "any real or personal property" or
"any property," 69 thirty-one of the thirty-eight states that require harm to
be inflicted on the subject matter of the offense extend protection to any
personal property as long as it also meets a monetary criterion in the majority
of those states. The remaining seven states either protect only specified per-
sonal property, or do not protect it at all. Six of these seven, Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, Montana, New York, and Oregon, protect specified per-
sonal property by virtue of their respective definitions of "building" or
"structure," or in connection with their contents.370 Except for New York,
these states do not otherwise protect personal property by the felony sanctions
of their arson statutes.37 ' New York includes, in addition, motor vehicles in
the subject matter of arson. 312 The sole remaining state, Alaska, makes it a
felony to burn (or explode) any personal property only if it endangers another
person. 73
With respect to real property, each of these eighteen states using the
comprehensive phrases "any real or personal property" or "any property"
368. The thirteen states are identified supra notes 363-64.
369. These states are identified supra notes 366-67.
370. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-40(1) (1982): "Building" includes any vehicle, railway
car, aircraft or watercraft used for the lodging of persons or for carrying on business
therein. The felony arson provisions only protect "buildings." Id. §§ 13A-7-41 to -
42 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 222(1) (1979): "Building," in addition to its ordinary
meaning, includes any structure, vehicle, or watercraft. The felony arson provisions
only protect "buildings." Id. §§ 801-803.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West Supp. 1986): "Structure means.., any vehicle,
vessel, watercraft, or aircraft." (emphasis supplied). The felony arson provisions
apply only to dwellings or structures or their contents. Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(40) (1985): 'Occupied structure' means any build-
ing, vehicle, or other place suitable for human occupancy or night lodging of persons
or for carrying on business, whether or not a person is actually present." The felony
arson provisions (along with two inchoate offenses discussed infra notes 408-12) apply
only to occupied structures. Id. §§ 45-6-102 to -103.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.00(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986): 'Building,' in addition
to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for over-
night lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein.") See
infra text accompanying note 371.
Although Oregon uses the phrase "protected property" rather than "building
or structure," that phrase is defined in essentially the same way. "'Protected property'
means any structure, place or thing customarily occupied by people .... " OR. REV.
STAT. 164.305(l) (1985) (emphasis supplied). The felony sanction of arson protects
only "protected property" and "buildings" in Oregon. Id. §§ 164.315, -.325. Al-
though "any property" may be the subject of arson, it is arson only if the fire (or
explosion) endangers either people or "protected property." Id. § 164.325. Thus other
property, as property, is not protected in Oregon.
371. See citations supra note 370.
372. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.05-.20 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
373. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.400-.410 (1983).
19861 373
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protect real property as the subject matter of at least one felony arson of-
fense. But with respect to real property, all of these states (except Hawaii)
also describe a "dwelling," a "building," or a "structure" as the subject
matter of arson as well.174 Hence the arson laws in these states protect (1)
dwellings, or buildings, or structures (or more usually, because of the defi-
nition used, all three); (2) any other real property (such as water towers,
windmills, bridges, dams, and the like); and (3) any personal property (though
it must meet certain monetary criteria in fourteen of the eighteen states).
In the thirteen states which comprehensively protect personal property,
but not real property, their arson statutes include (1) dwellings, or buildings,
or structures (or more usually, because of the definitions used, all three);
and (2) any personal property (but in the majority of these states only if
specified monetary criteria is met) . 75 In addition, five of these thirteen states
protect specified items of real property, (such as bridges and dams),3 76 and
seven extend protection to such items of real property as forests, woods, and
standing crops.3 77 But none comprehensively include all items of real property
as the subject matter of arson.
2. States with Inchoate Offenses378
As we have seen before, the principal thrust of the Model Penal Code's
arson provisions is the protection of people against the risks of injury and
death created by unlawful fires and explosions.3 79 And the drafters of the
Code extended their protection beyond that afforded in the harm states by
converting arson into an inchoate offense. The Model Penal Code offenses
are committed when the actor purposely "starts a fire or causes an explosion"
either with the further purpose of "destroying a building or occupied struc-
374. See supra notes 366-67 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
376. MD. CRIu.. LAW CODE ANN. § 7 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (piers, wharfs, &
public bridges); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 2 (West 1970) (bridges, locks,
dams, flumes, and tanks); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-61 (1981) (bridges); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-3-203 (1982) (bridges and railroads); VA. CODE § 18.2-80 (1982) (bridges,
locks, dams, or other structures).
377. MAss. GEm. LAws ANN. ch. 266, § 5 (West 1970); NEv. REv. STAT. §
205.020 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-4-7 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-140
(Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-203 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 507 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-81 (1982).
378. Included here are the twelve states which define their basic arson offense
as an inchoate crime. As indicated below (see infra text accompanying notes 402-07),
several of these states also define one of their offenses as a traditional result, or
harm, crime. On the other hand, while five "harm states" define their basic arson
offense in the traditional way, they also define one of their remaining arson offenses
as an inchoate crime. See infra notes 408-12 and accompanying text. The criterion
used to classify these states is the principal thrust of their basic arson offenses.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
374 [Vol. 51
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ture of another" (or any property to collect insurance for such loss) or which
recklessly "places another person in danger of death or bodily injury" or
"places a building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage or
destruction. ' 380 In either case the offense is committed when the fire is started
or the explosion is caused with the requisite purpose or which endangers
persons or buildings or occupied structures.
3
'
In a harm state, the property must be either "burned" or "damaged"
before the crime of arson is committed. A culprit who throws gasoline on a
dwelling house, lights a match, and then changes her mind commits arson
under the Model Penal Code, but attempted arson in the majority of states,
for they adhere to the harm concept . 8 2 If the culprit changed her mind just
before the match was lit, she would be guilty of attempted arson in all
American states. Thus the inchoate provisions of the Model Penal Code
convert only a portion of the law of attempted arson into arson. In one
sense, the Model Penal Code has shifted the emphasis from the requirement
of burning or damage to a similar, but perhaps less perplexing problem:
when is a fire started? Be that as it may, there is no traditional subject matter
of these inchoate provisions. Instead there is either (1) property which is the
target of the actor's incendiary (or explosive) conduct, or (2) persons or
property which are recklessly endangered by such conduct. In either case the
function of the target property, or the person or property endangered is
precisely the same: they define the risks the creation of which the arson
offenses seek to punish and suppress. Of course, the subject matter of the
arson offense in the harm states functions in essentially the same way, but
our traditional ways of thinking about arson as a "result crime" suggests
that separate treatment of the target and endangered property may be re-
quired. 3 3 In addition, people are the direct concern in the Model Penal
Code's "Reckless Burning or Exploding" provisions, whereas they were never
the direct concern of the common law offense. 384 Instead, they were implicitly
and indirectly protected at common law, and in the harm states which have
expanded the personal protection of arson, people are protected only after
property is "burned" or "damaged." '385
Finding it "difficult to distinguish the burning of property from other
methods of property destruction reached by more generally applicable of-
380. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(2).
381. The primary purpose behind the use of buildings or occupied structures
as the target of the offense or the property endangered is to implicitly protect people.
See supra text accompanying notes 200-05.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79, 289-90, 297-305.
383. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2).
384. Although arson protected the dwellers in the habitation, it did so indirectly
by virtue of the definition of the subject matter of the offense-a "dwelling house."
See supra notes 18-50 and accompanying text.
385. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 280-311.
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fenses," the drafters of the Model Penal Code exclude property from the
protection of the Code's arson provisions, except when the prospect of danger
to human life is involved.38 6 In short, the Code does not use the arson
provisions to protect property as property. Property is protected as an implicit
means of protecting people (or protecting against insurance fraud).3 87 That
is, of course, the reason for limiting the target property or the property
endangered to "a building or occupied structure of another.11
8
Before moving on to a consideration of the nature of the property which
may either be a target of the actor's conduct or endangered thereby, one
further point should be made. If in one of these states the target property
or the property (or person) endangered is actually damaged (or injured),
quite obviously the offense is committed if the fire (or explosion) which
caused the damage (or injury) were accompanied with the necessary mens
rea.
Twelve states have patterned their arson laws, at least in substantial
part, on the Model Penal Code's concept of arson as an inchoate offense. 89
386. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.1 comment 5, at 21.
387. As indicated in the introduction, a discussion of arson insurance fraud is
beyond the scope of this paper. See supra note 5.
388. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)-(2).
389. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902 to -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (§ 41-1903
contains two damage provisions in subsections (b) and (c)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53a-1 11 to -113 (West 1985) (§ 53a-1 13 is a damage statute); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
712.1-.3 (West 1979) (these are all inchoate provisions); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 513.020,
.040, .060 (1985) (§ 513.040 is a damage provision. § 513.060 is an insurance fraud
provision, and though such provisions are beyond the scope of this paper, it is
mentioned here because it too is a damage provision.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) (this is entirely an inchoate provision); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:17-1 (West 1982) (this is entirely an inchoate offense); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30-17-5 to -6 (1984). § 30-17-5(A) is an inchoate offense ("arson") whereas sub-
section (B) (negligent arson) is a damage provision. § 30-17-6 (aggravated arson) is
also a damage statute. Because the basic arson offense (§ 30-17-5(A)) is an inchoate
provision, I have classified New Mexico as an inchoate state. Since I have no empirical
data as to the frequency with which the various provisions are violated, I could have
easily classified New Mexico as a harm state. Nevertheless, I have selected as the
criterion of choice whether the basic provision, arson as opposed to "aggravated"
or "negligent" arson, is inchoate or not. Under that criterion New Mexico is an
inchoate state. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21-01 to -02 (1985) (§ 12.1-21-02(c) is a
damage provision, whereas the remainder of that section (subsections (a) & (b)), are
inchoate provisions as is all of § 12.1-21-01); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02-.03
(Page Supp. 1984) (§ 2909.02(A)(2) is a damage provision. The remainder of that
section contains inchoate provisions. Section 2909.03 is an equal blend of inchoate
and harm provisions.); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (Purden 1983) (the section
creates only inchoate offenses); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
(this section contains only inchoate offenses); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-101 to -103 (1977)
(§ 6-3-102 is an inchoate insurance fraud provision, but it is included here because
of its inchoate nature. § 6-3-103(a)(ii) is a property damage provision, but the re-
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Of these twelve states, eleven define the basic offense in terms of an actor
who starts a fire or causes an explosion with the intent of (or with the purpose
of) damaging or destroying property (the target of the actor's conduct). In
nine of the eleven states "buildings" or "structures" are at least one of the
target properties (and sometimes the only target property), 1 Like the states
which use "buildings" or "structures" as the subject matter of their tradi-
tional harm statutes, these terms typically include the other, and such items
of personal property as vehicles, watercraft, aircraft, trailers, sleeping cars,
and the like.3 9' Two states, Arkansas and New Mexico, include (along with
buildings or structures) any property; 392 and that comprehensive phrase is the
only description of the target of this inchoate offense in Iowa and Maine,
which of course, covers "buildings" and "structures" as well.193 Arkansas
and North Dakota also include vital public facilities within their description
of the target of the actor's conduct. 394 Finally, New Jersey uniquely makes
"another person" the target of the actor's incendiary (or explosive) con-
duct. 395 Seven of these eleven states include personal property as the target
of their attempt-like offense beyond the specific items of property included
within the definition of the terms "buildings" or "structures." These are
the states with the comprehensive "any property" description of the target
of their attempt-like offense, and states which use a similar phrase limited
to personal property (generally with a monetary requirement as well). 396
mainder of this section (subsection (i)) is an inchoate provision as is all of § 6-3-
102.).
For reasons converse to those which caused me to classify New Mexico as an
inchoate state, I classified Montana as a harm state. But the classification of Montana
as a harm state is surely so close that it could have been easily classified either way.
I simply chose to classify Montana as a harm state. See infra note 408 for the inchoate
provisions in Montana.
390. These are the states listed supra note 389 with the exception of Iowa and
Maine. As to these two states, see infra note 393. The Texas statute uses the phrase
"building, habitation, or vehicle." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. 28.02(a) (Vernon Supp.
1985). Ohio is the only state that uses an endangering type inchoate offense as its
basic inchoate arson crime. See supra note 389.
391. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-100(a) (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 513.010 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:18-1 (West 1982); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2909.01 (Page 1975 & Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-104(v)-(xi) (1977).
392. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1901 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5 (1984)
(This statute also specifically mentions bridges, utility lines, fences, or signs, but the
value of the "thing" damaged or destroyed must be over $100 to be a felony).
393. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 712.1 (West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
394. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1901(4), -1902(d), -1903(c) (1977 & Supp. 1983);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-21-01 to -02(1)(b) (1985).
395. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(a) (West 1982) ("A person is guilty of aggra-
vated arson ... if he starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property
or another's: (1) Thereby purposely or knowingly placing another person in danger
of death or bodily injury . . .")
396. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1901(2), -1902(b)-(c) (1977 & Supp. 1983); IOWA
19861
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Nine of these twelve states also include an "endangering" statute, a
statute which prohibits an actor from endangering people or property by fire
(or explosion),3 97 which is substantially similar to the "Reckless Burning or
Exploding" provisions of the Model Penal Code.3 98 In all of these states,
risks to people are specifically mentioned,99 buildings or structures are de-
scribed in five, 410 and any property of another or any personal property is
protected from such conduct in four states.40
But in seven of the states in which arson is predominately an inchoate
offense, the traditional definition of arson as an offense requiring harm is
used for at least one of the arson offenses. 402 The subject matter of these
CODE ANN. §§ 702.14, 712.1 (West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802
(West 1983 & Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-21-02 (1985); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.03 (Page Supp. 1984); 18 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 3301(d)(2) (Purdon 1983).
397. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902(1)(c), -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-111(a)(4), -112(A), -114 (West 1985); IowA CODE ANN. §§
712.1-.3 (West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802(B)(2) (West Supp. 1985);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(a)(1), -1-(b)(1) (West 1982); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-
21-02(l)(a)-(b) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02(A)(1), (3), .03 (Page Supp.
1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(1)(i), (c)(2), (d)(1)-(2) (Purdon 1983); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-3-103(a)(i) (1977).
398. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2).
399. See supra note 397.
400. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-114 (West 1985) ("Recklessly places a
building of another ... in danger of destruction or damage."); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:17-1(b)(2) (West 1982) ("Thereby recklessly placing a building or structure of
another in danger of damage or destruction."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02(b)
(1985) ("Places an entire or any part of a building or inhabited structure of another
... in danger of destruction."); Oio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02(A)(2) (occupied
structure), .03(A)(3) (certain named public buildings) (Page Supp. 1984); 18 PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(1)(ii), -(c)(1), -6(c)(2), -(d)(1) (Purdon 1983) ("A ...
building or structure of another.").
401. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 712.1, .3 (West 1979) (the value of the personal
property must exceed $500); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802(B)(2) (West Supp.
1985) (no monetary qualification); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.03(2)-(4) (Page
Supp. 1984) (no monetary qualification); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3301(d)(2) (a
value of $5,000 or more).
The Arkansas and North Dakota statutes also protect "vital public facilities."
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1901(4), -1902(d), -1903(c) (1977 & Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-21-02 (b) (1985).
402. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1903 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (the reckless burning
offense is part inchoate (subsection (a)), and part harm (subsections (b) & (c)); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-1 13 (West 1985) (arson in the third degree: recklessly "causes
destruction or damage to a building"); Ky. REV. STAT. § 513.040 (1985) (arson in
the third degree: "wantonly causes destruction or damage to a building of his own
or of another"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5(B) (1984) (negligent arson: "causing
the death or bodily injury of another; or damaging or destroying a building or
occupied structure of another"), id. § 30-17-6 (aggravated arson: "damaging... any
bridge, aircraft, watercraft, vehicle, pipeline, utility line, communication line or struc-
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non-inchoate offenses are similar to the subjects used in the states where the
traditional definition prevails. 403 They are buildings or structures in five of
the seven states,4 a vital public facility is added in Arkansas, 40 , additional
property is set forth in the New Mexico statute,4 and two states, North
Dakota and Wyoming, include any property of another in excess of a given
amount. 407 It is unclear why these states have chosen to use the traditional
definition of arson in these instances.
Conversely, five or perhaps six of the states that generally use the tra-
ditional definition of arson (as a harm offense) also define one of their arson
crimes as an inchoate offense. 408 With the exception of Tennessee, which uses
ture, railway structure, private or public building, dwelling or other structure, causing
a person great bodily harm"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02(c) (1985) (endangering
by fire or explosion: "causes damage to property of another constituting pecuniary
loss in excess of two thousand dollars"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02(2) (Page
Supp. 1984) (aggravated arson: "cause physical harm to any occupied structure"),
id. § 2909.03 (an equal blend of inchoate and damage provisions: "cause, or create
a substantial risk of, physical harm"); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-103(a)(ii) (1977) (third degree
arson: "with criminal negligence ... destroys or damages any property of another
which has a value of two hundred dollars ... on more").
403. See supra text beginning at note 334.
404. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1903(b) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 53a-113
(West 1985); Ky. REv. STAT. § 513.040 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5(B), -17-
6 (1984); OHIo REV. STAT. ANN. § 2909.02(2), .03(3) (Page Supp. 1984).
405. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1903(c) (1977). Although North Dakota also pro-
tects "vital public facilities" by its arson laws, it does so only with its inchoate
provisions. See supra note 394.
406. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-6 (1984).
407. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02(c) (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-103(a)(ii)
(1977).
408. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-4-105 (1978) (fourth degree arson: "A person who
knowingly or recklessly starts or maintains a fire or causes an explosion, on his own
property or that of another, and by so doing places another in danger of death or
serious bodily injury or places any building or occupied structure of another in danger
of damage .... "; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-102(1)(a) (1985) (Negligent arson:
"[P]urposely or knowingly starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own
property or of another, and thereby negligently places another person in danger of
death or bodily injury ... ." The section also has a misdemeanor provision covering
endangering the property of another. Id. § 45-6-103(b) (arson: "When, by means of
fire or explosives, he knowingly or purposely... (b) places another person in danger
of death or bodily injury .... "); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 (Supp. 1985) (arson-first
degree: "Any person who knowingly causes ... or creates by means of fire or
explosion, a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or damage to
any building the property of himself or another ... which is occupied or in use ....
"); TEN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-204 (1982) (setting fire with intent to burnm-"if any
person set fire to any material or thing, with intent to burn any building, boat or
other subject matter of arson .... "); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020(1)(a),
.020(1)(c) (West Supp. 1985) (arson in the first degree: knowingly and maliciously:
"(a) causes a fire or explosion which is manifestly dangerous to any human life,
including firemen ... (c) causes a fire or explosion in any building in which there
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the target variation of the inchoate offense,0 the provisions in these states
are of the endangering variety.410 Of the states with the "endangering" type
statute, all name the danger to people as one of the objects of the statute, 41'
and in addition to the risk to persons, three or four states use the concept
of a risk to a building or occupied structure.
4 2
Tennessee exclusively uses the target type of inchoate offense, 43 and
Montana uses the same unique approach used by New Jersey when it defines
arson, in part, as "knowingly or purposely ... placing another person in
danger of death or bodily injury" by means of fire or explosives. 414
The rationale of the use of these inchoate offenses by states that generally
adhere to the traditional definition of arson is clear enough. They wish to
extend the personal protection of their arson laws to situations in which
human risks are created but harm has not been inflicted on one of the subject
matters specified in one of their traditional arson offenses. This purpose can
be gleaned from the description of what is protected by these statutes: people
shall be at the time a human being who is not a participant in the crime . .. ").
Although the New Hampshire statute is ambiguous, that state may also have an
inchoate provision of the endangering variety. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(III)(b)
(1974) reads as follows: "The actor purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion on
anyone's property and thereby recklessly places another in danger of death or serious
bodily injury, or places an occupied structure of another in danger of damage .... .
While there is no particular ambiguity in this wording, the ambiguity arises because
of the construction of the entire section. Section 634:1(I) gives the basic definition
of arson: "A person is guilty of arson if he knowingly starts a fire or causes an
explosion which unlawfully damages the property of another." Subsections II, III,
and IV of Section 634:1 grade the arson liability described in subsection I. If these
subsections simply divide the arson liability described in subsection I, then all of the
circumstances described in subsections II, III, and IV require that the fire or explosion
damage the property of another. If this is so, then subsection 111(b) requires that the
purposely set fire or explosion (a) be on anyone's property, (b) but it must damage
the property of another, and (c) thereby recklessly endanger another or the specified
property. An example may be in order. These requirements would be fulfilled if the
culprit knowingly burned the victim's automobile (thus damaging the property of
another) while it was parked on the street (on public property) dangerously close to
the victim's house, which was ignited by the blaze (endangering an occupied structure).
Nevertheless, I have treated this provision as an inchoate offense though I find no
cases addressing this issue. A court, however, could easily hold that this is a "harm"
provision. Although I am inclined toward the harm interpretation, I later mention
New Hampshire as having an inchoate provision, out of an abundance of caution.
409. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-204 (1982).
410. The statutes are cited supra note 408.
411. These four states are Colorado, Montana, Rhode Island, and Washington.
The statutes are cited supra note 408.
412. The three states are Colorado, Rhode Island, and Washington. The stat-
utes are identified supra note 408. If the New Hampshire statute is construed to be
an inchoate offense, then there are four states. See supra note 408.
413. The statutes are cited supra note 408.
414. The statutes are cited supra note 408. .
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and buildings or occupied structures. Why these states have not fully em-
braced the inchoate approach to arson is, however, less than clear.
Since twelve states have patterned their arson laws, at least in substantial
part, on the Model Penal Code's concept of arson as an inchoate offense,
have these states also followed the Code's conception of arson as essentially
a crime which protects people, not property? Of these twelve states only
Arkansas, Connecticut, and New Jersey fail to protect property interests
against the risks of damage or destruction by fire. 41s Indeed these three states
more closely follow the Model Penal Code than any other American state.
But, since Arkansas and Connecticut also use the traditional harm definitions
for at least one of their arson offenses and New Jersey does not, 4 6 New
Jersey comes closer to the Model Penal Code's provisions, yet there are still
substantial differences between the two.4 17 Nevertheless, as does the Model
Penal Code, all three of these states protect property by their felony arson
offenses only incidentally to the protection of human risks associated with
that property. Not so with the remaining nine states.
In Maine, the arson statute reflects no special interest in the protection
of human risks over property risks. They are treated essentially the same,
they are subject to the same punishment and all property of another is
protected.418 Likewise, the Texas statute, though it protects only limited types
of property, draws no distinction between those provisions of the statute
aimed at protecting property and those aimed at protecting people.4 9 Iowa,
420
Kentucky, 42' and Ohio42  protect persons with their first degree or aggravated
arson offenses, and property with their lesser degree or (simple) arson of-
fenses. There is, however, a difference in the scope of the property protection
afforded by the arson law in these three states. Iowa's second degree arson
statute protects against endangering buildings, structures, real property of
any kind, standing crops, and personal property which exceeds $500.00 in
value,421 whereas the Kentucky second and third degree arson statutes apply
only to buildings. 424 On the other hand, the Ohio (simple) arson statute
415. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902 to -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-111 to -113 (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1 (West 1982).
416. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
417. New Jersey, for example, uses a person as the target of one of the arson
offenses. See supra note 395 and accompanying text. The Model Penal Code contains
no similar provision.
418. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
419. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (buildings, habi-
tations, or vehicles in the specified situations).
420. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 712.1-.3 (West 1979).
421. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 513.020-.040 (1985).
422. OnHo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02-.03 (Page Supp. 1984).
423. IowA CODE ANN. § 712.3 (West 1979).
424. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 513.030-.040 (1985).
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applies to any property of another and to certain specified public buildings. 421
New Mexico protects people endangering property (e.g., occupied struc-
tures) in the same section that protects the "property of another," bridges,
utility lines, fences or signs. And as long as the value of the thing "damaged
or destroyed" is valued at over $1,000, they are all punished as a third degree
felony. 426 While North Dakota does treat person endangering conduct more
seriously than property endangering conduct, 427 it is a felony to damage the
property of another if the loss is in excess of $2,000.428 Pennsylvania protects
uninhabited buildings, unoccupied structures, and any personal property of
another having a value of $5,000 or more from the risks created by reckless
fires and explosions. 4 9 Finally, Wyoming's third degree arson statute protects
''any property of another which has a value of two hundred dollars . . . or
more.' '430
Thus, unlike the Model Penal Code, seven of the nine inchoate states
(Maine, Iowa, Ohio, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wyo-
ming) protect a wide range of property. Although the remaining two states
(Kentucky and Texas) protect fewer types of property than the other seven
inchoate states, they nonetheless differ substantially from the Model Penal
Code's single minded person endangering approach to arson. 41'
Since the common law curtilage rule functioned to include buildings
which were not dwellings as the subject matter of arson, one can only un-
derstand the demise of that rule by first reflecting on the modem statutory
changes in the subject matter of arson. But before moving on to a discussion
of the current status of the curtilage rule, a summary of the changes in both
the traditional and the inchoate states should therefore be helpful.
1. Although the subject matter of the common law offense was a dwell-
ing house, all American states have expanded the subject matter of their
arson offenses to include a wide variety of property. 4 2
2. That expansion had as its purpose either the extension of the crime
to protect property interests, or the expansion of the protection afforded to
people from the risks of death or bodily injury attendant upon fires or
explosions, or both. 43 The minority of states currently confine their arson
offenses to protecting a limited class of people (the inhabitants of dwelling
425. Oino REv. CODE ANN. 2909.03 (Page Supp. 1984).
426. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5A(3) (1984). It is a fourth degree felony if the
property is valued at over $100 but not more than $1,000. Id. at 5(2). If it is below
$100, it is a misdemeanor. Id. at (5)(1).
427. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985) with id. § 12.1-21-02.
428. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02(c) (1985).
429. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3301(d) (Purdon 1983).
430. Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-103(a)(ii) (1977).
431. See supra text accompanying notes 190-218.
432. See supra notes 339-40, 355-77, and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 232-62, 338-45, and accompanying text.
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houses, as did the common law) but they protect a wide variety of property
interests. These are the states which have patterned their legislation on the
Model Arson Law. This result has been achieved through the redefinition of
the subject matter of the offense to include, in addition to dwelling houses
and buildings within the curtilage, all buildings or structures, and personal
property above a certain monetary value. 434 On the other hand, the majority
of states, while also expanding the protection to property interests in the
same manner as the minority, have also extended the protection afforded to
persons beyond that recognized by the common law by either using a person
endangering subject matter for its person protecting arson offenses, or person
endangering circumstances, or both, to extend the personal protection of
their felony arson provisions. 435 A fewer number of the states which have
extended the personal protection of the arson statutes have done so by using
either a person endangering subject matter or person endangering circum-
stances, but not both.436
The property protecting offenses are distinguished from the people pro-
tecting offenses in all American states by the presence or absence of special
person endangering qualities of the subject matter and frequently, but not
inevitably, by the requirement of person endangering circumstances. For
example, a person protecting offense will have a subject matter such as
"inhabited" or "occupied" buildings or structures whereas the property pro-
tecting offense will have as its subject matter buildings or structures. A person
protecting offense may also be created by using person endangering circum-
stances in connection with a subject matter which does not include any
enhanced human risks, such as when the actor knows that another person is
in a building or structure at the time of the burning.
3. Despite the fact that different terms in the various arson statutes may
include the same subjects (because one term is more general than the other),
and that the same term may not include the same subjects (because of unique
statutory definitions), general patterns do emerge from the statutes in the
thirty-eight harm states.437
4. In thirty-six of the thirty-eight harm states "buildings" or "struc-
tures," or sometimes both, are the subject matter of at least one of the
felony arson offenses. 438 The two remaining states use a comprehensive def-
inition which would include all buildings and structures, however defined. 439
5. In addition to the use of "buildings" or "structures," eighteen of
the harm states use a comprehensive phrase such as "any real or personal
434. See supra notes 222-231, 338-43, and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 219-22, 244-62, and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 232-43 and accompanying text.
437. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 356-62 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 358.
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property" or "any property" to describe the subject matter of at least one
of the felony arson offenses.4 " Other states frequently include such items of
real property as bridges, dams, powerplants, timber and the like either within
the definition of "structure" or as an enumerated subject matter in the arson
statute itself.441
6. Thirty-one of the thirty-eight harm states extend felony arson pro-
tection to any personal property, but there is a monetary minimum on the
value of the personal property or the amount of the damage caused in a
majority of these states.4 2 The remaining seven states either protect only
specified personal property, or do not protect it at all."43 But as seen above,
it is not uncommon for certain items of specified personal property to be
included within the definition of a "building" or "structure," and a few
states include the contents of specified buildings or structures as the subject
matter of arson as well. 4 "
7. In all eleven of the inchoate states which use an attempt-like arson
offense as their basic arson crime, "buildings" or "structures" are at least
one of the target properties." 5 In nine of these eleven they are enumerated
in the statute. When these terms are specifically mentioned in the statute,
like the harm states, they are typically defined to include the other term, and
such items of personal property as vehicles, watercraft, aircraft, trailers,
sleeping cars, and the like. 4" In the remaining two states, buildings and
structures (and other property) are included within the comprehensive phrase
"any property.""*4 7 In addition to "buildings" and "structures," two more
of these eleven states also use the comprehensive "any property" terminol-
ogy, several states-include "vital public facilities," and one state, New Jersey,
uniquely makes "another person" the target of the actor's conduct. 4 48
In seven of the nine states which protect property as property, personal
property is also included as one of the targets of the attempt-like offense. 49
But, again like the harm states, several states include specific items of per-
sonal property as part of their definition of "building" or "structure.
4 0
440. See supra notes 366-68 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 358-62 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 368-69 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
444. Id.
445. Although there are twelve inchoate states, see supra note 389, Ohio does
not use an attempt-like statute. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02-.03 (Page
Supp. 1984); see supra notes 389-95 and accompanying text.
446. See supra note 390-91 and accompanying text.
447. See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 414-17, 431, and accompanying text.
450. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
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8. Nine of the twelve states which use the inchoate approach to arson
include an endangering statute in their arson provisions.45" ' In all of these
states risks to people are specifically mentioned, buildings or structures are
described in five, but any property of another or any personal property above
a given amount is protected from endangering conduct in only four states.4
5 2
In the five or six harm states with endangering provisions, all name the
danger to people as one of the objects of the statute, while four or five also
seek to suppress and punish conduct which risks person endangering prop-
erty-occupied buildings or structures.4 -3
9. The inchoate states have largely patterned their offenses on the Model
Penal Code which does not protect property as property. The primary pur-
pose of the Model Penal Code's arson provisions is to protect persons and
prevent insurance fraud. 45 4 Although all of the inchoate states have patterned
their arson provisions after the Model Penal Code, only three states follow
the code to the extent that they do not protect property as property. 455 Seven
of the remaining nine, like the majority of harm states, protect the property
interests in a wide variety of real and personal property (there are usually
monetary criteria for the personal property), but the remaining two states
protect fewer types of property.45 6
10. Although the inchoate states generally tend to protect slightly fewer
property interests than do the harm states, the principal distinction between
the harm states and the inchoate states does not lie in drastic differences
between the subject matter of the arson offense in the traditional state and
the target of the attempt-like offense in the inchoate state. Instead it is in
the difference between the traditional states' subject matter definition and
the endangering statutes. People are never the enumerated subject matter in
a harm state, whereas they are commonly mentioned in endangering type
statutes in both the inchoate states45 7 and the harm states which supplement
their traditional approach with endangering statutes.4 8
C. The Modern Status of the Curtilage Rule
As we have seen above, dwelling houses were the primary subject matter
of arson at common law. 459 But a building, not itself a dwelling, was also
451. See supra note 397.
452. See supra notes 399-401.
453. See supra notes 408-12 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 190-218 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
456. See supra text accompanying note 431.
457. See supra notes 397-99 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 410-11 and accompanying text.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 10, 18-38.
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the subject matter of arson if it was within the curtilage of a dwelling house.41
The curtilage rule thus operated to define a secondary subject matter of
common law arson, buildings within the curtilage. There are two reasons for
characterizing a building within the curtilage as a secondary subject matter.
First, the application of the rule was entirely dependent upon the existence
of a dwelling house at the time of the fire. If the house in question did not
qualify as a dwelling in exactly the same way required if it were burned,
then the curtilage rule was inapplicable. For example, if the prior dwellers
moved from the dwelling with the intent of abandoning the house as "home,"
and the house stood vacant when a detached garage was willfully and ma-
liciously burned by a complete stranger, it would not be arson at common
law despite the fact that it was located only a few feet from the house (the
proximity requirement), and despite the fact that it was used by the prior
dwellers as a place in which to shelter the family automobile and to wash
the family clothes (the use requirement). 46 Secondly, the focal point of the
geographic proximity requirement of the curtilage rule was the dwelling house
itself. For a building to qualify as the subject matter of arson, it had to be
sufficiently close to the dwelling house, not another building within the cur-
tilage.4 62 In other words, the curtilage rule could not be used to include a
building which was quite distant from the dwelling on the theory that it was
within the curtilage of a building which was, in turn, within the curtilage of
a dwelling house. Given the rationale of the curtilage rule, the protection of
dwellers from nearly the same risks which would be created if the dwelling
house itself was burned, the curtilage rule made sense as a rule of inclusion,
as a rule that extended the protection of the law of arson. But the curtilage
rule also operated as a rule of exclusion. A building which was physically
close enough to a dwelling to qualify under the proximity requirement was
nonetheless not within the curtilage if it was not used by the dwellers, but
by someone else. Thus the burning of a building only a few feet away which
was used by someone other than the dweller was not arson on the theory of
the curtilage rule, even though the fire created an extreme risk of burning
the dwelling.463 Similarly, the burning of items of personal property which
were physically located very near the dwelling was not arson, despite the very
high risk which might well be created, and despite the daily use of the item
by the dweller, for only buildings within the curtilage would do.4
Given the underinclusive nature of the personal protection afforded by
the curtilage rule, and the common law's failure to protect such valued
property as property, it is not surprising that all modern legislation extends
460. See supra text accompanying notes 39-50.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 38, 40-46.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
463. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
464. See supra text accompanying note 47.
[Vol. 51
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the subject matter of arson to include all buildings and similar structures (at
least "of another") wherever situated, by whomever used, and for whatever
purpose/ 6' The curtilage rule was thus rendered completely obsolete as a
principle which included some buildings within the subject matter of arson,
and excluded others and any other type of property.
Nonetheless, the spirit of the curtilage rule, insofar as it sought to sup-
press the risks of death or bodily harm to the dwellers caused by the burning
of a building within the curtilage, survives in many jurisdictions in statutes
which define one of the greater arson offenses in terms of causing a fire or
explosion that endangers a building or occupied structure.46 Though, of
course, these statutes extend that personal protection well beyond the persons
protected by the curtilage rule at common law (dwellers within the dwelling).
And though the curtilage rule is no longer used to define the subject
matter of arson, a statutory equivalent of that rule is still used in some states
to determine whether the burning of a particular building is arson of a greater
or lesser degree. This distinct but related rule is discussed below in the section
of grading the modern arson offenses. 467
D. Of Another
1. The Harm States
a. The Model Arson Law Approach
The primary purpose of common law arson was to protect the physical
safety of the inhabitants of a dwelling house.48 And since it was the inhab-
itants' possession of the dwelling house which formed the causal link between
the burning of the dwelling and their exposure to the risks of death or bodily
harm created by the fire, the "of another" requirement meant that the
dwelling house had to be in the possession of someone other than the in-
cendiary. 469 The ownership of the building was irrelevant. For example, if a
landlord rented a house to a tenant, as long as the tenant continued to dwell
there, the tenant could burn down the dwelling without guilt of common law
arson. 470 Conversely, if the landlord burned the house, she would be guilty
of arson. And if the tenant moved out and the house was vacant while the
landlord was searching for another tenant, the house was unprotected by the
465. See supra text accompanying notes 438-39, 445, 452.
466. See supra text accompanying notes 397-401.
467. See infra text accompanying notes 828-830.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
470. Protecting the dweller from her own incendiary acts, of course, was not
regarded as necessary or appropriate. All felonies at common law were directed at
the safety of the person, habitation, or property of some person other than the actor.
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law of arson until it became the dwelling house of the next person to take
possession with the necessary intention of making the place his home. If the
building were burned before that occurred, again it was not arson for it was
not the dwelling house of another at the time of the fire.1
7
'
It was thus the "of another" requirement which guaranteed that com-
mon law arson would remain a special offense against the person, against
the inhabitants of dwelling houses, though it was commonly classified as an
offense against the habitation.4 7 And as long as the "of another" require-
ment was retained, arson would remain primarily an offense against the
person. There was, however, a property interest which was protected by
common law arson, but it was purely secondary, incidental to the protection
of the dwellers, and that was the inhabitants' possessory interest in the dwell-
ing house. If arson were to protect additional property interests in the dwell-
ing, then the "of another" requirement would need to be abolished or
substantially altered.
Indeed when in accordance with the presumed necessities of the time,
the legislatures in England and the United States transformed arson into an
offense which also widely protected property, that result was accomplished
by expanding the subject matter of arson, and by abolishing the "of another"
requirement for various arson offenses. 473 The Model Arson Law is the par-
adigm of this approach. 474 As we have seen above, forty-four American states
at mid-century had adopted a version of the Model Arson Law or their
legislation contained most of its salient provisions. 475
The Model Arson Law divided the arson offenses into three distinct
categories for the purpose of assessing different punishments. The highest
offense was the willful and malicious burning of "any dwelling house" and
buildings which were, in essence, within the common law curtilage rule.476
Although there was no substantial change in the subject matter between this
offense and the common law's subject matter, it abolished the "of another"
requirement with the language "whether the property of himself or of an-
other."' 4 7 With this simple change, the Model Arson Law's highest arson
offense protected the property interest in the dwelling while at the same time
retaining the common law's protection of the inhabitants from the risks of
death or injury from fires.4 78 Returning to the example of the rental house,
it is arson under this section for the tenant to burn the dwelling house and
471. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24, 28-29, 38.
472. See supra text accompanying notes 51-66.
473. See supra text accompanying notes 116-48, 336-38.
474. The Model Arson Law (1948) is reproduced infra Appendix A.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
477. MODEL ARsoN LAW infra App. A, § 1.
478. E.g., Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 189 A. 248 (1937).
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for the landlord to do so as long as it remains a dwelling house. Although
the landlord would have been equally guilty under the common law and the
statutory provision, the tenant would be guilty only under the statute. The
abolition of the "of another" requirement has thus transformed arson into
an offense which protects the proprietary interest of the landlord as well as
the possessory interests of the tenant. Though never mentioned in the cases,
a slight increase in the personal protection afforded to the inhabitants was
arguably also achieved. As we have seen, a husband did not commit arson
when he burned the dwelling in which he and his wife lived though she did
not participate in here husband's act and was injured in the fire.4 79 Under
this provision of the Model Arson Law, the wife's safety is protected against
the husband's acts for it is arson for a co-tenant to burn the dwelling house
under such a provision.4 80
If, in our example of the rental house, the tenant moved out and the
house was burned by the landlord in disgust because she could not find
another renter, it would not be arson at common law for the property was
no longer a dwelling house. So too it would not be the highest arson offense
under the Model Arson Law for that offense has as its subject matter a
"dwelling house" (and buildings within the curtilage) and the building in
question was no longer a dwelling house at the time of the fire.43
But the Model Arson Law also prohibited the burning of any barn,
stable, garage or other building, whether the property of himself or another,
not a parcel of a dwelling house.4 82 Under this provision our landlord would
arguably be guilty of arson, though an offense of intermediate severity, for
even those who owned and possessed buildings free and clear were apparently
prohibited from burning them under this provision of the Model Arson Law.
The Model Arson Law thus expanded arson to cover buildings which were
not the subject matter of arson at common law, and by failing to use the
"of another" requirement the primary protection is given to the property
interest in these buildings. To be sure, this provision also protects people
who may happen to be in those buildings when they are burned by the
incendiary, but since there is nothing about these buildings to suggest that
people will be frequently endangered by their burning (unlike dwellings), and
because the offense is punished less severely than the offense which obviously
protects people (the highest arson offense), the personal protection is essen-
tially incidental to the protection of the property interests in the buildings." 3
With this offense, the common law priorities have been reversed. Buildings
479. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
480. This follows, of course, from the fact that any person who burns the
dwelling is liable once the "of another" requirement is abolished.
481. MODEL ARSON LAW, infra App. A.
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are primarily protected as property whereas people receive only incidental
protection.
But one of the remarkable effects of omitting the "of another" require-
ment is that it prevents owners of all of the possessory and proprietary
interests in these buildings from burning them as well. They too are prevented
from burning their property, unless the mens rea requirement is interpreted
in such a way as to alter this result.
484
Finally, the Model Arson Law further expanded the scope of arson as
an offense against property by extending protection to all personal property
"of another" over the value of $25.00. 4 11 Here the common law's "of an-
other" requirement was used to restrict the protection afforded to property
interests in personal property. Although there are apparently no cases in
point on this issue, a lessee in possession of personal property over the value
of $25.00 could burn it with impunity for the "of another" requirement, as
shown above, referred to possession of another, not ownership of another.
48 6
The Model Arson Law may have had as its goal permitting owners to burn
their personal property at will, but preventing others from doing so. If this
is so, then the common law's "of another" requirement should not have
been used because it would only permit an owner who was also in possession
of the property to burn it, and it permitted the possessor of such property
to harm or defeat the proprietary interests of others in the property with
impunity. The problem, of course, was with the uncritical acceptance of a
common law rule that was designed to assure that arson was an offense
protecting personal interests not property interests. Surely the use of the
common law "of another" requirement was inappropriate for use with a
property offense, unless, of course, the goal was to protect only possessory
interests in such personal property. There is no evidence that this was the
limited goal of the personal property protecting offense in the Model Arson
Law.
But the complete omission of the "of another" requirement in the per-
sonal property offense, such as was done with dwellings and buildings within
the curtilage (the highest offense under the Model Arson Law) and other
buildings (the intermediate offense under the Model Arson Law), would
create another set of difficulties. These difficulties are best seen by analyzing
the effect of the omission of the "of another" requirement for the higher
Model Arson Law offenses. Since the purpose of those provisions was the
protection of the proprietary and possessory property interests in building
48 7
484. Some states have construed the mens rea of the offense to permit owners
in possession to burn their property when no other person is harmed or endangered.
See infra text accompanying notes 584-89.
485. MODEL ARSON LAw, infra App. A, § 3.
486. See supra text accompanying note 51. The Model Law did not privide for
a definition of the phrase "of another" different from that used at common law.
487. E.g., Wimpling v. State, 171 Md. 362, 189 A. 248 (1937).
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from willful and malicious burnings, the "of another" requirement would
have been inappropriate. As we have seen by its omission an owner in pos-
session of a building could not burn it either (at least as the statute is
written).411 Why such owners should be prevented from burning their build-
ings in all circumstances is unclear. Surely a legislature might well want to
prevent owners in possession from burning buildings in circumstances which
endangered persons or other property, but if that were the goal, the statute
is grossly overinclusive for it prevents burnings in all circumstances. On the
other hand, if the goal is to preserve all buildings as a societal resource, the
provision would be well related to that goal, but it is doubtful whether such
a drastic alteration of the law of property was meant by this provision.
Furthermore, the Model Arson Law only prevented "setting fire to or burn-
ing" the buildings. 419 Other forms of destruction, such as explosion or simply
demolishing the building by tearing it down, were not addressed. Thus the
use of the "of another" requirement for personal property, and the omission
of the qualification in the "building" provisions of the Model Arson Law
allow for rather bizarre results. It would be even more bizarre to omit it
from the personal property protecting offense.
Nevertheless, the great majority of states at one time used similar, if
not identical, provisions, and today thirteen of the thirty-eight harm states
continue to adhere to a version of the Model Arson Law or their arson
statutes reflect a modified version of the same scheme. 490
488. It is possible to allow an "owner" to burn her property without guilt of
arson through an interpretation of the mens rea requirement. This result is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 584-89.
489. MODEL ARSON LAW, infra App. A, § 2.
490. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-801 to -803 (1979); Mo. Cum. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 6-
8 (1982); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 1-2, 5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1986)
(Massachusetts has additional felony arson provisions not found in the Model Arson
Law: § 7.); MICH. Con. LAws §§ 28.267-.269, .271 (1981) (Michigan also has a
special provision for spouses and felony arson provisions not found in the Model
Arson Law. Id. § 28.273, .275); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-17-1, -17-3, -17-5, -17-7
(1973) (Mississippi has additional felony arson offenses not found in the Model Arson
Law. Id. § 97-17-13.); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 205.010, .020, .95 (1985); Nevada, how-
ever, has a unique and somewhat ambiguous provision: "To constitute arson it shall
not be necessary that another person than the defendant should have had ownership
in the building or structure set on fire." NEv. REV. STAT. § 205.050 (1985). Since it
is arson to burn a building or structure "whether the property of himself or of
another" (id. §§ 205.010, .015), apparently this provision simply emphasizes that the
word "property" includes title (ownership) and possession. The North Carolina states
exemplify legislation upon which the Model Arson Law was based: N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-58, -58.1, -58.2, -59, -60, -61, -62, -62.1, -63, -64, and -66 (1983); OxJA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1401-1403 (West 1983).
Because of the adoption of a new first degree arson statute in 1980, Rhode
Island's first degree arson statute does not resemble Section 1 of the Model Arson
Law. Nevertheless, the remaining felony arson provisions contain many of the salient
1986]
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b. The Remaining Harm States
Although the remaining twenty-five states have substantially different
arson provisions, the influence of the Model Arson Law is evident in the
architecture of their statutes. Like the Model Arson Law, each of these states
divide arson into several levels of severity. Some of the provisions are aimed
at protecting persons and others at protecting property. Generally, the most
severely punished offense protects persons, while the lesser offenses protect
buildings or structures and personal property as property. 91
i. The Person Protecting Offenses
With respect to the person protecting offenses in these states, the com-
mon law's "of another" requirement could have been used, for the purpose
of that requirement was to assure that arson protected the personal safety
of the inhabitants (the possessor) of the dwelling house. As we have seen,
the property interests in the structure were of no great concern to the common
law of arson. Since each of these states have expanded the personal protection
of their arson laws, that result could have been achieved by simply expanding
the subject matter from "dwellings of another" to any occupied building or
structure of another. But the problem with this approach is that it does not
protect people from the risks of death or bodily harm caused when a person
in possession bums his own property. People who would not be protected
in those circumstances are the occupants, joint possessors of the structure,
and those who might be drawn to the fire for public safety reasons. If, for
example, the structure is a public theatre, the lessee of the theatre could burn
it during a performance without being guilty of arson. Quite obviously such
behavior creates very serious risks of death or great bodily harm, but the
"of another" requirement would prevent the application of the arson statute
from protecting the occupants from the possessor's acts.
Partly, no doubt, because of the limited personal protection afforded
by the simple use of the "of another" requirement coupled with an expanded
features of the Model Arson Law. R.I. GEN. LAWS: §§ 11-4-2, -4-3, -4-5 (1981 &
Supp. 1985). There is an additional felony arson provision not found in the Model
Arson Law in Rhode Island: id. § 11-4-7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-110, -11-140
(Law. Co-op. 1985).
Because of Tennessee's adoption, in 1979, of an aggravated arson provision
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201 (1982)), this offense does not resemble the Model
Arson Law, but the remaining arson offenses in Tennessee are nearly identical to
Sections 2 and 3 of the Model Law. Id. §§ 39-3-201 to -203 (1982). Tennessee has
additional arson offenses not found in the Model Arson Law. Id. §§ 39-3-204, -206,
-209, -210. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 502-504 (Supp. 1985). Vermont also has felony
arson provisions not found in the Model Arson Law. Id. §§ 502, 507; W. VA. CODE
§§ 61-3-1 to -3 (1984).
491. See infra text accompanying notes 805-10.
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definition of the subject matter, only two states, Colorado 492 and Wiscon-
sin,493 use this approach. Both states do, however, protect a joint possessor
of the property by altering the definition of "of another" so as to include
a proprietary or possessory interest in any other person which the actor has
no right to defeat. 494
Since occupants or other people on the property are not protected from
the incendiary (or explosive) acts of the owner in possession of the property
under the approach used in Colorado and Wisconsin, four states use a sub-
section similar to the provision found in those two states (including the
expanded definition of "of another"), but add another subsection to cover
situations in which any property is burned in circumstances which endanger
other persons. 49 For example, one of the person protecting offenses in In-
diana is violated when a person, "by means of fire or explosive, knowingly
or intentionally damages: (1) a dwelling of another person without his con-
sent; [or] (2) property of any person under circumstances that endanger
human life. 496
Four states, Georgia,497 Indiana,498 Montana,499 and New Hampshire,:0
use a variant of this approach. Like Colorado and Wisconsin, and in general
accord with the Model Penal Code, these states have also altered the defi-
nition of "of another" to include a proprietary or possessory interest in any
other person. 0 ' To that extent, these states also protect the property interest
of the owner against the incendiary acts of the possessor of the property.
But a majority of nineteen of these twenty-five harm states follow an-
other path. 0 2 They eliminate the "of another" requirement completely. In-
492. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-4-102 (1978). But cf. id. § 18-4-105 (a person
endangering provision similar to that used in the inchoate states).
493. Wis. STAT. AN. § 943.02(1) (West 1982).
494. Although these provisions are more relevant to the property protecting
offenses, they are not so limited by the statutes of either state. COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-4-101(3) (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.02(2) (West 1982).
495. See infra notes 496-500.
496. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a) (Burns 1985).
497. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1401(a) (1983).
498. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a) (Burns 1985).
499. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-103(1) (1983).
500. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(11) (1974 & Supp. 1983).
501. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-401(j) (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-23 (Burns
1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(55) (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 637:2(IV)
(1974 & Supp. 1983).
In addition to using general provisions similar to the foregoing states, Florida,
though eliminating the "of another" requirement, also makes the damaging of "any
dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents" the subject of its highest arson
offense. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West Supp. 1986).
502. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41 (1982); ALASKA § 11-46-400 (1983); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 803 (1979); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 708-820 (1976); Criminal Code of
1961, tit. III, art. 20, § 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1
1986] 393
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stead they rely upon an expanded definition of the subject matter together
with specified person endangering circumstances, circumstances in which dan-
ger to other persons is to be anticipated. In essence, they recognize that the
goal of protecting persons can be furthered by dropping the "of another"
requirement in favor of a single, all encompassing provision. For example,
unless the goal of the Indiana statute also is to protect the proprietary and
possessory interests of other people in "a dwelling of another" (because of
the expanded statutory definition of "of another"), the elimination of sub-
section (1) of that statute will retain the same person protecting coverage in
a single provision better tailored to its goal. 03 This would be true, however,
only if the damaging of "a dwelling of another" is held to "endanger human
life" under subsection (2). But this would always seem to be so. The arson
offense which primarily protects the person in Alabama, for example, is first
degree arson. That offense is committed when a person "intentionally dam-
ages a building" by starting a fire or causing an explosion when: "(1) Another
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-1 (Burns 1984); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3719 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561 (West Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.040 (1979);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-502 (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.15, .20 (McKinney 1975
& Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.325 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-33-1 (1979 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-1-3 (1979); VA. CODE §
18.2-77 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020 (West Supp. 1985).
California defines its person protecting offense as the burning of any structure,
forest land or property that causes great bodily injury or that causes an inhabited
structure or inhabited property to burn. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(a)-(b), 452(a)-(b)
(West Supp. 1986). The "of another" concept is not used.
503. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1985):
(a) A person who, by means of fire or explosive, knowingly or inten-
tionally damages:
(1) A dwelling of another person without his consent;
(2) Property of any person under circumstances that endanger hu-
man life; or
(3) Property of another person without his consent if the pecuniary
loss is at least five thousand dollars [$5,000];
commits arson, a Class B felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony
if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any person
other than a defendant.
(b) A person who commits arson for hire commits a Class B felony.
However, the offense is a Class A felony if it results in bodily injury to any
other person.
(c) A person who, by means of fire or explosive, knowingly or inten-
tionally damages property of any person with intent to defraud commits
arson, a Class C felony.
(d) A person who, by means of fire or explosive, knowingly or inten-
tionally damages property of another person without his consent so that the
resulting pecuniary loss is at least two hundred fifty dollars [$2501 but less
than five thousand dollars [$5,000] commits arson, a Class D felony.
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person is present in such building at the time, and (2) the actor knows that
fact, or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person
therein a reasonable possibility. ' '504 Although the scope of the person en-
dangering circumstance in the Alabama statute is different from the Indiana
arson provisions, the Alabama statute illustrates the unitary approach fol-
lowed by the majority. In these majority jurisdictions the personal protection
of these statutes is expanded (over the common law offense) in two ways:
first, all people, regardless of their connection to the property (whether pos-
sessors, owners, or others) are prevented from burning it under the specified
circumstances; and second, because the definition of the property or the
circumstances of the actor's conduct (or both) create a substantial risk of
injury to people. Insofar as property protection is to be afforded by the law
of arson, property protecting provisions can easily be added. And they are
in each of the twenty-five states except New Hampshire.?° Insofar as a
traditional harm offense is concerned, this is by far the better solution for
it protects everyone connected with the subject property from whomever
might damage the property by fire or explosion. Of course, the scope of the
protection will depend upon the description of the subject matter and the
person endangering circumstances. Finally, Arizona defines its person pro-
tecting offense by the simple expedient of expanding the subject matter from
the common law "dwelling house of another" to "an occupied structure."
506
This approach is, of course, similar to the person protecting provision of
the Model Arson Law, and is subject to the same criticism.50 7 Arizona is not
classified with the Model Arson Law states because it greatly extends the
scope of personal protection and its remaining provisions are quire unlike
the Model Law.
When these nineteen states are added to the thirteen states that have
laws based on, or similar to, the Model Arson Law, we see that thirty-two
of the thirty-eight states have abandoned the common law's "of another"
requirement for their people protecting offense although the thirteen Model
Arson Law states only slightly extend the personal protection of that offense.
ii. The Property Protecting Offenses
Ironically, it is with reference to the property protecting offenses in the
twenty-five harm states (which do not follow the Model Arson Law or have
similar provisions) that one finds a substantial division of views as to how
504. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41 (1982).
505. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1 (1974 & Supp. 1983). Instead, New Hamp-
shire protects property, as property, by the offense of criminal mischief. See id. §
634:2.
506. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1704 (Supp. 1985).
507. See supra text accompanying notes 474-81.
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the "of another" phrase is used. The Model Arson Law did not use the "of
another" requirement for the property offense which protected buildings,
but it was used with reference to the protection of personal property. 08 And
as we have seen, the result was that buildings were over protected (for owners
could not burn them even though the property interest of others were not
involved and the burning did not endanger persons or other property), and
personal property was under protected (once the decision was made to protect
personal property with the felony sanction of arson because a possessor could
harm the property interests of the owner without incurring arson liability).
How has this changed?
Since New Hampshire does not use its felony arson provisions to protect
property as property5°9 there are twenty-four harm states that have provisions
which differ from the Model Arson Law.
In four of the twenty-four states, Arizona, 10 California," ' Florida, 1 2
and Virginia,5 '3the subject matter of arson is not generally limited to the
property of another. Since the felony arson provision which protects property
in Florida is limited to "any structure, whether the property of himself or
another," the Florida statute uses essentially the same approach as the in-
termediate level offense in the Model Arson Law; '1 4 and, of course, it there-
fore has the same difficulties. 5 5 In the remaining three states nearly every
type of real and personal property is protected regardless of who owns or
possesses it.516 Here the Model Arson Law's treatment of buildings as a
property offense (the intermediate level offense) is extended to include the
personal property protecting provisions as well. Owners cannot burn the
subject property even when it neither harms the property interests of others,
nor endangers persons or other property. There is one exception here. In
California, it is not arson for a person to burn "his own personal property
unless there is an intent to defraud or there is injury to another person or
another person's structure, forest land or property. 5 1
7
Conversely, in Louisiana the property protecting offense applies to "any
property of another" and there is no statutory definition of that phrase.'",
The Louisiana property offense is thus fraught with the same problems as
508. See supra text accompanying notes 482-90.
509. See supra note 505.
510. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1703 (Supp. 1985).
511. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(b)-(d), 452(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1986).
512. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01(2) (West Supp. 1986).
513. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-79 to -81, -86 (1982).
514. See supra note 512.
515. See supra text accompanying notes 482-84.
516. See supra notes 510-11, 513.
517. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(d), 452(d) (West Supp. 1986) (Section 452(d) is
a misdemeanor offense).
518. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:52 (West 1986).
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the personal property protecting offense (the lowest level offense) in the
Model Arson Law.5 19
Rather than simply choosing between the use of the common law "of
another" device (as did Louisiana) or conversely eliminating it (as did Ari-
zona, California, Florida and Virginia), the great majority of states (nineteen
of the twenty-four states) (1) permit an owner to burn her property when it
neither harms the property interests of another, nor endangers persons or
sometimes other property, and (2) prohibit a possessor of property from
burning it when it interferes with the property rights of some other person.52
Two different, though related, techniques are used to achieve this result.
The most prevalent device is to make only property of another the
subject matter of the offense, but that phrase is given a very different mean-
ing than it had at common law. In the twelve states that use this approach,
property of another means property in which anyone other than the actor
has a possessory or proprietary interest which the actor has no right to defeat
or impair, even though the actor may also have such an interest in the
property.52 ' There is, however, some variation in these states as to whether
a lien or security interest qualifies as a legal or equitable interest,5 22 and two
of these states, Minnesota 2 3 and Wisconsin,52"' use this approach for one of
their property protecting offenses, but not the other.
The second approach to this problem, which is used in the remaining seven
states, is to define the subject matter of the property protecting provisions
519. See supra text accompanying notes 485-86.
520. These nineteen states are listed infra notes 521, 525-34.
521. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-4-101(3), -4-103 to -104 (Supp. 1985); HAWAII
REv. STAT. §§ 708-800(16), -821 to -822 (1976); Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art.
20, § 20-1 (Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-41-1-2, -43-1-1(a)(3), -43-1-1(d) (Burns 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3718(a) (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.556(2), .563 (West Supp. 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(55), -6-102(b) (1985) (an inchoate provision in this harm
state, see supra text accompanying note 406); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.305(2),
.315 (1985); S.D. CODInED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-33-3, -33-9 (1979 & Supp. 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-101(1), -6-102(b) (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.02(1)(a), .02(2)
(West 1982).
Georgia reaches somewhat the same result by providing that the subject property
be "of another without consent or in which another has a security interest including,
but not limited to, a mortgage, lien, or a conveyance to secure debt without the
consent of both." GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1402 to -1403 (Supp. 1985).
522. Compare HAWAII REv. STAT. § 708-800(15) (1976) witt GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-1402 to -1403 (Supp. 1985); see also State v. Phillips, 99 Wis. 2d 46, 298
N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
523. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.562 (West Supp. 1985) with id. §
609.563.
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as any property, but an affirmative defense is provided if (1) no person other
than the actor has a possessory or proprietary interest in the property dam-
aged; or if other persons have those interests, all of them have consented to
the actor's conduct; and (2) the actor's sole intent was to destroy or damage
the property for a lawful and proper purpose. Alabama1 25 Alaska,526 Del-
aware,' 27 Missouri,' 28 Nebraska,' 29 and Washington 3 ° use this approach.
However, the Missouri"' Nebraska,'32 and Washington' statutes do not use
the affirmative defense for all of their property protecting provisions. In
addition, although New York also uses this approach, the New York statute
also requires that the actor have no reasonable ground to believe that his
conduct might endanger the life or safety of another person or damage other
property which is the subject matter of arson in New York. 34 A similar result
is reached in the other affirmative defense states by virtue of their other
arson provisions. 3'
2. The Inchoate States
There are twelve states which use the Model Penal Code's inchoate
approach to arson in at least one of their basic arson offenses. 3 6 With respect
to the person protecting provisions in these twelve states, essentially the same
approaches are used as are found in the thirty-eight traditional harm states.
Like the majority of those states, eight of the twelve inchoate states eliminate
the "of another" requirement in their person protecting provisions. 537 In-
525. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-42 to -43 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
526. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.410 (1983).
527. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 801-802 (1979).
528. Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.050 (1979).
529. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-503 (1979).
530. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.48.040, .48.060 (West 1977).
531. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.050 (1979) with id. § 569.055.
532. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-503 (1979) with id. § 28-504(2).
533. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.030 (West 1977) with id. §§
9A.48.040 and 9A.48.060.
534. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.05, .10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986).
535. In the other states it would be arson in the first degree (the person pro-
tecting offense) and the affirmative defense is not available to first degree arson, but
only to the property protecting offenses. However, the wording of the statutes, and
the detail vary considerably. See the authorities cited supra notes 525-30.
536. See supra note 389.
537. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-113 (West 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 712.2
(1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 513.020 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802(1)(B)(2)
(1983 & Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-6 (but this is a damage type statute
in this inchoate state, see supra note 313), 30-17-5B (1984); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2090.02 (Page Supp. 1984) (Section 2909.02(2) is actually a harm provision while
the remainder of the section is inchoate, see supra note 313.); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-101, -103(a)(i) (1983).
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stead, they use one or more enumerated person endangering circumstances
which are tailored to protect people from the risks created by fires and
explosions aimed at various types of target property, and in some states, a
person endangering definition of the target property is used as well.
In three of the remaining four states the person protecting provisions
use the "of another" requirement (but with the new statutory definition of
that phrase), but they also include a provision which would subject possessors
and sole owners of property to arson liability if they burn or explode property
and thereby endanger persons or specified property of another. 38 These three
states thus follow the example set by the Model Penal Code.53 9
North Dakota is the only inchoate state to adhere to the common law's
"of another" requirement in its definition of the target of the actor's con-
duct. 514 It is, of course, subject to the same criticism as the traditional harm
states that adhere to this view.v4.
As we have seen above, nine of the twelve inchoate states also protect
various property interests with their felony arson provision . 42 How does the
"of another" concept fair in these nine states with respect to the property
protecting provisions? Interestingly enough, a slight majority of these states,
five in number, use the "of another" requirement in essentially the same
way that the Model Arson Law used that concept in its personal property
protecting provisions (the lowest arson offense in the Model Arson Law) to
define the target of the actor's conduct in their property protecting offen-
ses.
543
Two states, Maine and Pennsylvania,544 also use the "of another" re-
quirement. But unlike the five states just mentioned, they define "property
of another" to mean property in which a person other than the actor has
an interest which the actor has no authority to defeat or impair, even though
the actor may also have an interest in the property. 545 This approach is
essentially the same as that used by twelve of the traditional harm states.5 46
538. ARK. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1902(a), (c), -1903 (1977 & Supp. 1985);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(a)(1)-(2), -1(b)(l)-(2) (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 3301(a)(1)(i)-(ii), (c)(1)-(2) (Purdon 1983).
539. See supra text accompanying notes 194-99.
540. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985).
541. See supra text accompanying notes 492-93.
542. See supra text accompanying note 415.
543. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5(A) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02(C)(1985); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2909.03(1), .03(3), .03(4) (Page Supp. 1984); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(4), .02(5) (Vernon Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-103(a)(ii)
(1983).
544. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 352(4), 802 (1964 & Supp. 1984); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 33010) (Purdon 1983).
545. See supra note 544.
546. See supra text accompanying notes 521-24.
19861
105
Poulos: Poulos: Metamorphosis of the Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
400 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Kentucky reaches essentially the same result by creating a defense to its
property protecting provision which is essentially the same as the affirmative
defenses used in the seven harm states already mentioned.5 47 Finally, though
couched in terms of an exception rather than a defense, Iowa uses a similar
provision to exclude from arson liability a person who acts with the consent
of the owner, and "where the act was done in such a way as not to unrea-
sonably endanger the life or property of any other person."' 54'
The current status of the "of another" requirement may be summarized
as follows:
1. In the thirteen harm states that have enacted the Model Arson Law
or which have statutes that contain many of its salient features, the "of
another" requirement has been eliminated, except for the personal property
protecting provisions (which is the lowest in severity) . 49 Since the common
law "of another" requirement was created for the purpose of assuring that
common law arson remained an offense which protected the safety of the
dwellers within the habitation, the common law requirement is not well suited
to a property protecting offense. Both the use and the omission of the com-
mon law "of another" requirement produces bizarre results. 5 0 A statutory
response is clearly called for.
2. In the person protecting provisions of the remaining twenty-five harm
states, the majority eliminate an "of another" requirement and further the
person protecting goal by expanding the subject matter (sometimes defined
in person endangering terms) and by using person endangering circumstan-
ces. " ' The scope of these person protecting provisions (who is protected and
under what circumstances) varies, of course, according to the particular word-
ing of the statute, and there is variation among the statutes in these states.55 2
A minority of six states retain an "of another" requirement which,
unlike the common law conception of the phrase, is defined by statute to
include a possessory or proprietary interest in any other person which the
actor has no legal right to defeat (though there is some variation among the
definitions).5 Four of these states also use an additional provision which is
similar to the single provision used by the majority jurisdictions.5 54 And one
state, Arizona, simply uses a person endangering definition of the subject
matter in conjunction with the abolition of the "of another" requirement
(with all of the problems of that approach).55
547. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 513.030, .040 (1985); see supra text accompanying
notes 525-35.
548. IowA CODE ANN. § 712.1 (West 1979).
549. See supra notes 476-90 and accompanying text.
550. Id.
551. See supra notes 502-07 and accompanying text.
552. Id.
553. See supra notes 492-501 and accompanying text.
554. See supra notes 495-501 and accompanying text.
555. See supra notes 506-07 and accompanying text.
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3. With reference to the property protecting provisions of the twenty-
four harm states which protect property, but that do not follow the Model
Arson Law, the great majority (nineteen of the twenty-four) (a) permit owners
to burn their property when it neither harms the property interests of another,
nor endangers persons or sometimes other property; and (b) prohibit pos-
sessors of property from burning it when it interferes with the property rights
of some other person.1 6 Twelve states accomplish this result by defining the
subject matter of the property protecting offense as "property of another,"
but that phrase does not mean "in the possession of another" as it did at
common law. Instead, it is defined by statute to mean property in which
anyone other than the actor has any possessory or proprietary interest which
the actor has no legal right to defeat. Although, as to be expected, there is
some variation in the definition among the various states.5 57
The remaining seven states describe the subject matter of the property
protecting offenses as "any property" (or a similar term), but provide that
it is an affirmative defense that (a) no person other than the actor has a
possessory or proprietary interest in the property damaged, or if other persons
have such interests, all of them have consented to the actor's conduct; and
(b) the actor's sole intent was to destroy or damage the property for a lawful
and proper purpose. Again, there are variations among the states as to the
exact scope of the defense.55
In a minority of four states, the property protecting offense is not limited
to the property of another. 59 Conversely, one state, Louisiana, describes the
subject matter of the property protecting offense as "any property of an-
other."560
4. The "of another" requirement is treated by the inchoate states in
much the same way as in the harm states with respect to the people protecting
offenses. The majority (eight of the twelve) do not use the "of another"
requirement.5 6' Instead, like the majority of harm states, they use one or
more enumerated person endangering circumstances and sometimes a person
endangering definition of the target property is used as well. Occasionally
both are used.5 62
The minority (three of the twelve), like the minority of harm states, use
two provisions. One provision describes the target as the property of another
(but with the new statutory definition of that phrase), and the second is
substantially similar to the single provision used by the majority of states. 63
556. See supra note 520 and accompanying text.
557. See supra notes 521-24 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 525-35 and accompanying text.
559. See supra notes 510-17 and accompanying text.
560. See supra notes 518-19 and accompanying text.
561. See supra note 537 and accompanying text.
562. Id.
563. See supra notes 538-39 and accompanying text.
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It subjects sole owners of the property and possessors to arson liability if
they burn or explode property and thereby endanger persons or specified
property of another.
Only one state, North Dakota, uses the common law "of another"
requirement1 64
5. Nine of the twelve inchoate states also protect property with at least
one of their felony arson offenses.5 65 Incongruously, five of these states use
the "of another" requirement apparently in accordance with its common law
meaning (as did the Model Arson Law).5- Two more states use the "of
another" requirement, but define that phrase in accordance with the modern
statutory definition mentioned above. 567 Of the two remaining states one uses
a unique provision,5 68 and one uses the affirmative defense approach.5 69
6. The common law "of another" requirement has clearly outlived its
usefulness. It is incongruously used in the personal property protecting pro-
visions of a minority of states. These are the states which continue to adhere
to the Model Arson Law; and it is also used by a slight majority of the
inchoate states that protect property.5 70 In these inchoate states, the provision
appears to be a reminant from prior statutes which were patterned upon the
Model Arson Law .5 7 The common law "of another" requirement is used by
only North Dakota for a person protecting provision.5 72
The modern (majority) approach to the person protecting offenses is to
abandon the common law concept and replace it with either a person en-
dangering subject matter, or person endangering circumstances, or both.
The modern (majority) approach to the property protecting offenses is
to use one or the other of the following techniques: a modern concept of
"of another" created by statute, or a statutorily created affirmative defense.
Both of these modern techniques avoid the problems associated with either
the use or the omission of the common law "of another" requirement for
the property protecting offenses.
564. See supra notes 540-41 and accompanying text.
565. See supra notes 542-43 and accompanying text.
566. See supra note 543 and accompanying text.
567. See supra notes 544-46 and accompanying text.
568. See supra note 548 and accompanying text.
569. See supra note 547 and accompanying text.
570. See supra note 566 and accompanying text.
571. In each of these inchoate states the Model Arson Law, or a statute with
most of its salient provisions, was enacted and in effect during the middle years of
the Twentieth Century. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. This history,
no doubt, influenced the inchoate provisions when the Model Arson Law was replaced
with statutes patterned upon the Model Penal Code.
572. See supra notes 540-41 and accompanying text.
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E. The Mens Rea of Modern Arson
"Malice" was the mens rea of arson at common law. As seen above,
there is a "malicious" burning when the actor either intentionally or wantonly
burns property without justification or excuse.5 73 Has the common law's mens
573. See supra text accompanying notes 95-115.
Although a general discussion of the justifications or excuses applicable to arson
is beyond the scope of this paper, the "defense" of consent should be briefly men-
tioned. In a state in which the subject matter of arson is the property of another,
and the common law concept of "of another" is used, an actor who burns the subject
property at the request of the possessor of the property is not guilty of arson. The
theory here is that under the applicable rules of accomplice liability, since the pos-
sessor could burn the property with impunity, the actor who burns the property at
the possessor's request cannot be guilty as well. E.g., Heard v. State, 81 Ala. 55, 1
So. 640 (1887); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 1236 (1928). Some cases, however, indicate that
the lack of consent of the possessor is an element of the offense which must be
proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt in every case. E.g., State v.
Lastrapes, 443 So. 2d 652 (La. Ct. App. 1983). Occasionally, a statute will use the
"of another" requirement and will speak of "of another without his consent." E.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1401 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a)(1) (Burns 1985).
Arguably, in Georgia and Indiana lack of consent is an element of the "of another"
requirement. Quite generally the statutes are silent on this issue, as are the statutes
cited above in this note.
Aside from the question of insurance fraud and accohplice liability, the consent
of the "other" (whether at common law or under one of the statutory definitions of
that term) should be treated as a defense in the sense that the defendant bears the
burden of interjecting that issue. This is the approach used in those states which solve
the "of another" problem with the statutory affirmative defense. See supra notes
525-35 and accompanying text. Of course, the consensual burning would have to be
done in circumstances that did not violate some other statute which prevents the
burning of the property in question by all persons in given circumstances (such as
when it endangers other persons), if there is such a statute in the state in question.
Professors Perkins and Boyce suggest that the mental element must be phrased
to exclude mitigation, in addition to justification and excuse. They suggest that a
mitigated burning, a burning caused by adequate provocation during the heat of
passion, should not be arson. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 276 n.27.
The professors cite no authority for the proposition nor does there seem to be any.
In view of the historical development of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, their
assertion seems quite untenable. The rule of provocation created a lesser homicide
offense, voluntary manslaughter, which was punished less severely than murder. But
the common law did not create a lesser arson crime. If the rule of provocation
operated to mitigate arson to an existing offense, what was the lesser offense? One
possibility would be the common law misdemeanor of "malicious mischief." If an
actor burned the dwelling house of another because he or she was "adequately pro-
voked" to do so by the dweller's provocation, the common law judges could have
invoked the rule of provocation and found the actor guilty of the misdemeanor of
malicious mischief. In this way they could have avoided creating a new felony (as
they did for "voluntary manslaughter"), and they could have used the existing mis-
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rea requirement been carried forward into the statutes? If not, how has the
mental element of arson changed?
1. The Harm States
a. "Willfully and Maliciously" or Similar Uses of the Term "Malice"
The Model Arson Law uses the common law phrase "willfully and
maliciously" to describe the mental element of its three arson provisions,5 74
and ten of the states with arson statutes either identical with or substantially
similar to the Model Arson Law use that same phrase.5 5 In addition, Mich-
igan describes the mens rea of two of its arson offenses with the common
law phrase willfully and maliciously, but for two others the mental element
is described as willfully or maliciously. 76 On the other hand, Virginia uses
the word "maliciously" alone in all of its arson provisions . 77 Since the
addition of the word "willfully" adds nothing to the common law concept
of malice, each of the statutes in these twelve states should be interpreted
alike if the statutory phrase enacts the common law mens rea for these arson
demeanor of malicious mischief as the lesser arson offense. There are two obvious
problems with this suggestion. Professors Perkins and Boyce suggest that the rule of
provocation is applicable to arson because the mens rea of that offense ("malice")
is essentially the same as the mens rea for murder ("malice"). Id. at 856-61. But
since the misdemeanor of malicious mischief likewise uses the mens rea of "malice,"
id., the suggestion that the rule of provocation (mitigation) applies to all offenses
which use a "malicious" mental state means that the actor would not be guilty of
malicious mischief as well. Indeed, Professor Perkins and Boyce argue that the rule
of provocation does apply to the crime of malicious mischief as well. Id. at 408-13.
With this analysis, an actor who commits arson under the rule of provocation would
be acquitted of both arson and malicious mischief. In other words, if the rule of
provocation is held to apply to both arson and malicious mischief, then it operates
as a complete defense in the arson context, but only as a device to grade criminal
behavior in the law of homicide. The second problem, of course, is one of policy.
Why should the rule of provocation be applied outside of the law of homicide? I
find neither history nor policy which supports the application of the rule of provo-
cation to arson.
574. MODEL ARSON LAW, infra App. A., §§ 1-3.
575. IDAHO CODE § 18-801 to -803 (1979); MD. C iM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 6-
8 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 1, 2, 5 (West 1970); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 97-17-1, -3, -5, -7, -13 (1973); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 205.010, .015, .020 (1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1401-1403 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-110,-
140, -170 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-202, -3-203, -3-206 (1982)
(Tennessee, however, has abandoned the Model Arson Law formulation for aggra-
vated arson in favor of a modern damage provision. Id. § 39-3-201.); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 502-504, 507 (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3-1 to -3-3 (1984).
576. MIcH. ComP. LAWS §§ 28.267 (willfully or maliciously), .268 (willfully
or maliciously), .269 (willfully and maliciously), .275 (willfully and maliciously) (1981).
577. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77, -79 to -81 (1982).
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offenses.5 78 And it is commonly thought that these statutes do employ the
common law concept of malice.
79
"Malice" for common law arson, as it was for murder at common law,
consisted of two different mental states: (1) intentional burnings without
justification or excuse, and (2) wanton or wanton and willful burnings with-
out justification or excuse. 8 And the cases do hold, without exception, that
an intentional burning of the property of another without justification or
excuse is a malicious burning under these statutes. 81 There are so few cases
of wanton burnings without justification or excuse under these or similar
statutes and they are so ambiguously decided that the question of whether
a wanton burning is sufficient seems unresolved in most of these states.
58 2
Nevertheless, in view of the history of arson, the legislative use of the com-
mon law expression, and the similarity in the culpability between those who
wantonly burn and those who burn intentionally,5 83 the statutory phrase
"willfully and maliciously" should be interpreted in accordance with the
common law.584 But what should be the result in these Model Arson Law
578. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
579. DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981); R. PER-
KINS & R. BoYCE, supra note 2, at 277.
580. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
581. E.g., State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 576 P.2d 1383 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)
(under the Arizona version of the Model Arson Law, since repealed); In re Appeal
in Pima County Juvenile Action No. J-37390-1, 116 Ariz. 519, 570 P.2d. 206 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1977); People v. Tanner, 95 Cal. App. 3d 948, 157 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979)
(under the California version of the Model Arson Law, since repealed); State v. Dunn,
199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972); State v. O'Farrell, 355 A.2d 396 (Me. 1976) (under
Maine's version of the Model Arson Law, since repealed); Commonwealth v. La-
mothe, 343 Mass. 417, 179 N.E.2d 245 (1961); State v. Nelson, 17 Wash. App. 66,
561 P.2d 1093 (1977) (under a prior statute similar to the subsequently promulgated
Model Arson Law); Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1983) (under Wyoming's
version of the Model Arson Law, since repealed).
582. See, e.g., People v. Hitel, 131 Cal. 577, 63 P. 919 (1901); Fox v. State,
179 Ind. App. 267, 384 N.E.2d 1159 (1979) (dictum); DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md.
App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981); People v. Fanshawe, 137 N.Y. 68, 32 N.E. 1102
(1893) (under a prior statute similar to the subsequently promulgated Model Arson
Law); see also State v. Brackett, 306 N.C. 138, 291 S.E.2d 660 (1982) (under a statute
describing the mental element as "wantonly and willfully" burning).
Nevada has a unique statutory provision which covers the typical situation in
which arson liability is predicated on a wanton arson theory:
Whenever any building or structure which may be the subject of arson in
either the first or second degree shall be so situated as to be manifestly
endangered by any fire and shall subsequently be set on fire thereby, any
person participating in setting such fire shall be deemed to have participated
in setting such building or structure on fire. NEv. REv. STAT. § 205.045
(1985).
583. See infra text accompanying notes 592-95 for a discussion of the similarity
between the two mental states.
584. See DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981); United
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states when an owner in possession burns her building, and no other person
is either injured or endangered by the act? Since each of these states has
abolished the "of another" requirement for all buildings, the definition of
the physical part of the crime (the actus reus) includes such conduct. Does
the use of the common law mens rea of arson require a different result?
Suppose that an owner in possession burns her dwelling house, in which
she resides alone, in a fit of disgust with the plumbing in the house. No
other person is in or near the dwelling and the house is located in the middle
of a large lush irrigated pasture on the actor's ranch. Also assume that no
other property is endangered nor is any other person put at risk by the fire.
In one of these Model Arson Law states the actor would have performed
the physical part (the actus reus) of the crime of arson. If the common law
mens rea of arson, which is applicable in these Model Arson Law states, is
simply an intentional burning without justification or excuse, our actor would
be guilty of arson. It has been so held by the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, 8 ' though the case was later reversed by the Maryland Court of
Appeals .86 The problem with describing common law arson's malice require-
ment as an intentional burning without justification or excuse is that it iso-
lates the mental state from the physical part of the crime. It was not the
intentional burning of property that was the crime at common law, but the
intentional burning of the dwelling house of another. The definition of the
subject matter of the crime (a dwelling house) worked in tandem with the
"of another" requirement to make arson "a more serious offense than other
crimes involving the burning of property because of the possibility that those
who reside in the dwelling will be killed in the fire. 58 7 Arson was an offense
against people, albeit a special class of people-the dwellers; and the common
law mens rea required intentional risk taking, risks that the inhabitants of
the dwelling would be killed or injured by the fire. Thus when the actor is
charged with one of the people protecting arson offenses, unless the actor's
burning of her own dwelling constituted intentional risk taking with respect
to the life or limb of others in or near the dwelling when it was burned, the
common law mens rea would be absent. Not surprisingly, the few cases that
have considered this point have so held, though the basis for their decision
is not always clearly articulated.1 8 Nevertheless, based on the foregoing anal-
States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 2, at 277.
585. Brown v. State, 39 Md. App. 497, 388 A.2d 130 (1978), rev'd, 285 Md.
469, 403 A.2d 788 (1979).
586. Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788 (1979).
587. People v. Foster, 103 Mich. App. 311, 316, 302 N.W.2d 862, 864 (1982)
(emphasis added).
588. People v. Tanner, 95 Cal. App. 3d 948, 157 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979); De
Bettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981).
The intentional risk taking that satisfied the common law offenses did not extend
406 [Vol. 51
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ysis, they are correct in principle. Thus, our owner in possession should not
be guilty of the person endangering element of the highest arson offense in
these Model Arson Lav states. What of the property protecting provisions
of these laws? It should be emphasized here that the owner in possession of
the property has burned only her own property. The fire has not spread to
the property of others. If the fire had spread so that the dwelling house of
another (or the expanded subject matter under the statutes) was burned, the
case is easily resolved by the traditional analysis.
Since the common law offense protected property only as an incident
to the personal protection afforded to the dweller, the common law mens
rea did not involve intentional property risk taking. But since the statutes in
these states all provide for property protecting offenses, the legislative use
of the common law mens rea phrase should be interpreted to extend the
concept of malice to include an intent to harm or endanger the property
interests of others as well. Again, the few cases on this point have concluded
that malice, for this purpose, includes an intention to harm the property
interests of others. 89 Although these cases reach their result by emphasizing
that the statute uses the words "willfully and maliciously" in the conjunctive,
they are again correct in principle. Whether wanton risk taking concerning
the property interests of another will suffice as a malicious state of mind has
not been decided. The dictum statements in the cases, however, indicate that
it is a sufficient mental state under these Model Arson Law statutes. 90 Fi-
nally, the highest courts in two states have held that statutes which prevent
an owner from burning her own property in circumstances in which there is
neither an intent to harm or endanger the persons or property of others is
an unconstitutional interference with an owner's property interests.59'
Before moving to the mens rea requirement under the remaining statutes,
it is important to recognize here why the common law mens rea of arson,
"malice," included the concept of a wanton burning without justification or
excuse . 92 As we have just seen, an intentional burning of a dwelling house
to the risk of public safety personnel being injured in the fire. Otherwise all fires of
any size would have involved the same mental state. See Brown v. State, 285 Md.
469, 403 A.2d 788 (1979); People v. Foster, 103 Mich. App. 311, 302 N.W.2d 862
(1982).
589. People v. George, 42 Cal. App. 2d 568, 109 P.2d 404 (1941); Love v.
State, 107 Fla. 376, 144 So. 843 (1932); Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788
(1979); DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 428 A.2d 479 (1981).
590. See People v. George, 42 Cal. App. 2d 568, 109 P.2d 404 (1941); Love
v. State, 107 Fla. 376, 144 So. 843 (1932); DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522,
428 A.2d 479 (1981).
591. State v. Dennis, 80 N.M. 262, 454 P.2d 276 (1969); State v. Spino, 61
Wash. 2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963) (en banc); see also People v. George, 42 Cal.
App. 2d 568, 109 P.2d 404 (1941) (construing the California version of the Model
Arson Law (since repealed) so as to avoid the constitutional argument); State v.
Leach, 282 S.C. 178, 318 S.E.2d 267 (1984) (semble).
592. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
113
Poulos: Poulos: Metamorphosis of the Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
408 MISSOURI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 51
was in essence intentional risk taking with the life and limb of the inhabitants
of the dwelling house. But it was the risk taking that was sought to be
suppressed and punished, for that risk did not have to materialize for guilt
of arson. Thus the inhabitants could all be temporarily absent when the
dwelling was burned and yet it was arson. 9 As so conceived, the concept
of wanton arson is nearly the same idea. It required an intentional act which
created a very high risk of burning a dwelling house, which risk was known
by the actor and disregarded when the actor performed the risk taking act.
The only real difference between the two mental states (intentional risk taking
and wanton risk taking) is (1) that the intentional actor does the act for the
purpose of burning the dwelling which created the risk of death or injury to
the dwellers whereas the wanton actor acts in callous disregard of it; and (2)
the risk of death or injury to the dwellers is more serious (more likely to
materialize) when the intentional actor burns the dwelling house than when
the wanton actor starts a fire which creates a very high risk that the dwelling
house will be burned, and it is in fact, burned. The common law judges
regarded a person who acted in such callous disregard of such an extreme
risk of death or injury to another as the moral equivalent of the person who
intended that result. Hence the law of arson was the same in this respect as
the law of murder. 94 And for precisely these reasons, the states which use
the common law formulation of the mens rea of arson should use the wanton
state of mind as well. Whenever the courts in these Model Arson Law states
have been directly presented with this issue, they have so ruled.59
There are two additional states which use the concept of malice in their
statutory schemes, but their provisions are so different that they cannot now
be considered Model Arson Law states. California defines its highest arson
offense's mens rea as "willfully and maliciously" 5"s and its remaining arson
offense as "recklessly." 5 97 Washington uses the phrase "knowingly and
maliciously"5 98 for its two highest arson offenses and "recklessly" for its
remaining felony offense. 5" The California courts have held that the statutory
phrase "willfully and maliciously" includes an intentional burning in the
situation in which the property intentionally burned is the property of some
other person.6 There is no reason to suspect that the Washington statute
will be read differently. Since both statutes are recent enactments, the ques-
tion of whether wanton burnings are included within the term "malice" is
593. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
594. See supra notes 579-80 and accompanying text.
595. See supra note 582 and accompanying text.
596. CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 (West Supp. 1986).
597. Id. § 452.
598. WASH. REV. CODE A,. §§ 9A.48.020, .030 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986).
599. Id. § 9A.48.040.
600. People v. Green, 146 Cal. App. 3d 369, 194 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1983).
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an open question in both states. 6°1 Since neither state uses the "of another"
requirement (either in its common law conception or as revised by most
statutes) or the affirmative defense approach, 60 2 it is unclear whether it is
arson in California and Washington for a person to intentionally burn prop-
erty which neither harms nor endangers persons or the property of others. 6 3
The offenses in both of these states which use the "reckless" mens rea will
be discussed below.604
Finally, since North Carolina uses common law arson for the burning
of dwelling houses,65 the common law mens rea is alive and well in reference
to that offense. The remaining arson provisions, in North Carolina uses the
phrase "wantonly and willfully," and the cases have interpreted that phrase
to have substantially the same meaning as the common law mens rea of
malice.60
b. Intentionally or Purposely
In the remaining twenty-three of the thirty-eight harm states, the statutes
have abandoned all reference to the common law mens rea of malice. Instead,
they have either apparently or obviously been influenced by the mens rea
601. See People v. Green, 146 Cal. App. 3d 369, 194 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1983)(with reference to the burning of the personal property-the opinion is completely
opaque).
602. The statutes are identified supra notes 596-99. The "of another" issue is
discussed at the text beginning supra note 468, and the affirmative defense approach
is discussed beginning supra note 520.
603. The California statutes are confusing on this point inasmuch as they both
contain the following statement: "For purposes of this paragraph arson of property
does not include one burning or causing to be burned his own personal property
unless there is an intent to defraud or there is injury to another person or another
person's structure, forest land or property." CA. PENAL CODE §§ 451(d), 452(d)
(West Supp. 1986). Since the California statutes do not contain a similar statement
with reference to the burning of structures or forest land, there is a good argument
that owners of such property are prohibited from burning their own property in all
circumstances. Yet the statute requires a malicious mens rea, and prior California
authority would indicate that it is not a malicious burning if an owner burns her
own property neither endangering nor intending to endanger other persons or the
property of someone else. See California authorities cited supra notes 588-89. There
is nothing in the statute to refute this notion and the statutory definition of malice
is too ambiguous to do more than create an apparent ambiguity on this issue. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 450(e) (West Supp. 1986).
604. See infra text accompanying notes 651-68.
605. E.g., State v. White, 291 N.C. 118, 229 S.E.2d 152 (1976); State v. White,
288 N.C. 44, 215 S.E.2d 557 (1975); State v. Long, 243 N.C. 393, 90 S.E.2d 739
(1956); see also State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 291 S.E.2d 599 (1982); State v. Shaw,
305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E.2d 325 (1982); State v. Oxendine, 305 N.C. 126, 286 S.E.2d
546 (1982).
606. E.g., State v. Brackett, 306 N.C. 138, 291 S.E.2d 660 (1982).
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provisions of the Model Penal Code. Although none of these states have
adopted the inchoate approach to arson, in the spirit of the Model Penal
Code they have all simplified the mental elements of their arson offenses.
It is generally agreed that intentional consequences are those which "(a)
represent the very purpose for which an act is done (regardless of likelihood
of occurrence), or (b) are known to be substantially certain to result (re-
gardless of desire)." 67 Thus an actor intentionally damages property when
he either acts for the very purpose of damaging that property or when he
acts under circumstances in which damage to the property is substantially
certain.
Thirteen states require that the defendant act intentionally for their basic
felony arson offenses. 608 Twelve of the thirteen describe the mens rea as
intentionally damaging property (by fire or explosion), whereas South Da-
kota, the remaining state, requires that the actor "intentionally sets fire to
or burns or causes to be burned" the property in question.w9
Although a wanton burning of a dwelling house of another (without
justification or excuse) was part of the common law's concept of malice, a
wanton burning sufficed as malice not because it could not be distinguished
from intention, but because these two distinct mental states were regarded
as nearly equally reprehensible. 610 Since both mental states require the actor's
awareness of either the certainty (with the substantial certainty type of intent)
or the high probability (wantonness) of the result, the distinction between a
wanton burning and an intentional burning of the "substantially certain
variety" lies in the difference in the magnitude of the risk involved. 61, A
result is substantially certain to occur when it is the "known inevitable
concomitant ' 61 2 of the act in question, or to put it in other words, it is
607. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 196; R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 2, at 835.
608. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-41 to -7-42 (1982 & Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. §§
11.46.400, .46,410 (1983); Atuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1703 to -1704 (Supp. 1985)
(Arizona also includes the word "unlawfully." Whether this means anything more
than without justification or excuse, in view of the statutory definition of the mental
state, is unclear. See infra notes 642-49 and accompanying text.); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 802-803 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 to -821(b) (1976); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14:51-:52 (1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.561-.563 (West Supp.
1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-502 to -504 (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.10-.20
(McKinney Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.315, .325 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 22-33-1 to -33-3 (1979 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-102
to -103 (1978 & Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.02-.03 (West 1982).
609. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-1 to -33-3 (1979).
610. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 comment 4, at 21; R.
PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 858; see also supra notes 591-92 and accom-
panying text.
611. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 858-61; MODEL PENAL CODE
AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 comment 3, at 236 n.13 and § 210.2 comment 4, at 21.
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something that is "bound to happen, ' 61a something that is "practically cer-
tain" to occur. 6 4 On the other hand, a lesser degree of probability that the
result will occur, a lesser risk that the actor's conduct will actually cause the
result, will suffice for wanton conduct. 615 Thus if as a result of the actor's
conduct it is "substantially" or "practically" certain that the subject property
will be burned, the actor knew this at the time, and the conduct caused the
property to burn, the actor would have intentionally burned the property.
But if instead of being substantially certain, the actor's conduct created a
very high risk, the person engaged in that risk taking conduct, and the
property was burned, the actor would have wantonly burned the property.
Since these statutes require an intentional burning, and since wanton
burnings are not included within the generally accepted notion of intent,
wanton burnings would not ordinarily suffice. However, in nine of these
twelve states the statutory definitions of "intent" not only clearly eliminate
wanton burnings, but they also limit the concept of intent to the situation
in which the person acts for the very purpose of burning the property in
question. 61 6 In these nine states, with reference to the arson provisions which
require intent, neither wanton behavior nor acting in circumstances in which
it is substantially or practically certain that the actor's conduct will cause a
burning (and it is known to the actor) will do.
The remaining four states which use "intentional" conduct for their
basic arson offenses do not define "intent" so restrictively. Rather than
confining it to the act-for-the-purpose-of-achieving-the-result variety of in-
tention, three states apparently define "intent" in accordance with the gen-
erally accepted view-"intent" includes both the person who acts for the
purpose of causing the result, and the person who acts knowing that the
result is virtually certain to occur, though there is some doubt here. 61 7 Ne-
613. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 835 n.56.
614. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 comment 3, at 236-37
n.13.
615. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 858-59.
616. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(l) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(l) (1983); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(5)(a) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 231(a) (1979);
HAwAn REV. STAT. § 702-206(1) (1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(1) (McKinney
1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(7) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2(l)(b)
(1979 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(1) (1978).
617. Minnesota and Wisconsin use exactly the same definition: "Intentionally
means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified
or believes that his act, if successful, will cause that result." MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.02(3) (West 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.23(3) (West 1982).
Louisiana's provision is even more ambiguous:
Criminal intent may be specific or general: ... (2) General criminal
intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circum-
stances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human expe-
rience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as
19861
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braska, the fourth state, does not use a statutory definition of intent. Pre-
sumably, this generally accepted view will prevail in that state as well.
All thirteen states have thus drastically altered the mens rea of their
arson offenses from what it was at common law. Since nine of the twelve
use the intentional mens rea for all of their arson offenses, unintentional
burnings are not arson in those states. Thus, although a wanton burning of
a dwelling house was a capital offense at common law, and the wanton
burning of a building is arson in the Model Arson Law states, it is not a
felony arson offense in Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, Nebraska,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin.6 1 8 However, Delaware,619 Min-
nesota, 20 and New York62' also use a felony offense which is based upon
the mental state known as "recklessness," but those offenses will be discussed
below.622
In addition, ten of the twelve intention states do use a mental element
in addition to the basic requirement of an intent to damage or burn in
connection with their person endangering offenses.6 13 Since this additional
requirement is similar to the requirements in other states, it will be discussed
below.6 14
Finally, since each of these states uses either a statutory definition of
the phrase "property of another" or an affirmative defense which makes it
clear that an owner can burn her property when it neither harms nor en-
dangers others (or their property), '6 an actor in one of these states can
intentionally burn her own property in those circumstances without arson
liability.
reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:10 (West 1986). However, in the absence of qualifying
provisions, the terms "intent" and "intentional" have reference to "general criminal
intent." Id. § 14:11.
The Reporter's Comments to subsection 11 suggest that arson is a "general
criminal intent" crime in Louisiana. Id. (Reporter's Comment). This apparently means
that the Louisiana definition of "intent" or "intentionally" comports with the gen-
erally accepted definition.
618. The statutes are cited supra note 607.
619. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 801 (1979).
620. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.576 (West Supp. 1986). The Minnesota statute
uses the phrase "culpable negligence." Although the statutes do not define that
phrase, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that "culpable negligence," as used
in the Minnesota second-degree manslaughter statute, has the same meaning as the
Model Penal Codes's definition of "recklessness." State v. Frost, 342 N.W.2d 317,
319-20 (Minn. 1983). There is no reason to suspect that the identical phrase in the
arson statute will be interpreted differently.
621. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.05 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
622. See infra text accompanying notes 651-68.
623. See infra notes 671-93 and accompanying text.
624. See infra text beginning at note 669.
625. See supra notes 520-35 and accompanying text.
118
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/1
19861 ARSON LAW 413
c. Knowingly
The Model Penal Code divides the generally accepted definition of "in-
tent" or "intentionally," into two separate categories of mental culpability.
A person who acts for the purpose of achieving a particular result acts
"purposely" with respect to that result, 626 and a person who acts under
circumstances in which the result is substantially certain to occur from the
actor's conduct acts "knowingly" with respect to that result. 627 Under the
generally accepted definition of "intent," a person who acts either "pur-
posely" or "knowingly" acts intentionally, but the Model Penal Code does
not use that term. 628
As we have seen above, eight of the twelve states which use the inten-
tional mental state in their arson statutes define it in the same way the Model
Penal Code defines "purposely. ' 629 Since the remaining four states that use
the mental state "intentionally" use it in accordance with the generally ac-
cepted definition, in the parlance of the Model Penal Code these intentional
arson offenses can be committed either "purposely" or "knowingly."
Seven states, however, define their basic arson offenses as knowingly
setting fire to or knowingly damaging property. 60 Four (Colorado, Illinois,
Missouri and New Hampshire) define the mental state of "knowingly" either
identically with, or in substantially similar terms to, the Model Penal Code
provision. 63 ' The remaining three states do not use a statutory definition of
this mental state. 6 2 Since a person who acts "purposely" also acts "know-
ingly," 633 in at least four of these seven states the mens rea of their basic
arson offenses is the same as the states which use the conventional concept
of "intention. ' 63 4 In other words, the concepts are the same, but the ter-
minology is different. In addition, Tennessee uses the mental state of "know-
- 626. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2).
627. Id.
628. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 comment 2, at 23-24.
629. Compare the statutory definitions cited supra note 615 with MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(a).
630. These states are Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island. Their statutes are cited infra notes 630-31.
631. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(6) (1973); Criminal Code of 1961, tit. II,
art. 4, §§ 4-4 (Intent), 4-5 (Knowledge), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 4-4, -5 (1969);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.016(3) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2(I)(b) (1974).
632. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-603 to -606 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-
3201, -3202 (1981); State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 752, 545 P.2d 379 (1976); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 11-4-2 to -7 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
633. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5); State v. Sunday, 187 Mont. 292, 609
P.2d 1188 (1980).
634. The four states are Colorado, Illinois, Missouri, and New Hampshire. See
supra note 630.
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ingly" damaging property for its person protecting offense, first degree arson,
but there is no statutory definition for that term. 635
Of these seven states, one, Colorado, also uses a "reckless" mental state
for one of its lesser arson offenses, 63 6 two, New Hampshire and Rhode Island,
use an inchoate offense, 637 and five, in addition to knowingly damaging or
starting a fire, require another mental state with reference to the person
endangering circumstances contained in their arson provisions designed to
protect people. 638
It bears repetition here that a person who acts wantonly does not act
knowingly, for a wanton mental state requires a lesser degree of probability
that the consequence will be caused by the actor's conduct than does "know-
ingly" (a virtual or substantial certainty). 63 9 Furthermore, the statutory def-
initions of the "knowing" mental state exclude the concept of wantonness.'4
Thus, in these seven states, a wanton burning is not arson under one of the
arson provisions which requires a "knowing" state of mind.
Although two additional states (Indiana and Montana) use both "know-
ingly" or "purposely" as the mental states for their basic arson offenses
(defined in accordance with the Model Penal Code),641 since a person who
acts purposely also acts knowingly within the statutory definition of those
terms, nothing is gained by the addition of the "purposely" state of mind
except emphasis.6 2 In addition, Montana uses several inchoate provisions- 3
which will be discussed below.64
Finally, Florida describes the mens rea of its arson offense as "willfully
and unlawfully." Although the term "willfully" usually means little more
635. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201 (1982).
636. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-105 (1973). The mental state of "recklessness"
is considered infra text beginning at note 651.
637. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(III)(b) (1974 & Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-4-2 (Supp. 1985).
The mens rea of the inchoate offenses is discussed infra text beginning at note
699.
638. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1401(5) (1983); Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art.
20, § 20-1.1(a) (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1(a) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.040 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(I1)(b)
(1974 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201 (1982).
639. See supra text accompanying notes 613-14.
640. See supra text accompanying notes 615-16.
641. Indiana actually uses the phrase "knowingly or intentionally." IND. CODE
ANN § 35-43-1-1 (Burns 1985). But "intentionally" is defined in terms of the Model
Penal Code's definition of "purposely," as is "knowingly." Id. § 35-41-2- 2(a), -41-
2(b).
Montana uses the phrases "purposely or knowingly" (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
6-102 (1985)), and "knowingly or purposely" (id. § 45-6-103), and both terms are
defined in accordance with the Model Penal Code. Id. § 45-2-101(33), -2-101(58).
642. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5); see State v. Sunday, 187 Mont. 292, 609
P.2d 1188 (1980).
643. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-6-102, -103(b) (1985).
644. See infra text accompanying notes 700, 718-22.
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than "intentionally, ''64 the Florida courts have interpreted the phrase "will-
fully and unlawfully" 6 6 to mean something quite different from a standard
reading of the phrase "intentionally (willfully) and without justification or
excuse (unlawfully). '" 647 As shown above, Florida is one of the few states
that does not use the "malice" concept, but that also defines the physical
part of the crime in such a way as to apparently prohibit owners in possession
from burning their own property.648 The Florida courts have interpreted "un-
lawfully" to "mean something more than the mere burning of one's own
property without any danger or damage to others or the property of others,
nor intent to inflict such damage." 649 Since the Arizona statutes use the
similar phrase, "intentionally and unlawfully, ' 650 and, like Florida, Arizona
purports to prevent owners in possession from burning their property under
all circumstances,65' perhaps the Arizona statute will be read in the same
way. 6
52
Florida also uses a mens rea component for its people protecting pro-
vision in addition to the basic mens rea requirement that the defendant act




Three of the harm states supplement their basic arson offenses with a
felony defined in terms of "recklessness." These states are California6 4 and
645. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02(8) at 248-49 and § 2.02
comment 10; see Love v. State, 107 Fla. 376, 144 So. 843 (1932); Brown v. State,
285 Md. 469, 403 A.2d 788 (1979); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 875-
77.
646. Before the amendment in 1979, the statute read "willfully and mali-
ciously." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West 1976).
647. The term "unlawfully" is seldom treated as a positive mens rea concept.
It is generally used to indicate a lack of legal justification or excuse for the intentional
act. Thus the term generally means "without justification or excuse." See, e.g., State
v. Janvrin, 122 N.H. 75, 441 A.2d 1144 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105
(30) (1978); see infra note 649.
648. See supra notes 512-15 and accompanying text.
649. State v. Mayle, 406 So. 2d 108, 109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (emphasis
added), petition denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1982); accord State v. Wall, 445 So.
2d 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
650. AIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1703, -1704 (Supp. 1985).
651. See supra notes 510-17 and accompanying text.
652. Unlike Florida, however, the Arizona Code defines both "intentionally"
and "unlawfully." Intentionally means "purposely," ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
105(5)(a) (1978), and unlawfully "means contrary to law or, where the context so
requires, not permitted by law." Id. § 13-105(30) (1978). Hence, the argument is
somewhat more difficult to make in Arizona. It should be noted here, however, that
the Arizona statutory definition of "unlawfully" is declaratory of the generally ac-
cepted meaning of that phrase. See supra note 644 and accompanying text.
653. See infra notes 684-85 and accompanying text.
654. CAL. PENAL CODE § 452 (West Supp. 1986) ("recklessly sets fire to or
burns or causes to be burned").
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Washington, 6"1 which use "malice" for their basic offenses, and Delaware, 656
which uses the "intentional" mental state for its basic provision. It is a
felony under these statutes to "recklessly" set fire to or burn, or damage
property.6 7 In turn "recklessness" is defined in accordance with the Model
Penal Code's definition of that culpable mental state.658 In essence, "reck-
lessness" is advertent criminal negligence, an act which creates a substantial,
and unjustifiable risk of burning (or exploding), when the risk is known by
the actor and disregarded, in circumstances which constitute a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation. "Recklessness" is distinguished from "wantonness" by the dif-
ference in the magnitude of the risk created by the defendant's act which
she knowingly disregards.6 19 Indeed, when the Model Penal Code uses the
mental state of "wantonness," it speaks of "extreme recklessness," which
makes the point well."6 A person who knows of the extreme risk and acts
in disregard of that risk manifests the extreme indifference to the burning
that marked the lower limits of the common law felony - a wanton burn-
ing . 6 ' A person who acts "recklessly," however, acts with the knowledge
that she is creating a far lesser risk, though that risk is a gross deviation
from the norm. "Recklessness," differs from "knowledge" (or the substan-
tially-certain-to-occur variety of intent) in that the former requires only gross
risk taking whereas the latter requires indifference to a result which will
occur to a virtual certainty.62 Although the differences between "knowledge"
(a practical certainty), "wantonness" (extreme risk taking), and "reckless-
ness" (gross risk taking), are really a matter of degree, the common law only
imposed arson liability on those who acted intentionally (in the sense of both
purposely and knowingly, to use the modern terminology) and those who
acted wantonly."3 Criminal negligence, recklessness, would not suffice.64
Minnesota, which uses the "intentional" culpable mental state for its
basic arson offenses,"3 also breaks with the common law tradition: it has an
arson related felony which is defined in terms of "culpable negligence."
Thus a person who is "culpably negligent in causing a fire to burn or get
655. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.040 (1977) (recklessly damages).
656. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 801 (1979) (recklessly damages).
657. See supra notes 651-53.
658. CAL. PENAL CODE § 450(f) (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 23 1(c) (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010(c) (1977); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(c).
659. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 comment 4, at 21-
22.
660. Id.
661. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 2, at 879-80.
662. E.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 19, at 216.
663. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
664. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
665. See supra note 607 and accompanying text.
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out of control" which results in damage or injury to another, "and as a
result thereof a human being is injured and great bodily harm incurred is
guilty of [a felony]. . . ."666 The Minnesota courts have interpreted the phrase
"culpable negligence" to mean, in essence, criminal negligence. 667
Finally, New York's arson statute, vhen using the mens rea of recklessness,
requires that the actor recklessly damage a building or motor vehicle by inten-
tionally starting a fire or causing an explosion. 668 New York thus differs from
California, Delaware and Washington in that New York requires that the fire
be intentionally started or the explosion intentionally caused whereas a recklessly
started fire (or explosion) which damages property will suffice in the latter
states.6
69
With reference to the harm provisions in the remaining thirty-four states
which adhere to the traditional view of arson, the view that the offense
requires the infliction of harm upon a subject matter, recklessness is not
used. The actor must maliciously, or intentionally (purposely) or knowingly
damage the subject property, depending upon the jurisdiction in question.
It is not uncommon, however, for a state to provide for misdemeanor liability
based upon reckless damage by fire or explosion. 60
Insofar as the majority of states confine felony liability to intentionally
(purposely) or knowingly damaging property, they exclude from felony lia-
bility those who bum wantonly, as well as those who do so recklessly. In
the minority of states, the states that adhere to the "malicious" mental state
of the common law, all except the person who recklessly damages property
by fire or explosion is subject to such liability. Only a small minority of four
states use the "recklessness" infliction of damage for a felony arson pro-
vision. And of course, in these states, a person who burns wantonly is guilty
under the reckless burning provisions. 671
e. Culpability Requirements Beyond Those Necessary
for Initial Arson Liability
Although a detailed discussion of both the people protecting provisions
of the modern arson statutes and their grading schemes is beyond the scope
666. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.576 (West Supp. 1986).
667. E.g., State v. Beilke, 267 Minn. 526, 127 N.W.2d 516 (1964) (defining
the phrase "culpable negligence" as it is used in the Minnesota second degree man-
slaughter statute).
668. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.05 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
669. See supra text accompanying notes 651-55. As to the construction of the
New York statute, see, e.g., People v. Keech, 121 Misc. 2d 368, 467 N.Y.S.2d 786
(1983).
670. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-43 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1702
(West 1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.060 (1979); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 164.335
(1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-104 (1978).
671. See supra notes 651-61, 665-66, and accompanying text.
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of this paper, culpability requirements in addition to and different from6 72
those necessary for basic arson liability are frequently used both to assure
that persons will be protected against the risks attendant upon fires and
explosions, and to grade the various arson offenses. And as we noted above,
there is a close relationship between the lines which are drawn to separate
the people protecting offenses from the property protecting provisions, and
the lines used to grade offenses. 67a This is because we generally regard risking
the life or limb of persons or injuring them as far more reprehensible than
taking such risks with property.
Fourteen of the thirty-eight harms states use a culpability requirement
in addition to the mental state with which the act of burning or damaging
must be done to define at least one of their highest arson offenses. In an
additional three states the statutes are so ambiguous that it is unclear whether
an additional culpable mental state is required. This offense is also a people
protecting offense in each of these states.
Three states, Delaware, 674 New Hampshire, 675 and South Dakota, 676 re-
quire that the actor "know" of a particular circumstance, and each of these
states defines that culpability requirement as does the Model Penal Code. 677
New Hampshire requires that the actor know the building was an occupied
structure, 6 7 and South Dakota that the structure was occupied at the time.67 9
The Delaware statute, which exemplifies this general approach, is somewhat
different:
A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when he intentionally damages
a building by starting a fire or causing an explosion and when:
(1) He knows that another person not an accomplice is present in the building
at the time: or
(2) He knows of circumstances which render the presence of another person
not an accomplice therein a reasonable possibility."
672. In many of the modern codes, the prescribed culpability requirement ap-
plies to all material elements of the offense unless a contrary intention appears. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(4). Similar provisions exist in many states. See infra note 706
and accompanying text.
673. See supra text accompanying notes 339-44.
674. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 803 (1979).
675. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(11) (1974).
676. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-1 (1979).
677. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 231(b) (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626:2
(11)(b) (1974). Although the New Hampshire definition of "knowingly" apparently
does not include the act-with-a-virtual-certainty variety of intent, the remainder of
the definition is in accordance with the Model Penal code, and it is that definition
which applies to the additional mental state here in question. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-1-2(1)(c) (1979).
678. See supra note 672. Since the New Hampshire statute uses the "know-
ingly" mental state for the act, arguably this is not a different mental state; but since
the statute spells it out I have included it here.
679. See supra note 673.
680. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 803 (1979).
[Vol. 51
124
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/1
1986] ARSON LA W 419
Four states, Alaska, 681 Hawaii,682 Missouri, 683 and Oregon, 68 require that
the intentional damage to the subject matter recklessly endanger persons, or,
in Oregon, persons or "protected property." The Alaska statute provides a
good example of this approach.
(a) A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if the person
intentionally damages any property by starting a fire or causing an explosion
and by that act recklessly places another person in danger of serious physical
injury. For purposes of this section, "another person" includes but is not
limited to fire and police service personnel or other public employees who
respond to emergencies, regardless of rank, functions, or duties being per-
formed.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.'-
Finally, each of these states defines "recklessly" in accordance with the
Model Penal Code. 686
The additional culpability requirement in the final group of states is not
so easily characterized. In each of these states it is sufficient for the highest
arson offense if the actor (1) knew or (2) should have known of some ad-
ditional person endangering circumstance, as, for example, another person
was in the building at the time the actor intentionally or knowingly damaged
it.687 Furthermore, there is considerable variation in the wording of the al-
681. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400 (1983).
682. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 708-820 (1976).
683. Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.040 (1978).
684. OR. REV. STAT. § 164.325 (1985). "Protected property" is defined to
mean "any structure, place or thing customarily occupied by people, including 'public
buildings' . . . and 'forest land."' Id. § 164.305(1).
685. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400 (1983) (emphasis added).
686. Id. § 11.81.900(3); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-206(3) (1976); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 562.016(4) (1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.085(9) (1985).
687. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41 (1982) (the actor knows another person is present
in such building at the time "or the circumstances are such as to render the presence
of a person therein a reasonable possibility"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01(1)(c) (West
Supp. 1986) (any other structure that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe
was occupied by a human being); Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, § 20-
1.1(a)(1), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (he knbws
or reasonably should know that one or more persons are present therein); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.561(2)(a) (West Supp. 1985) (another person who is not a participant
in the crime is present in the building at the time and the defendant knows that, or
the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a
reasonable possibility); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-502(1) (1979) (when another person is
present in the building at the time and either (a) the actor knows that fact, or (b)
the circumstances are such as to render the presence of a person therein a reasonable
probability); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.15, .20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (these pro-
visions are substantially similar to those in Minnesota); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-
201 (1982) (he knows or reasonably should know that one or more persons are present
therein).
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ternative requirement to knowledge, the requirement that the defendant should
have known of some additional person endangering circumstance. 688 It does
seem clear, however, that one of the recognized subjective states of mind
(e.g., purposely, knowingly or recklessly) is not required. Should some other
form of culpability be required in these states? Negligence, criminal or civil?
Or should the culpable mental state end with the "knowledge" requirement?
Although there is some variation in the statutes, the New York provision
exemplifies this approach:
A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when he intentionally
damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire, when (a) another
person who is not a participant in the crime is present in such building or
motor vehicle at the time, and (b) the defendant knows that fact or the
circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a
reasonable possibility.
Arson in the second degree is a class B felony. "9
At common law the definition of the subject matter, a "dwelling house,"
assured that, to borrow the phrase from the New York statute, the presence
of a person in the property burned was "a reasonable possibility." The
common law offense thus protected people by its definition of the subject
matter.690 The New York statute, however, applies to any "building or motor
vehicle." The statute defines these terms in the following way:
As used in this article, 1. "Building", in addition to its ordinary meaning,
includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of
persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein. Where a build-
ing consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit
shall not be deemed a separate building.
2. "Motor vehicle", includes every vehicle operated or driven upon a public
highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power, except
(a) electrically-driven invalid chairs being operated or driven by an invalid,
(b) vehicles which run only upon rails or tracks, and (c) snowmobiles as
defined in article forty-seven of the vehicle and traffic law.69'
To convert Section 150.15 into a person protecting offense, the New York
legislature decided not to define the entire subject matter, as did the common
law and as do many modern statutes, in terms of property which inherently
created risks to people. Thus "motor vehicles" were included in the subject
matter of arson, and there is nothing about the definition of "motor vehi-
cles" which relates specifically to personal risks. Instead it decided to use
either the presence of a person which is known to the actor, or the fact that
there is a reasonable possibility that someone is present when the property
688. See supra note 684.
689. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
690. See supra notes 14-16, 18, and accompanying text.
691. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.00 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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is burned. The actual presence of a person, of course, is not required. If the
intent of the "reasonable possibility" provision in Section 150.15 is to modify
the subject matter of the offense, the argument is stronger that no actual
subjective mental state may be required. 692 On the other hand, its presence
in the same clause specifying one of the culpable mental states, "knowledge"
that a person is present, suggests that it is the actor's subjective perspective
that is important rather than an objective determination that there was a
"reasonable possibility" that a person was in the building. Since a person
who burns a building when there is a "reasonable possibility" of another
being present therein is treated in precisely the same way as a person who
burns the building "knowing" that another is present, the phrase should be
interpreted to mean that a subjective state of mind is required. The actor
must be shown to have knowledge of facts which lead her to conclude that
there is a reasonable possibility that another is present. Here the word "rea-
sonable" would not import a purely objective standard, but would serve to
exclude all possibility of a person being present, a standard which could
never be met. On the other hand, objective liability, facts which would lead
a reasonably prudent person to understand that there is a possibility of
another being present in the building when it is intentionally burned cannot
be rejected as absurd. All we can say now is that the question of whether
an additional mental state is required for conviction of this offense and, if
so, what it may be is very ambiguous and the resolution of this issue must
await another day.
Finally, the highest arson offense in Georgia, Louisiana, and Washington
raise similar questions. In Georgia first degree arson can be committed in a
variety of ways. One of which is by knowingly damaging any building (or
other specified property) "under such circumstances that it is reasonably
foreseeable that human life might be endangered. ' 693 Intentionally setting
fire to or damaging by explosion "any structure, watercraft, or moveable
whereby it is forseeable that human life might be endangered ' 694 is aggravated
arson in Louisiana. And arson in the first degree is committed in Washington
if a person "knowingly and maliciously: (a) [clauses a fire or explosion which
is manifestly dangerous to any human life, including fireman; or ... (b)
[clauses a fire or explosion in any building in which there shall be at the
692. Id. § 150.15 provides as follows:
A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when he intentionally
damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire, when (a) another
person who is not a participant in the crime is present in such building or
motor vehicle at the time, and (b) the defendant knows that fact or the
circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a
reasonable possibility.
Id. (emphasis added).
693. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1401(a)(5) (1983).
694. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985).
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time a human being who is not a participant in the crime .... -695 Although
the wording of these provisions does not as strongly suggest that a mental
element is required, as does the New York statute, these provisions are less
than clear, and the cases have yet to discuss these issues. 69
Before moving on to the mens rea requirements in the inchoate states,
the position of the thirty-eight harm states may be summarized as follows:
1. Seven states do require a mental state which is different from the
mental state for the act prohibited by the statute: three require "knowl-
edge, '697 and four require "recklessness. ' 691
2. Seven more states use the mental state of "knowledge," but it is
ambiguous whether there is an additional mental state for the alternative
provision to the knowledge requirement. 699
3. Three states use language which is ambiguous as to whether a mental
state is required and, if so, what that mental state would be.700
4. The remaining twenty-one harm states do not, at least on the face of
their statutes, require a mental state that is different from the mental state
prescribed for the act prohibited by the statute in question.7 0'
2. The Inchoate States
The offenses in the inchoate states fall into two distinct patterns: (1)
statutes with an architecture which is essentially the same as an attempt
statute; and (2) endangering statutes. Not all of the inchoate states, however,
use both types of provisions. 70 2 In addition, four or five harm states use an
endangering type offense, and one, Tennessee, uses an attempt- like statute.
These inchoate provisions will be considered below.70 3 All of the inchoate
states except one (Ohio) use an attempt-like statute as their basic arson
offense.
695. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020 (1977). Washington has no provi-
sions similar to MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3)-(4).
696. A challenge that the phrase "manifestly dangerous to any human life,
including fireman" is unconstitutionally vague and uncertain was rejected in State v.
Levage, 23 Wash. App. 33, 594 P.2d 949 (1979). The question of the mens rea
requirement for that circumstance was not mentioned.
697. See supra notes 671-77 and accompanying text.
698. See supra notes 678-83 and accompanying text.
699. See supra notes 684-89 and accompanying text.
700. See supra notes 690-93 and accompanying text.
701. See supra note 670 and following text.
702. Eleven of the twelve inchoate states use the target-type offense as the basic
arson provision. Ohio is the only inchoate state that does not use a target-type inchoate
offense. See supra notes 389-96 and accompanying text. Nine of the twelve inchoate
states also use an endangering type inchoate statute. See supra notes 397-401 and
accompanying text.
703. See supra notes 408-14 and accompanying text.
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a. The Attempt-like Statutes
These statutes all require the actor to intentionally, or purposely or
knowingly, (depending on the state in question) start a fire or cause an
explosion for the purpose of achieving a particular result or knowing that a
particular result will happen.
Since the Model Penal Code is the inspiration for the inchoate arson
offense, not surprisingly, eight of the twelve inchoate states define the culp-
able mental states used in their arson provisions in essentially the same way
as does the Model Code.7 4 There is, however, a difference in terminology.
Although six of these states describe the mental state as "intentionally," the
definitions of that culpable mental state in these statutes make it abundantly
clear that they are restricting it to the Model Code's "purposely" require-
ment.70 5 The remaining two states use "purposely" as defined in the Code. 706
704. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-203 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-3(11)-
(14) (West Supp. 1985) (Only a portion of the Model Penal Code's concept of "know-
ingly" is used. Connecticut does not appear to use the substantially-certain-result
variety of intent, what the Model Penal Code also calls "knowingly."); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 501.020 (1985) (The Kentucky Statute is similar to Connecticut's definition
of "knowingly," but the terminology with respect to recklessly and negligently are
quite different. What Arkansas, Connecticut, and the Model Penal Code call "reck-
lessly" and "negligently," Kentucky labels "wantonly" and "recklessly."); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 35(l)-(4) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b) (West 1982);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b) (Purdon 1983).
In addition, the Texas definitions of "intent" or "intentionally" generally agree
with the Model Penal Code's definition of "purposely," and the same is true of
"recklessly" and "criminal negligence." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (Vernon
1974). The Texas definition of "knowledge" is substantially different in one crucial
respect. While the Model Penal Code and the states identified above in this note
define "knowingly" with respect to a result in terms of when the actor knows that
it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result, Texas defines know-
ingly as follows: "A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result." Id. § 6.03(b) (emphasis added). This definition makes "knowingly"
difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from recklessness.
North Dakota's attempt-like inchoate offense uses the phrase "with intent to
destroy." N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985). Intent is, in turn, defined as acting
for the purpose of achieving a result, what the Model Penal Code calls "purposely."
Id. § 12.1-02-02. So too the North Dakota definitions of "recklessly" and "negli-
gently" are largely consistent with the Model Penal Code's definition of those terms.
But North Dakota's definition of "knowingly" does not embrace the act-with-a-
practical-certainty concept, what the Model Penal Code calls "knowingly." Id. The
North Dakota arson statutes do not use the "knowingly" culpable mental state so
that the distinction does not affect the law of arson in North Dakota.
705. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-3(l I) (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 501.020(1) (1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 35(1) (West 1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-02-02(I)(a) (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(1) (Purdon); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 1974).
706. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-203(1) (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(b)(l)
(West 1982).
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Nevertheless, despite this difference in terminology, the structure of the basic
arson offense in each of these states is essentially the same. It is well illus-
trated by the Kentucky statute:
(1) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when he starts a fire or
causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a building: (a) Of
another; or (b) Of his own or of another, to collect or facilitate the collection
of insurance proceeds for such loss.
(2) In any prosecution under this section, it is a defense that: (a) No
person other than the defendant had a possessory or proprietary interest
in the building, or, if other persons had such an interest, all of them
consented to the defendant's conduct; and (b) The defendant's sole intent
was to destroy or damage the building for a lawful purpose.
(3) Arson in the second degree is a Class B felony. 0'
The Kentucky statute also illustrates a problem with all of these statutes.
Since they do not specify a mental state with respect to the act proscribed
by the statute, the starting of a fire or the causing of an explosion, is a
mental state required? If so, what mental state? Under the Model Penal
Code approach used in these states, the initial question should be easily
answered. The fire must be started or the explosion must be caused with
a culpable mental state. This follows from the Code's requirement that
when the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense
is not otherwise prescribed by law, such element is established if a person
acts "purposely," "knowingly," or "recklessly." 70 8 In this respect, the
Code arguably codifies the common law position. 70 9 More decisively, there
is a provision similar to the Model Penal Code's requirement in seven of
the eight states, including Kentucky. t 0 In the remaining state, Connecticut,
the force of the common law should reach the same result. But does this
mean that one can recklessly start a fire or cause an explosion "with intent
to destroy or damage a building," to use the phrase from the Kentucky
statute? It is nearly impossible to think of how this could be done. And
the same difficulty exists with the use of the "knowingly" mental state.
707. Ky. REV. STAT. § 513.030 (1985).
708. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). "When the culpability sufficient to estab-
lish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is estab-
lished if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto." Id.
709. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 comment 5, at 244; see
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 64-65 (2d ed. 1961); Turner, The
Mental Elements in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31 (1936).
710. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-204(2) (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 501.030(2), .040
(1985); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 34(l) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(I)(e)
(1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c) (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(c)
(Purdon 1983); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(c) (Vernon 1974).
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The requirement of purpose for which the fire was started or the explosion
was caused most logically suggests that the fire must be purposely set as
well. The statute which requires the use of "purposely," "knowingly," or
"recklessly" applies only when the statute does not require a different
mental state and the "purposely" mental state seems to be necessary in
each of these eight states. But there is an additional reason for this result.
The Code, and a statute in most of these states, provides that when a
culpable mental state is prescribed for the commission of an offense, with-
out distinguishing among the material elements of the offense, that pre-
scribed culpable mental state applies to all material elements of the crime,
unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. 7 1 Since the fire or explosion
must be set or caused for the purpose of destroying or damaging the
specified property, the argument is compelling that the fire must be pur-
posely set or the explosion purposely caused.
There is also, of course, an additional culpable mental state require-
ment under these statutes. In each, the fire must be set or the explosion
must be caused for the purpose of (though the actual language is "with
the intent to" in six of the states)7 2 destroying or otherwise damaging
specified property. We have alluded to this property before as the "target"
property. 7 3 It is the target property because the actor must purposely start
a fire or cause an explosion with the purpose of damaging or destroying
that property. The basic structure of the inchoate arson offense thus in-
volves two culpable mental states: purposely or "intentionally" performing
the act proscribed by the offense (starting a fire or causing an explosion)
with a specific purpose in mind (damaging or destroying the property).
The actor is guilty when the act is purposely performed with the requisite
purpose in mind. No damage or destruction need occur, though the actor
is equally guilty if his purpose is achieved.7 14 This is, of course, the dis-
711. The Code provides that "[w]hen the law defining an offense prescribes
the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without
distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all
the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4).
There are substantially similar provisions in seven of the eight states: ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-204(1) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 1985); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 501.030(2) (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 11 (1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:2-2(c.) (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02(3) (1985); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT ANN. § 302(d) (Purdon 1983).
712. "Intentionally," as we have seen above, is defined in each of these states
to mean "purposely." See supra note 702 and accompanying text.
713. See supra notes 335, 379-83, and accompanying text.
714. Just as a conviction for an attempt to commit a crime is permissible when
the proof shows that the target offense has been committed, so too with the target
type arson offense and with even greater reason. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra
note 19, at 451-52.
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tinguishing feature between an inchoate offense and a traditional harm
offense for the latter requires that the burning or damaging be done,
whereas the inchoate offense does not. The question of whether there are
additional mental states which are used in the inchoate provisions pro-
tecting persons and used to divide the arson offenses into various levels
of severity will be discussed below.
Before we turn to the four remaining inchoate states, the inchoate
provision in Tennessee should be noted here. Tennessee uses an attempt-
like inchoate offense. It requires an "intent to burn" specified property;
and thus, under the foregoing argument, the fire must be intentionally set
with the intent to burn the specified property.71 1
Three of the four remaining inchoate states, though they use exactly
the same structure for their inchoate provisions, use a different culpable
mental state. Rather than requiring the actor to start the fire or cause the
explosion "purposely" for the "purpose" of damaging or destroying the
target property, Iowa uses the mental states of "intentionally or know-
ingly. ' 71 6 Thus it is arson in Iowa for a person to cause a fire or explosion
"in or near any property with the intent to destroy or damage such prop-
erty, or with the knowledge that such property will probably be destroyed
or damaged. ' 7 1 7 Following the analysis set forth above,71 8 arson in Iowa
requires two culpable mental states: the actor must (1) intentionally or
knowingly cause a fire or explosion with (2) the intent to destroy or damage
or with the knowledge that such property will probably be destroyed or
damaged.
In New Mexico arson consists of "maliciously or willfully starting a
fire or causing an explosion with the purpose of destroying or damaging"
specified property. 7 9 Admirably, the New Mexico statute articulates the
715. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-204 (1982).
716. The new Iowa Code, adopted in 1976 (1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245), does
not define the culpable mental states of "intentionally" or "knowingly." Presumably
they will be read consistently with the definition of "purposely" and "knowingly"
in the Model Penal Code for that is arguably the new American meaning of these
terms. One can glean the intention to use these words in accordance with the typical
use of the word "intentionally" for "purposely," since most state which have adopted
the Model Penal Code approach have used the term "intentionally" but defined it
to mean "purposely." See supra notes 649, 701. Furthermore, if "intentionally" is
construed in accordance with the generally accepted meaning of that word, then the
word "knowingly" is either redundant or must be given a rather odd interpretation
for "intentionally" customarily includes "purposely" and "knowingly." See supra
text accompanying note 702.
717. IowA CODE ANN. § 712.1 (West 1979).
718. See supra text accompanying notes 705-09.
719. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5(A) (1984). For the meaning of the term "ma-
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culpable mental states necessary for this inchoate offense. And in a very
similar vein, a person is guilty of first degree arson in Wyoming "if he
maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or
damage an occupied structure.
7 20
The remaining inchoate state, Ohio, uses only offenses which endanger
property. These "endangering" offenses will be considered next.
b. Endangering Property by Fire or Explosion
The endangering offense differs from the attempt-like offense dis-
cussed above in one crucial respect: the actor need not be attempting to
purposely achieve a goal (or "knowingly" in a few states) of damaging or
destroying property. With the endangering offense the actor simply starts
a fire or causes an explosion that places persons or property at risk. The
structure of this offense then is (1) a culpable mental state with respect to
starting a fire or causing an explosion which, (2) with a culpable mental
state, endangers persons or property.
Although there are differences in terminology, six of the inchoate
states and two harm states require that the fire or explosion be started or
caused "purposely,"and that the fire or explosion "recklessly" endanger
persons or property.7 2' There are two principal differences in terminology.
Most of these states describe the culpable mental state with which the fire
must be set or the explosion caused as "intentionally, '72  though that term
is defined to mean "purposely" in the parlance of the Model Penal Code.723
And, though Montana (a harm state with inchoate provisions) uses the
word "negligently, " 724 that term is defined in accordance with the Model
Penal Code's definition of "recklessness. 7 25
720. Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-101 (197)) (emphasis supplied).
721. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1903 (1977) (purposely-recklessly. Arkansas also
has an attempt-like offense which uses the additional culpability requirement of neg-
ligently.) Id. § 41-1902(1)(c). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-113 (West 1985) (inten-
tionally (purposely)-recklessly); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-102 (1983) (a harm state
with this inchoate offense: purpose or knowingly-negligently (recklessly)); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 634:1(b) (1974 & Supp. 1983) (a harm state with this arguable inchoate
offense: purposely-recklessly); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C- 17-1(b) (West 1982) (purposely-
recklessly); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02 (1985) (intentionally (purposely)-reck-
lessly); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(1) (Purdon 1983) (intentionally (pur-
posely)-recklessly); id. at 3301(c)(2) (intentionally (purposely)-recklessly); id. at 3301(d)
(intentionally (purposely)-recklessly); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1986) (intent (purpose)-recklessly).
722. See the parentheticals accompanying each of the statutes set forth supra
note 718. The first term is the word used in the statute, the parenthetical term is the
Model Penal Code equivalent terminology.
723. See supra note 701.
724. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-102 (1983).
725. Id. § 45-2-101(37).
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Wyoming differs from the majority of the states by imposing liability
when the fire or explosion which is "intentionally" started or caused en-
dangers property in a criminally negligent manner (rather that "reck-
lessly"). 716 "Criminal negligence" in Wyoming is defined in accordance
with the Model Penal Code's concept of "negligence. ' 727
Ohio principally relies upon the inchoate endangering offense for its
basic arson provisions. Any person in Ohio, who "by means of fire or
explosion, shall knowingly.., cause or create a substantial risk of" spec-
ified harm is guilty of arson.728 The mental state of "knowingly" is given
a very different meaning in Ohio than it is in the Model Penal Code and
the majority of states which use that term. Instead of awareness that a
consequence will be caused by his act to a "substantial" or "practical"
certainty, the Ohio definition requires only that "he is aware that his
conduct will probably cause a certain result. ' 729 But this unique and am-
biguous use of the term "knowingly" is not the only difficulty with the
Ohio scheme for it is also unclear whether the "knowing" mental state
applies to both the setting of the fire or the causing of the explosion, and
the harm created by the actor's conduct.
Maine, the last of the inchoate states with an endangering provision,
requires the fire or explosion to "recklessly endanger" person or property.
Unlike the majority of states with endangering provisions, the Maine stat-
ute is silent regaiding whether the fire or explosion must be purposely or
knowingly set or caused 3.7 0 But as we have seen above, the statute probably
requires that the fire or explosion be "recklessly" set or caused as well.71
Finally, Colorado, Rhode Island and Washington, although they are
harm states, use endangering offenses with the opposite form of ambiguity.
The Colorado offense requires that the actor "knowingly or recklessly"
start a fire or cause an explosion "and by so doing places another in
danger of death or serious bodily injury. ' 732 Rhode Island requires that
the fire or explosion be "knowingly" set or caused and that it "creates a
substantial risk" of specified harm 7133 and in Washington, that a person
"knowingly and maliciously" cause a fire or explosion "which is mani-
festly dangerous to any human life, including firemen. ' 734 In these states,
as opposed to Maine, the culpable mental state for the act is defined by
the statute, but the statute is silent as to the mental state required for the
726. WYo. STAT. § 6-3-103 (1977).
727. Compare id. § 6-1-104(iii) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d).
728. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.03 (Page Supp. 1984).
729. Id. § 2901.22(B) (Page 1975).
730. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
731. See supra text accompanying notes 705-08.
732. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-4-105 (1978).
733. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-4-2 (Supp. 1985).
734. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020(l)(a) (Supp. 1985).
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risk. Here, however, the answer seems even clearer. There is nothing wrong
at all with "knowingly or recklessly" starting a fire or purposely doing so
for that matter. What the statutes seek to suppress and punish is the
knowingly or recklessly endangering of persons or property, and these
statutes will, no doubt, be so construed.
735
It should be noted here, however, that three of the inchoate states do
not use endangering statutes, but confine their inchoate provisions to the
attempt-like variety; 736 and Ohio uses only the endangering type statute,
though its provisions are quite unique.
737
In contrast with the common law, these inchoate states have drastically
altered the mens rea required for the arson offenses. The common law
offense used the mens rea of "malice" and then only for the act of burn-
ing. In the majority of the inchoate states the act must be done "pur-
posely" and it must be done with a "purpose" to produce a specified
harm. The person who wantonly burns, or even a person who "knowingly"
burns, both of whom would act with "malice" at common law, commit
neither an attempt-like nor an endangering-type inchoate felony arson of-
fense in the majority of these inchoate jurisdictions. The person who wan-
tonly starts a fire which wantonly endangers people or property would be
guilty of a felony arson offense only in Maine, and perhaps in Ohio, as
far as the inchoate states are concerned, and, with reference to the harm
states, under the inchoate provisions of Colorado. 738 In the remaining states,
however, some other charge may be available.7 39
c. Additional Culpability Requirements for
Attempt-like Inchoate Offenses
For obvious reasons, none of the endangering-type inchoate offenses
have additional culpability requirements.7 40 Do any of the attempt-like
statutes, statutes which require the actor to purposely start a fire or cause
an explosion for the purpose of damaging or destroying specified property,
require additional culpability for their highest arson offense (or for any
735. See text accompanying notes 705-08 for a similar argument with respect
to the attempt-like statutes.
736. The states are Iowa, Kentucky, and New Mexico. The statutes of these
three states are cited supra note 313.
737. See supra notes 725-26 and accompanying text.
738. Although the common law offense did not directly address the concept
of endangering people, this was the reason that the offense was confined to the
burning of "dwelling houses." The wanton act of burning the dwelling house in turn
wantonly endangered the dwellers.
739. E.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304 (Purdon 1983) (criminal mischief).
740. This is because it is difficult to conceive of an additional culpability
requirement for an act which recklessly endangers people or property.
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other)? Only the Arkansas statutes use one of the standard culpability
requirements: if a person (purposely) starts a fire or causes an explosion
with the purpose of destroying or otherwise damaging any property, she
is guilty of the highest arson offense "if the act thereby negligently creates
a risk of death of serious physical injury to any person. ' 74
The Connecticut and Kentucky statutes impose first degree arson li-
ability when the actor intentionally (defined to mean purposely in both
states) starts a fire or causes an explosion with the intent to destroy or
damage a building, and the actor "has reason to believe the building may
be inhabited or occupied. ' 742 This phrase creates an additional subjective
mental state which must be proved before guilt is established. Finally, the
Iowa first degree arson statute requires that "the presence of one or more
persons can be reasonably anticipated. '7 43 Does the requirement impose
purely objective liability? This is, of course, the same problem we have
seen with similar provisions in the harm states, and we should expect the
same solution for the same reasons.7 44 Nevertheless, fewer of the inchoate
states use additional culpability requirements for their higher arson offen-
ses, usually the person protecting provisions, than do the harm states.
Fourteen harm states clearly required some additional culpability require-
ment and three, though their statutes are ambiguous, arguably do so, 741
whereas only three of the inchoate states use an additional culpability
requirement with respect to their attempt-like provisions, and one is am-
biguous on this point. But the majority of states in both categories have
no such additional requirements.
Before moving on to the final topic of this paper, a consideration of
the grading schemes used in the modern statutes, the mens rea requirements
under these statutes may be summarized as follows:
1. The common law mens rea, "malice," consisted of two distinct
mental states: the intentional burning and the wanton burning of the dwell-
741. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(i)(c) (Supp. 1985). This provision so sub-
stantially overlaps with the reckless burning provision as to create a substantial am-
biguity in the Arkansas statutory scheme. Suppose that the actor has a valuable item
of personal property which he wishes to burn. He takes the property into his back
yard and "purposely" sets the property on fire. It is a hot, dry day in the summer
and a high wind is blowing. Sparks from the fire land on the roof of a neighbor's
house and the roof catches on fire. The neighbor, who is taking a nap in an upstairs
bedroom, is seriously burned in the fire. With this hypothetical in mind, compare
id. § 41-1902(c) with id. § 41-1903(1)(a).
742. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-lll(a)(1) (West 1985) (emphasis supplied)
(This is only one of the ways of committing first degree arson in Connecticut.); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 513.020(l)(a) (1985) (emphasis supplied) (This too is only one of the
ways of committing first degree arson in Kentucky.).
743. IowA CODE ANN. § 712.2 (West 1979).
744. See supra text accompanying notes 684-90.
745. See supra text accompanying notes 694-97.
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ing house of another.746 The common law concept was adopted by the
Model Arson Law, and ten states which have either enacted the Model
Law or patterned their statutes after that law. 747 In addition, two statutes
use a variant of the common law terminology, but the common law con-
ception of the malice appears to apply in those two states as well. 748 Finally,
North Carolina still uses the common law offense, and the other statutory
crimes in that state have been interpreted to use essentially the common
law mens rea.749
Quite understandably, there is little problem in any of these states
with intentional burnings of the property of another. And though there
are extraordinarily few cases which present the issue of wanton burnings,
wanton burnings of the property of another are generally recognized as
being malicious burnings in these states. 7 0 A problem has arisen, however,
because all of these states have abolished the common law "of another"
requirement. Responding to the situation in which an owner intentionally
burns her property in circumstances in which neither other persons nor
other property is damaged or endangered, the courts have held that the
burning is not "malicious," and hence it is not arson.7 5 ' Though the opin-
ions assume that such a burning was "malicious" at common law, they
have concluded, for a variety of reasons, that the statutory phrase requires
an intent to injure or endanger other persons or property.7 2 These cases
reach the correct result, but they are mistaken with respect to the as-
sumption that this interpretation of the statutory phrase differs from the
common law concept of malice.
Two states, California and Washington, use the concept of malice in
the definition of the mental state necessary for at least one felony arson
offense as a result of recent enactments, but the meaning of that concept
in both states is less than clear. 753
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that a reckless burning is not a mali-
cious burning in any of these states; and, as we have seen, reckless burnings
were not malicious burnings at common law.
2. The common law mens rea has been clearly abandoned in the re-
maining thirty-five states.75 4 There is no felony arson offense in any of
these states which is defined in terms of the culpable mental state of
746. See supra text accompanying notes 580-82.
747. See supra text accompanying notes 574-75.
748. See supra text accompanying notes 576-79.
749. See supra text accompanying note 605.
750. See supra notes 582-84 and accompanying text.
751. See supra note 588 and accompanying text.
752. See supra notes 588-91 and accompanying text.
753. See supra notes 596-603 and accompanying text.
754. See supra text following note 605, and supra notes 699-700 and accom-
panying text.
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"wantonness." Three states, however, do have a felony arson offense
which uses the "reckless" state of mind, and thus a wanton burning would
suffice for this felony.7 " But in the vast majority of the American states
(thirty-two of thirty-five), the wanton burning or damaging of property,
which would have been the capital felony of arson if the property burned
was a dwelling house at common law, would not be arson in any degree.7 56
Although it might well be arson in one of the inchoate states summarized
below.
3. Although malice at common law also required the absence of jus-
tification and excuse for both intentional and wanton burnings, the modern
statutes usually do not speak of an absence of justification and excuse. 5 7
It is assumed in the statutory scheme. Two states, however, use the term
"unlawfully" in the statutory description of the mental element of their
basic arson offenses. This word is generally thought to mean nothing more
than the absence of justification and excuse. But one of these states, Flor-
ida, has construed that term to permit an owner to burn her property when
no other person had an interest in the property and the burning did not
endanger the safety or property of another person.7 58 In this respect, the
word "unlawfully" has been construed to reach the same result as the
term maliciously, in the modern statutes.7 59
Commentators have suggested that the concept of mitigation, bor-
rowed from the common law of murder (another common law felony which
was defined in terms of the malicious state of mind) is applicable to ar-
son. 760 No Arerican statute specifically provides for the use of the "rule
of mitigation" for arson, and I find no American cases which support that
view as a common law principle.7 6 '
4. In the twenty-three harm states which do not use the term "malice"
in their description of the culpable mental state of arson (fifteen states use
this term, thirteen in accordance with its common law meaning), their
statutes have been influenced by the mens rea provisions of the Model
Penal Code. In accordance with the Model Penal Code, they have all
simplified the mental elements of their arson offenses.
5. Thirteen (of the twenty-three) harm states require that the defendant
act intentionally for their basic arson offenses. 762 Twelve describe the mens
rea as intentionally damaging the subject property by fire or explosion,
755. See supra text accompanying notes 651-61.
756. See supra text following note 667.
757. See supra note 643.
758. See supra text accompanying notes 642-49.
759. Id.
760. See, e.g., supra note 573.
761. Id.
762. See supra text accompanying notes 606-08.
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and one requires that the actor "intentionally sets fire to or burns or causes
to be burned" the subject property.763
Nine of these thirteen states define the term "intentionally" restric-
tively to mean the act-for-the-purpose-of-achieving-a-result variety of in-
tent, what the Model Penal Code calls "purposely." ' 764 In these states, a
person who acts in circumstances in which the burning or damaging is a
virtual or substantial certainty does not act "intentionally" (purposely).
A fortiori a person who wantonly burns is not guilty as well. Of course,
this too is a radical departure from the common law mens rea of "malice."
Why these states have chosen to restrict the mental state of their basic
arson offense to the "purposeful" culpable mental state is less than clear.
The remaining three and perhaps four states which use the "inten-
tional" mental state use it in its generally accepted form: (a) the act-for-
the-purpose-of-achieving-the-result variety of intent; and, (b) the act-
knowing-to-a-virtual-certainty-that-the-result-vill-be-caused variety of in-
tent. 765 This is exactly how the intentional burning component of malice
was defined for the mens rea of arson at common law. 7 6 Of course, a
wanton burning is not an intentional burning in these states either.
6. The act-knowing-to-a-virtual-certainty-that-the-result-will-be-caused
variety of intent is defined in the Model Penal Code as the culpable mental
state of "knowingly. ' 767 Seven states define their basic arson offenses as
knowingly setting fire to or knowingly damaging property, 76 and four of
these seven states define the term in substantial accordance with the Model
Penal Code definition. 769 The remaining three states offer no statutory
definition of the term, 770 although it will probably be interpreted to mean
the "virtual certainty" variety of intent. Since three or four of the states
that use the intentional mens rea use that term in its generally accepted
sense, a person who acts "knowingly" is guilty of arson in those states.
Finally, two states expressly use "knowingly" or "purposely" as the men-
tal states for their basic arson offenses (defined in accordance with the
Model Penal Code).7 7 ' These two states, albeit with different terminology,
thus use the intentional mental state in its generally accepted form. Thus
twelve or thirteen states have felony arson offenses which can be committed
"knowingly."
763. Id.
764. See supra text accompanying note 615.
765. Id.
766. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97, 625-26.
767. See supra text accompanying notes 625-26.
768. See supra text accompanying note 629.
769. See supra text accompanying note 630.
770. See supra text accompanying note 631.
771. See supra text accompanying notes 632-33.
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7. Only three of the harm states supplement their basic arson offenses
with a felony defined in terms of "recklessly" burning or damaging prop-
erty,772 and one state has a felony arson offense which uses inadvertent
criminal negligence as its culpable mental state. 773 Neither recklessness nor
negligence was sufficient for arson at common law.774
8. Fourteen of the thirty-eight harm states use a culpability require-
ment in addition to the mental state with which the act of burning or
damaging must be done to define at least one of their people protecting
offenses, which is also the highest arson offense in each state.7  "Know-
ingly" and "recklessly" are the two most commonly used additional culp-
able mental states, and they refer to the person endangering circumstances
such as "knowing that a person is in the property" which is intentionally
damaged by fire (or an explosion), or "intentionally damag[ing] any prop-
erty by starting a fire or causing an explosion and by that act recklessly
places another person in danger of serious physical injury.) 776
In some of the statutes, however, there is considerable ambiguity as
to whether an additional culpable mental state is needed with respect to
the person endangering circumstances and, if so, what it is.777
9. All but one of the inchoate states use attempt-like offenses as their
basic arson crimes. The attempt-like statutes all require that the actor
intentionally, purposely, or knowingly (depending on the state in question)
start a fire or cause an explosion for the purpose of achieving a particular
result or knowing that a particular result will happen. 78 The basic structure
of these inchoate arson offenses thus involves two culpable mental states.
For example, purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion for the
purpose of damaging property. Although most of these statutes do not
specify the mental states with which the fire must be started or the explo-
sion caused, most logically it must be done with the same mental state
required for the target of the actor's conduct-"purposely" in our ex-
ample. 779
There are twelve states which use inchoate provisions for their basic
arson offenses, and eleven of these twelve use the attempt-like statute as
their basic arson offense.780 Eight of these eleven define the mental states
used in their statutes in accordance with the Model Penal Code, although
772. See supra text accompanying notes 652-55.
773. See supra text accompanying notes 662-64.
774. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
775. See supra text following note 670.
776. See supra text accompanying notes 671-83.
777. See supra text accompanying notes 684-93.
778. See supra text accompanying note 699.
779. See supra text accompanying notes 700-711.
780. See supra note 699.
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there is a difference in terminology in six states.7 8 ' These six use the "in-
tentional" mental state, though it is defined to mean "purposely" in the
parlance of the Model Penal Code. 718 2 The two remaining states use the
Model Penal Code terminology. 783 Hence, though six states use "inten-
tionally," all eight of these states mean "purposely." The three remaining
states have unique mental states which have not been clearly defined in
the statutes or clarified by the courts.7 4
10. Nine of the inchoate states use an "endangering" statute, a statute
which prohibits an actor from endangering people or property by fire or
explosion. The structure of these offenses requires two distinct mental
states: (a) a culpable mental state with respect to starting a fire or causing
an explosion which, (b) with a culpable mental state, endangers persons
or property. Although there are differences in terminology, six of the
inchoate states and two harm states that have endangering offenses require
that the fire or explosion be started or caused "purposely," and that the
fire or explosion "recklessly" endanger persons or property.785 The prin-
cipal difference in terminology is that while most of these states use the
term "intentionally" it is defined by statute to mean "purposely" in ac-
cordance with the Model Penal Code's definition.7 8 6 One state also uses
different terminology for the endangering element ("negligently"), but that
term is statutorily defined in accordance with the Model Penal Code's
definition of "recklessly. ' 7 7 The remaining five states with an endangering
offense use unique mental states which do not contribute to a general
understanding of the contemporary law of arson. 788
11. For obvious reasons, none of the endangering-type inchoate of-
fenses have additional culpability requirements. Only three of the inchoate
states use an additional culpability requirement with respect to their at-
tempt-like provisions, and one is ambiguous on this point. One of these
states uses a "negligence" culpable mental state789 and the other two use
the same unique subjective provision-when the actor "has reason to be-
lieve" the building may be inhabited or occupied. 790 Thus, far fewer of
the inchoate states use an additional culpability requirement in connection
with the person endangering circumstances than do the harm states.
781. See supra text accompanying note 701.
782. See supra text accompanying note 702.
783. See supra text accompanying note 703.
784. See supra text accompanying notes 713-17.
785. See supra text accompanying notes 718-22.
786. See supra text accompanying notes 719-20.
787. See supra text accompanying notes 721-22.
788. See supra text accompanying notes 725-32.
789. See supra text accompanying note 738.
790. See supra text accompanying notes 739-41.
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F. Grading the Arson Offenses
The common law did not grade arson into various levels of severity.
There was a single arson offense, and all found guilty of that felony were
automatically punished by a sentence of death. 9' But in a larger sense,
there was a crude grading scheme. If a person maliciously burned the
property of another, it was either arson or the misdemeanor of malicious
mischief depending upon whether it was a dwelling house or some other
type of property. 7 2 Grading in this larger sense exists in every modern
statutory scheme, for every American state has both arson and "malicious
mischief" statutes which may be committed by fire as well as by other
means.19"
But, with one exception,794 every American state also divides arson
into various categories or "degrees" for the purpose of assessing different
punishments. The range is from a low of two 795 to a high of seven different
felony categories. 796 Most of the states, however, have either two (18), 797
791. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
792. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
793. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 220.3 comments 1-8, at
41-58 (listing many of the modern statutes); see also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra
note 2, at 406-13 (for a discussion of the common law offense). Of course, the statutes
vary in both their name and content.
794. See infra note 798.
795. See infra note 794.
796. See infra note 800.
797. ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (arson in the first degree);
id. § 13A-7-42 (arson in the second degree); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400 (1983) (arson
in the first degree); id. § 11.46.410 (arson in the second degree); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1902 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (arson); id. § 41-1903 (reckless burning); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 806.01(1) (West Supp. 1986) (first degree arson); id. § 806.01(2) (second
degree arson); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 708-820 (1976) (criminal property damage in
the first degree); id. § 708-821 (criminal property damage in the second degree);
Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, §§ 20-1 (Arson), 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson)
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1, 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 712.2 (West 1979) (arson in the first degree); id. § 712.3 (arson in the second
degree); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3718 (1981) (arson); id. § 21-3719 (aggravated arson);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985) (aggravated arson); id. §
14:52 (simple arson); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-102 (1983) (negligent arson); id. §
45-6-103 (arson); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(11) (1974 & Supp. 1983) (class A
felony); id. § 634:1(11) (class B felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-1(a) (West 1982)
(aggravated arson); id. § 2C:17-1(b) (arson); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985)
(arson); id. § 12.1-21-02 (endangering by fire or explosion); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2909.02 (Page Supp. 1984) (aggravated arson); id. § 2909.03 (arson); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 164.315 (1985) (second degree arson); id. § 164.325 (first degree arson);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (first and second degree arson);
UTAH CODE ANN § 76-6-102 (1978) (arson); id. § 76-6-103 (aggravated arson); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 943.02 (West 1982) (arson of buildings, damage of property by explo-
sives-class B felony); id. 943.03 (arson of property other than building-class E felony).
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three (22),798 or four (7)799 grades of felony arson offenses. 00 Maine does
798. A~iz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1703 (Supp. 1985) (arson of an unoccupied
structure or property-class 4 or 5 depending on value); id. § 13-1704 (arson of occupied
structure-class 2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 801 (1979) (arson in the third degree);
id. § 802 (arson in the second degree); id. § 803 (arson in the first degree); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-1401 (1983) (arson in the first degree); id. § 26-1402 (arson in the second
degree); id. § 26- 1403 (arson in the third degree); IDAHO CODE § 18-801 (1979) (arson
in first degree); id. § 18-802 (arson in second degree); id. § 18-803 (arson in third
degree); Ky. REV. STAT. § 513.020 (1985) (arson in the first degree); id. § 513.030
(arson in the second degree); id. § 513.040 (arson in the third degree); MD. CRIM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 6 (1982 & Supp. 1984) (dwelling or adjoining building); id. § 7
(barn, garage, etc.); id. § 8 (burning personal property of another); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 266, § 1 (West 1970) (dwelling house); id. § 2 (meeting houses); id. § 5
(woods and other property); MICH. Copn. LAWS § 28.267 (1981) (burning dwelling
houses); id. § 28.268 (burning of other real property); id. § 28.269 (burning of personal
property); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561 (West Supp. 1985) (arson in the first degree);
id. 609.562 (arson in the second degree); id. § 609.563 (arson in the third degree);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1973) (arson in the first degree-burning dwelling house
or out building); id. § 97-17-3 (arson in the first degree-state supported school build-
ings); id. 97-17-5 (arson in the second degree-other buildings or structures); id. 97-
17-7 (arson in the third degree-personal property); Mo. REv. STAT. § 569.040 (1979)
(arson in the first degree); id. § 569.050 (arson in the second degree); id. § 569-055
(knowingly burning or exploding); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-502 (1979) (arson in the
first degree); id. § 28-503 (arson in the second degree); id. 28-504 (arson, third degree);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 205.010 (1985) (first degree arson); id. § 205.015 (second degree
arson); id. § 205.020 (third degree arson); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5 (1984) (arson
and negligent arson); id. § 30-17-6 (aggravated arson); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1401 (West 1983) (arson in the first degree); id. § 1402 (arson in the second degree);
id. 1403 (arson in the third degree); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a) (Purdon
1983) (arson endangering persons); id. § 3301(b) (arson endangering property); id. §
3301(d) (reckless burning or exploding); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-1 (1979
& Supp. 1985) (first degree arson); id. § 22-33-2 (second degree arson); id. 22-33-3
(third degree arson); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (Supp. 1985) (first degree arson);
id. § 503 (second degree arson); id. § 504 (third degree arson); VA. CODE § 18.2-77
(1982) (burning or destroying dwelling house-class 2, 3, or 4 felony); id. § 18.2-79
(burning or destroying meeting house-class 3 or 4 felony); id. § 18.2-80 (burning or
destroying other building or structure-class 3 or 4 felony); id. § 18.2-81 (burning or
destroying personal property-class 4 felony or misdemeanor); id. § 18.2-82 (burning
by person committing a felony-class 4 felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020
(West 1977 & Supp. 1985) (arson in the first degree); id. § 9A.48.030 (arson in the
second degree); id. § 9A.48.040 (reckless burning in the first degree); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-3-1 (1984) (arson in the first degree); id. § 61-3-2 (arson in the second degree);
id. § 61-3-3 (arson in the third degree); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-101 (1977) (first
degree arson); id. § 6-3-102 (second degree arson); id. § 6-3-103 (third degree arson).
799. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-102 (1978) (first degree arson); id. § 18-4-103
(second degree arson); id. § 18-4-104 (third degree arson); id. § 18-4-105 (fourth
degree arson); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-111 (West 1985) (arson in the first
degree); id. § 53a-I12 (arson in the second degree); id. § 53a-113 (arson in the third
degree); id. § 53a-114 (reckless burning); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns Supp.
1985) ((a)-(b)-class A felony, (c)-class C felony, (d)-class D felony); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 150.05 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (arson in the fourth degree); id. § 150.10 (arson
143
Poulos: Poulos: Metamorphosis of the Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
438 MISSOURI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 51
not grade arson,8 1 Rhode Island has five categories, 802 and California has
seven. 0 3 Although there is no uniformity in the terminology used for the
grading schemes, the most common is to call the various grades of arson
"degrees" and to rank them ordinally (e.g., first, second, and third de-
gree). Well over one-half of the states (twenty-seven) do sO.8 °4 The re-
maining twenty-two states either use labels such as "arson and aggravated
arson" (6)805 or "arson" and "reckless" or "negligent arson" (4),06 or
in the third degree); id. § 150.15 (arson in the second degree); id. § 150.20 (arson in
the first degree); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1981) (first degree arson-class C felony,
second degree arson-class D felony); id. § 14-58.2 (first degree arson); id. § 14-59
(class E felony); id. § 14-62 (class E felony); id. § 14-62.1 (class E felony); id. § 14-
63 (class H felony); id. § 14-64 (class H felony); id. § 14-66 (class H felony); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-110 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (first degree arson), (B) (second degree
arson), (C) (third degree arson); id. § 16-11-130 (no degree mentioned but is punished
by one to three years in prison); id. § 16-11-150 (no degree mentioned but a second
offense is a felony); id. § 16-11-170 (same)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201 (1982)
(aggravated arson); id. § 39-3-202 (setting fire to building or structure-three to twenty-
one years); id. § 39-3-203 (setting fire to property-one to ten years); id. § 39-3-204
(setting fire with intent to burn-one to five years); id. § 39-3-206 (willfully and
maliciously setting fire-same).
800. This analysis omits felony provisions which relate to insurance fraud,
special provisions concerning attempted arson, and misdemeanor arson offenses. In
at least one state, there is a separate felony provision for insurance fraud, for at-
tempted arson, and for misdemeanor arson offenses. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11- 4-4 (1981
& Supp. 1985) (arson-third degree-an insurance fraud offense); id. § 11-4-6 (arson-
fifth degree-a special attempt provision); id. § 11-4-8 (arson-seventh degree-a mis-
demeanor offense). It is uncommon for a state to have a separate insurance fraud
provision which is assigned a different punishment. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
505 (1979). But this offense is graded in the same way as third degree arson, so its
omission creates no distortion of the grading scheme presented in this paper. However,
states which follow the Model Arson Law typically have, as did the Model Law, a
separate specialized attempt offense. In states which call their various grades "de-
grees," such a provision is frequently called "fourth degree arson." Those statutes
have been omitted from this analysis and that omission does cause some distortion.
E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-804 (1979) (fourth degree arson-an attempted arson statute).
In the analysis used in this paper, arson in Idaho is divided into three degrees because
the attempt provisions are beyond the scope of this paper.
801. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 802 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
802. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (first degree arson); id. §
11-4-3 (second degree arson); id. § 11-4-5 (fourth degree arson); id. § 11-4-6 (fifth
degree arson); id. § 11-4-7 (sixth degree arson). Third degree arson is an insurance
fraud offense and is therefore omitted from this study. See supra note 797.
803. CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 (West Supp. 1986) (four felony categories); id.
§ 452 (three felony categories and one misdemeanor category).
804. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. See supra
notes 794-96 for the citations to the statutes of these twenty-seven states.
805. Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana (simple and aggravated arson), New Jersey,
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rely on descriptive titles and specify the punishment affixed to each pro-
vision (12).807
With respect to the distinction between arson offenses which have as
their purpose the protection of people as opposed to the protection of
property, forty-one states describe their highest arson offense ("first degree
arson," "aggravated arson," or "arson," to use the common labels) as
exclusively a person protecting offense.8 8 In the remaining eight states the
highest arson offense is not used exclusively to protect people. In three it
is also used to suppress and punish insurance fraud, 0 9 in three more it is
used to suppress and punish insurance fraud and to protect a special cat-
egory of property,8 0 and in one to protect a special category of property,
in addition to people.8 Only in Wisconsin can one discern no special
interest in protecting people over property in the highest arson offense. 12
In the majority of states the grades of arson lower than the highest
offense are used generally to protect various types or categories of prop-
Ohio, and Utah. See supra notes 794-800 for the citations to the statutes of these six
states.
806. Arkansas (arson and reckless arson), Montana (arson and negligent arson),
North Dakota (arson and endangering-a reckless offense), New Mexico (arson, neg-
ligent arson, and aggravated arson). See supra notes 794-800 for the citations to the
statutes of these four states.
807. Arizona, California, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin. See supra notes 794-800
for the citations to the statutes of these eleven states.
North Carolina uses several degrees of arson and this descriptive label approach.
See supra note 796 for the citation to the North Carolina statute.
808. In forty-one states, the highest grade offense can only be committed when
there is some harm or danger to persons created or inflicted by the actor's conduct.
This may be expressed in the statute through the subject matter or through a de-
scription of the harm or danger, or both.
Thirteen states express harm or danger to persons only through the description
of the subject matter of the arson offense: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
Twenty-three states express harm or danger through the description of an en-
dangering circumstance (alone or with an endangering subject matter): Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia.
Six states use both an endangering subject matter and a description of endan-
gering circumstances. When either is satisfied, the act qualifies for the highest offense:
Florida, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, South Carolina, and Utah.
See supra notes 794-800 for the citations to the statutes of these forty-one states.
809. These states are Connecticut, Georgia, and Washington. See supra notes
795-96 for the citations to the statutes of these three states.
810. These three states are Arkansas, New Jersey and North Dakota. See supra
note 794 for the citations to the statutes of these three states.
811. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-4-2 (Supp. 1985).
812. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.02 (West 1982).
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erty, or to suppress and punish insurance fraud, or to suppress and punish
reckless risk taking which endangers persons or property (or all three) . 1 3
The criteria used to grade the various arson offenses vary considerably
in their specific detail. It is also not uncommon for one or more criterion
to be used either alone or in conjunction with another in making a sorting
decision. In other words, there may be and usually are several alternative
ways of violating a particular arson offense, and more than one criteria
may be necessary as well. For example, a person is guilty of a felony of
the first degree in Pennsylvania if she intentionally starts a fire and (1)
thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily in-
jury, or (2) commits the act with the purpose of destroying or damaging
an inhabited building or occupied structure of another. 1 4 On the other
hand, if she intentionally starts a fire but recklessly places an inhabited
building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage or destruc-
tion, she is guilty of a felony of the second degree.1
5
But despite the variance in the detail and differences in how the various
criteria are combined to grade the actor's behavior, general patterns do
emerge from these arson statutes. Although no state may use all or even
most of the criteria listed below, these are the commonly used criteria to
grade the arson offenses:
1. The actual,8 16 probable8 1 7 or possible8 8 presence of another person
in the property at the time of the fire (or explosion). This criterion is
generally used to distinguish the highest arson offense (the person pro-
tecting offense) from the lower offenses.8 19
2. Whether the actor's conduct resulted in actual physical injury to
or the death of another person.8 20 This criterion is generally used in the
same manner as the first criterion.
82
'
813. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(c)-(d) (Purdon 1983).
814. Id. § 3301(l)(i)-(ii).
815. Id. § 3301(c)(2). A person can commit this offense by also intending to
damage or destroy a building or unoccupied structure of another. Id. § 3301(c)(1).
Or by insurance fraud. Id. § 3301(c)(3).
816. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41(a)(l) (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
1 lI(a)(l) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561(2)(a) (West Supp. 1985); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 569.040 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-502 (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
150.15(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN § 76-6-103(b) (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020(c) (Supp. 1985).
817. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01(1)(b) (West Supp. 1986) (where persons
are normally present).
818. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW. § 150.15 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (or the circum-
stances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a reasonable
possibility); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561(2)(b) (West Supp. 1985) (semble).
819. See, e.g., the statutes cited supra notes 813-15.
820. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(a), 452(a) (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-11l(a)(2) (West 1985); Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III, art. 20, §
440 [Vol. 51
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3. Whether another person or property was physically endangered by
the actor's conduct.822 Again, this criterion is generally used to distinguish
the highest arson offense (the person protecting offense) from the lower. 2 '
But it is sometimes also used to establish a lower person protecting offense
as well.8
24
4. Whether the property which is the subject matter or the target of
the offense is inhabited,25 occupied8 26 or used as a dwellinge27 (or any
20-1.1(2) (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 20-1.1(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a)(3) (Burns Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. §
513.020(b) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-6 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-
110(A) (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-201(2)-(3) (1982); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 28.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
821. For example, all of the statutes cited supra note 817 use this criterion to
define, at least in part, the most egregious arson offense.
822. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400 (1983) (recklessly places another person
in danger of serious physical injury); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(c) (Supp. 1983)
(negligently creates a risk of death or serious physical injury to any person); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-111(4) (West 1985) (at the scene of such fire or explosion a
peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1401(5) (1983) (it is reasonably foreseeable that human life might
be endangered); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 708-820 (1976) (thereby recklessly places an-
other person in danger of death or bodily injury); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51
(West Supp. 1985) (whereby it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.040 (1979) (thereby recklessly places such person in danger of
death or serious physical injury); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (Purdon
1983) (semble); id. § 3301(c)(2) (recklessly places an inhabited building or occupied
structure of another in danger of damage or destruction); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
28.02(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (when it will endanger the life of some individual
or the safety of the property of another).
823. E.g., the statutes cited supra note 819 all are for the highest arson offense
except for 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(c)(2) (Purdon 1983).
824. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-05 (1985) (endangering by fire or ex-
plosion); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3301(d) (Purdon 1983) (reckless burning or
explosion).
825. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(b), 452(b) (West Supp. 1986) (inhabited structure
or inhabited property); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-IIl(a)(1) (West 1985) (inhab-
ited or occupied); KY. REV. STAT. § 513.020(1)(a) (1985) (the building is inhabited
or occupied); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985) (building or inhabited structure);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1401 (West 1983) (inhabited or occupied); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3301)a)(1Xii) (Purdon 1983) (inhabited building or occupied structure).
826. E.g., Am. REV. STAT. § 13-1704 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1902 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-102 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-
103(1)(a) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(11) (1974); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
164.325(1)(a) (1985); S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-1 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 6-
3-101 (1977).
827. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01(a) (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 18-
801 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(1)(a)(1) (Burns Supp. 1985); MD. CRIM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 6 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 1 (1970); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 28.267 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561(1) (West Supp. 1985); Miss.
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combination of these factors). This criterion, of course, includes a "dwell-
ing house" at common law, its modern equivalent, and all types of build-
ings and structures in which one would expect another is likely to be
present, such as office buildings, public buildings, stores, and the like. It
is patterned upon the common law's use of dwelling houses as the subject
matter of arson, and is used because of the implicit danger to people
created by its damage or destruction by fire or explosive. This criterion,
too, is generally used to distinguish between the highest arson offense, and
the lower offenses (in which case the building would not be a dwelling, or
it would be uninhabited or unoccupied) .28 States which adopted or pat-
terned their statutes on the Model Arson Law use a statutory equivalent
to the common law curtilage rule to define the subject matter of their
highest arson offense.
5. Whether the property is an especially important type of property
to the general public, such as a vital public facility, a bridge, dam, tunnel,
power plant, school building, or similar "public property."8 29 This crite-
rion is used both to grade the property protecting offenses, and occasion-
ally to grade the actor's conduct into the highest arson offense. It is not,
however, a widely used criterion.830
6. The type of property burned, damaged, destroyed or endangered
by fire (or explosion) other than property covered by criteria 4 and 5
above.83 ' With this criterion, whether the property is a building, structure,
CODE ANN. § 97-17-1 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.010 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-58 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-110(B) (Law. Co-op. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 502 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020(l)(b) (Supp. 1985);
W. VA. § 61-3-1 (1984).
828. The statutes cited supra notes 822-24 are all for the highest degree of
arson in the respective state.
829. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(a) (Supp. 1983) (a vital public facility);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 451(c), 452(c) (West Supp. 1985) ("structure" includes bridges,
tunnels, and powerplants); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-3 (1973) (state supported school
building); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-59 (1981) (public buildings); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-21-01 (1985) (vital public facility); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.325(1)(a) (1985).
830. For examples of the use of this criterion to grade the property offense,
see the following statutes: compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 451(b) with § 451(c), and §
452(b) with 452(c) (West Supp. 1986); compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §
2 with § 5 (1970).
For examples of the use of this criterion to grade the actor's conduct into the
highest arson offense, see the following statutes: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1902(a) (Supp.
1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-01 (1985).
831. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(c), 452(c) (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE
§§ 18-802, -803 (1979); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 7, 8 (1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 266, §§ 2, 5 (1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.268, .269 (1981); MIss. CODE ANN.
§§ 97-17-7,-17-13 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 205.015, .020 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-62, -63, -66 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1402, 1403 (West 1983); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-110(c), -11-140 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-
3-202, -3-203 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 503, 504 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§
18.2-80, .2-81 (1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-3-2, -3-3 (West 1982).
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other (or any) real property, forest land, specified kinds of personal prop-
erty (e.g., vehicles, aircraft, vessels, etc.), or other personal property may
determine the grade of the arson offense. This criterion is used not only
to grade the various arson offenses aimed at protecting property interests,
but is sometimes used to distinguish between felony and misdemeanor
provisions as well.832 The Model Arson Law uses this as the exclusive
criterion for grading between its intermediate and lowest offenses. 33 This
is not one of the most widely used criterion.
7. The value of property burned, damaged, destroyed or endangered,
or the amount of the damage inflicted by the actor's conduct.3 4 This
criterion is used to distinguish misdemeanor offenses from the felony arson
offenses;135 and, more unusually, to grade among the felony offenses which
protect property interests.
3 6
8. The culpable mental state with which the actor burned, damaged or
destroyed the property, or the mental state with which the actor set the fire
832. E.g., compare CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 452(c) with § 452(d) (West Supp.
1986); compare IowA CODE ANN. § 712.3 with 712.4 (West 1979).
833. MODEL ARSON LAW, see infra App. A, §§ 2, 3.
834. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1703(B) (Supp. 1985) (value of property
over $100); HAWAji REV. STAT. § 708-821(b) (1976) (felony-damages property in
amount exceeding $500); IDAHO CODE § 18-803 (1979) (property of the value of $25);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a)(3), -1(d) (Burns Supp. 1985) (when pecuniary loss is
at least $250); IOWA CODE ANN. § 712.3 (West 1979) (value over $500); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:52 (West 1974) (damage amounts to $500 or more); MD. CriM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 8(c) (1982) (damage in excess of $1,000); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
266, § 5 (1970) (value in excess of $25); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 28.269 (1981) (value
of $50 or more); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.562, .563 (West Supp. 1985) ($300 or
more); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-17-7 (1973) (value of $25); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-
504(2)-(3) (1979) (damages amount to $100 or more); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.020
(1985) (value of property over $100); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634.1 (1974 & Supp.
1983) (pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5 (1984) (value
of property over $100); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02 (1985) (damage in excess of
$2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1403 (West 1983) (property worth not less than
$50); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3301(d)(2) (Purdon 1983) (endangering property
having a value of $5,000 or more); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-5 (Supp. 1985) (value in
excess of $100); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-140(6) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (other personal
property of the value of $25); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-3 (1979) (value in
excess of $25); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-203 (1982) (value in excess of $25); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-102 (1978) (damage in excess of $5,000); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-80,
.2-81 (1982) (specified property or property of the value of $200 or more); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit 13, § 504 (Supp. 1985) (value not less than $25); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-3
(1984) (value in excess of $50); Wyo. STAT. §6-3-103 (1977) (damage in excess of
$200).
835. See authorities cited supra note 831.
836. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5 (1984). It is not uncommon for states
to grade among the misdemeanor offenses based upon the value of the property
damaged. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-4-105 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. 7-6-102(2)
(1978).
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or caused the explosion which endangered people or property. With this
criterion,8" the more culpable the mental state (e.g., purposely as opposed
to recklessly), the higher the arson offense will be.83 8 But no state uses more
than two basic categories of culpable mental states to grade arson offenses;
and, when the culpable mental state is used to grade offenses, the critical
culpable mental states are usually acting "purposely" for the higher offenses
as opposed to acting "recklessly" for the lower offenses. 3 9 Most states,
however, do not grade on the basis of the culpable mental state with which
the person acted. Instead, the prescribed mental states are used for all felony
arson offenses.814
9. In a minority of jurisdictions a mental state in addition to the mental
state with which the act must be performed is required in some instances for
guilt of the highest arson offense.84' However, no state requires an additional
mental state for the general property protecting offenses. 842
10. Miscellaneous criteria: A very few states use such additional factors
as (a) the means used by the actor to damage, injure, or endanger;8 43 (b) the
837. See supra text beginning with note 573.
838. E.g., compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 with § 452 (West Supp. 1986).
839. E.g., compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 with § 452 (West Supp. 1986).
840. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-7-41 to -7-43 (1982 & Supp. 1985); Aruz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1703, -1704 (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 801-803
(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.01 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1401 to
-1403 (1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-801 to -803 (1983); Criminal Code of 1961, tit. III,
art. 20, §§ 20-1 (Arson), 20-1.1 (Aggravated Arson), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § § 20-
1, 20-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1 (Burns Supp.
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 712.1-.3 (West 1979); KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3718, -
3719 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:51, :52 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985); MD.
CRim. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 6-8 (1982 & Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
266, §§ 1-2, 5 (1970); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 28.267-.269 (1981); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 97-17-1 to -17-7 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 569.040-.055 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 205.010, .015, .020 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-502 to -504 (1979); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2909.02, .03 (Page Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1401-1403 (West
1983); ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.315, .325 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-4-2 to
-4-7 (1981 & Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-110, -11-140 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-33-I to -33-3 (1979 & Supp. 1985); TEXAS PENAL
CODE ANN. § 28.01 (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-102, -6-103
(1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 502-507 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-77, .2-
79, .2-80, .2-81; W. VA. CODE 61-3-1 to -3-3 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.02, .03
(West 1982).
841. See supra notes 669-93 and accompanying text.
842. Id.
843. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.20 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (first degree
arson can be committed by the use of an "incendiary device" or an "explosive").
Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.02(c) with § 943.03 (West 1982) (the damaging of
any property of another by means of "explosives" is a class B felony whereas it is
a class E felony to damage any property (other than a building) by means of fire).
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locale of the incident;8" (c) whether the damage, injury, or endangering was
pursuant to a contract for hire;84 and (d) the time of day.8 46
VI. CONCLUSION
Little but the roots of common law arson remain. But unseen, hidden
beneath the surface of our time, it shapes our basic conception of arson
today. And, occasionally, like Latin does for the linguist, its past wisdom
counsels us on the arson problems of our day.
We have witnessed the metamorphosis of arson from the narrow, com-
mon law felony which protected the safety of dwellers into an offense which
protected property interests, and, finally, into its current manifestation-an
offense which widely protects people and property from the risks of injury
or damage caused by fire or explosion. Not surprisingly, the elements of the
common law offense rarely had sufficient elasticity to withstand the demands
of a new age, and thus were abandoned for new formulations of the basic
concepts or for new concepts altogether.
The first to go, of course, was the subject matter of the offense. When
property protection became one of the principal goals of arson, that goal
could only be attained by expanding the subject matter of the newly conceived
crime. And when the protection of people from the risks attendant upon
fires and explosions became another of the crime's principal goals, the subject
matter of the newly created people protecting offenses was changed again.
Today, though not in every state, there may be differences in the description
of the subject matter between the property offenses and the people protecting
offenses. In the latter it is common to find a person endangering subject
matter, whereas in the former buildings, structures, other types of real prop-
erty, and personal property are protected in varying degrees, although there
is more similarity in the coverage than one might have thought at first blush.
With these changes in the subject matter wrought to expand the offense to
protect persons and property, the common law curtilage rule became mori-
bund, and it was buried along with the subject matter of the common law
offense, a dwelling house of another.
But with the evolution of arson as an offense designed to protect a
broader class of people than the inhabitants of dwelling houses, and to
844. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-42(d) (Supp. 1985) (detention facility or a penal
facility); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 451(e), 452(e) (West Supp. 1986) (prisons and similar
detention facilities); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 22-33-10 (Supp. 1985) (a place of
confinement); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (within
the limits of an incorporated city or town without the necessary permit); id. § 28.02(a)(4)
(located on property belonging to another).
845. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(1)(b) (Burns West Supp. 1985); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.02(3) (Page Supp. 1984).
846. Virginia is the only state to use this criterion. VA. CODE § 18.2-77 (1982).
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protect property as property, the "of another" requirement had outlived its
usefulness as well. That common law concept, completely ill-suited for a
property protecting offense and too limiting for a person protecting offense,
has been abandoned in all but a small handful of states. For the property
protecting offenses we have created two new concepts. The first was to
borrow the common law phrase "of another," but its meaning was changed
from a simple requirement that the subject matter of the offense be in the
possession of someone other than the arsonist into the modern statutory
meaning of that term: that no person other than the arsonist have a pro-
prietary or possessory interest in the property burned, damaged, or destroyed
which the arsonist has no legal right to defeat. The second technique used
to define the scope of the protection afforded to property is the statutory
creation of an affirmative defense, a new form of justification, which sub-
stantively operates to achieve nearly the same result as the modem statutory
definition of the "of another" requirement. There are, of course, important
procedural differences between these two approaches.
Although the common law "of another" requirement could have been
used in the newly created people protecting offenses, offenses which have
embraced the common law's concern with protecting people from the hazards
of fire, it has been abandoned for the person protecting offenses as well
except, again, in a small handful of states. It has been replaced by two
different techniques. The first was simply to change the subject matter of
the offense so that the class of people in or on the property is expanded.
This technique has been referred to as the use of "person endangering prop-
erty." For example, a change from "dwelling houses" to "occupied buildings
or structures" expands the protected class from dwellers to anyone who might
happen to be in a building or structure which is burned, damaged, or de-
stroyed. This change is really nothing more than tampering with the common
law element to achieve an expanded goal. But a more innovative technique
was discovered which liberates us completely from the common law's subject
matter orientation. This was, of course, the creation of the concept of the
"person endangering circumstances," circumstances which make the fire or
explosion dangerous to people (or to person endangering property). This new
technique can be used to protect people from the hazards of fires or explo-
sions associated with the burning of any property. And states that wish to
protect everyone from such risks generally describe the person protecting
offense as damaging "any property" by fire or explosion which "places
another person in danger of serious physical injury." Which of the techniques
are used, either separately or in tandem, and the scope of their respective
provisions varies in the states depending upon the breadth of the class of
people the legislature wishes to protect, the received traditions in that state,
and the prevailing art of statutory construction.
The only concem of the common law offense was the danger created
by fire. But with Alfred Nobel's discovery of dynamite during the nineteenth
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century, miscreants had a new means of endangering people and property
which did not amount to arson at common law, and this despite the simi-
larities of the risks created by explosions. The common law "burning" re-
quirement could not be stretched that far. And so the statutes began to
change the nature of the conduct prohibited by the arson offenses as well.
Today, the majority of American states include damage or destruction by
explosions as conduct prohibited by the law of arson.
But this was not the only change in the conduct prohibited by the modern
statutes from the days of the common law. The common law offense required
a burning of the dwelling by fire, and nothing less would do. If the fire set
by the culprit were extinguished or failed of its own accord without first
burning the dwelling, it was not arson regardless of any other damage caused
by the fire. Smoke damage and damage caused to the structure by the water
used to quench the fire did not therefore suffice for arson. Partly to fill this
gap and partly because of the need to describe how an explosion injures the
property, for clearly a "burning" will not do, the majority of statutes today
describe the prohibited conduct not as a burning but as "damaging" or
"damaging or destroying" the subject property by fire or explosion. And
though a minority of states use the older statutory phrase taken from the
infamous Waltham Black Act and repeated in the Model Arson Law-lan-
guage which prohibited "setting fire to or burning" the subject property-
the modern cases tend to interpret this phrase as though it prohibited one
from "damaging" the subject property; it remains an open question in many
of the states adhering to this older view.
But if one conceives of arson as an offense which should be used pri-
marily to protect people from the risk of fire (or explosions), as did the
common law, rather than as an offense which primarily protects property
interests, as did the Model Arson Law, then why is arson tied to the burning
or damaging of property at all? Why should we not free ourselves of the
common law's requirement that harm be inflicted (by a burning) on the
subject property? Why not punish and suppress risk taking by fires or ex-
plosions before any harm is caused? The drafters of the Model Penal Code
saw no reason to adhere to the common law conception of arson. They
created arson after the law of attempt and the common law felony of bur-
glary. Arson became an attempt-like offense under the Model Penal Code,
which is supplemented with a provision that seeks to suppress and punish
the endangering of property as well. But the spirit of the common law and
our attitudes about the general law of attempt have caused most states to
reject the inchoate approach suggested by the Model Code. Only twelve states
use inchoate provisions for their basic arson statutes, though a handful do
supplement their traditional approach with a single inchoate arson provision.
Surely there is something lost to the ear of the courtroom listener when
words like "malicious" are replaced by sterile terms such as "intentionally,"
1986] 447
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"purposely" or "knowingly," but that is the result in the majority of Amer-
ican courtrooms today. The common law mens rea of malice survives at best
in only thirteen states, and a scant two more use the phrase in newly enacted
legislation, though it is doubtful that the common law concept is what the
legislature had in mind in those two states.
A new Latin is emerging for the criminal law of America. It is the
language of the Model Penal Code. Soon lawyers may view the language of
the common law as does the linguist ancient Greek. But just as Latin without
Greek is unthinkable, so the language of the Model Penal Code is the child
of the common law. And as the language of the common law grows old and
is buried in the superseded books, more states join what is now the American
majority in the use of the culpable mental states recommended in the Model
Penal Code for the modern law of arson. In the majority of the states today
the crime is committed either "purposely" or "knowingly" in accordance
with the Code's definition, though there is some difference in the terminol-
ogy. Many of the states prefer the term "intentionally" to the Code's "pur-
posely" though there is not the slightest difference in the concept they describe.
But terminology is not the only difference in the thirty-five to thirty-
seven states that have abandoned the common law's malicious state of mind.
No longer can arson be committed with the common law's concept of a
wanton burning. Simply put, a wanton burning is no longer a felony in the
majority of states. Indeed, only three states clearly retain the common law's
"wanton" mens rea for a felony arson offense. Unfortunately, one can find
neither explanation nor justification for this choice. In the three states in
which a contrary result is clearly reached, it is by force of a felony provision
which makes a reckless burning or exploding arson. And, of course, a wanton
burning is a reckless burning in everyone's conception of recklessness.
Another modern innovation is the use of a mental state in addition to
the mental state with which the property was burned or damaged, and in
addition to the mental state for which the fire was started or the explosion
caused in the inchoate states. This additional mental state is a requirement
with respect to the person endangering circumstances in a minority of the
American states which use this device. But as we have seen not all states that
use the person endangering circumstance technique require additional mental
state in connection with that element of the offense. Quite clearly, however,
the architecture of these new inchoate arson offenses differs drastically from
the structure of common law arson.
Finally, all American states except Maine devide arson into various levels
of severity, usually called degrees of arson, for the purpose of assessing
different punishments. There was no such need at common law for the
offense was narrowly defined, defined to cover only a narrow band of risks
created by fire; and all felonies were then punished by an automatic sentence
of death. But the modern arson statutes have extended the arson offenses
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to cover a wide range of risks and damages to person and property unpro-
tected at common law. Our conceptions of proper punishment indicate that
a person who risks property should not be treated as equally culpable, as
deserving of the same punishment, as a person who risks the life or limb of
a fellow human being. Therefore, we protect against personal risks and prop-
erty risks and determine the punishment allotted to each by dividing arson
into various degrees or levels of severity.
First degree arson, the highest level of severity, is generally reserved as
the people protecting offense, whereas second and the lower degrees are the
property protecting offenses. But as we have seen, there is considerable var-
iation among the states, and it is not uncommon to have several person
protecting offenses and several property protecting offenses which are graded
differently.
Despite these differences, there is a striking similarity in the modern
statutory law of arson throughout the United States. Though deeply rooted
in the common law and heavily influenced by the Model Penal Code, the
law in a majority of American states resembles neither today. What we see
here is the emergence of a modern statutory common law of arson. A com-
mon law made by legislatures not judges. A common law produced not by
the adoption of a Model Law, as it was at mid-century, but by the labors
of individual legislatures throughout the United States. And presumably it
is a common statutory law for the same reasons that the judicial process in
England and America produced the "common law." But whether that spec-
ulation is true, and whether the same patterns follow for the other common
law felonies, must remain questions to be pondered another day.
We have now finished our odyssey of the law of arson. As we look back
over the path we have come, surely we must admit that Coke, Hale, and
Blackstone would hardly recognize that the modern law of arson was the
product of the common law they knew so well. Almost everything but the
name has changed, and sometimes not even that remains.
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APPENDIX A
THE MODEL ARSON LAW
Section 1. Burning Dwellings
Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes
to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling
house, or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel
thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto, whether the property of himself
or of another, shall be guilty of arson; and, upon conviction thereof, be
sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty years.
Section 2. Burning Buildings Other than Dwellings
Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes
to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any barn,
stable, garage or other building, whether the property of himself or of an-
other, not a parcel of a dwelling house; or any shop, storehouse, warehouse,
factory, mill or other building, whether the property of himself or of another;
or any church, meeting house, courthouse, workhouse, school, jail or other
public building or any public bridge, shall, upon conviction thereof, be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.
Section 3. Burning Other Property
Any person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes
to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any barrack,
cock, crib, rick, or stack of hay, corn, wheat, oats, barley or other grain or
vegetable product of any kind; or any field of standing hay or grain of any
kind; or any pile of coal, wood or other fuel; or any pile of planks, boards,
posts, rails or other lumber; or any street car, railway car, ship, boat or
other water craft, automobile or other motor vehicle; or any other personal
property not herein specifically named; (such property being of the value of
twenty-five dollars or more and the property, in whole or in part of another
person) shall, upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than three years.
Section 4. Burning to Defraud Insurer
Any person who willfully and with intent to injure or defraud the insurer
sets fire to or bums or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures
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the burning of any goods, wares, merchandise or other chattels or personal
property of any kind, whether the property of himself or of another, which
shall at the time be insured by any person or corporation against loss or
damage by fire; shall, upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to imprisonment
for not less than one nor more than five years.
Section 5. Attempt to Burn Buildings or Property
Any person who willfully and maliciously attempts to set fire to or
attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or procure the burning of any of the
buildings or property mentioned in the foregoing sections, or who commits
any act preliminary thereto, or in furtherance thereof, shall upon conviction
thereof, be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or fined
not to exceed one thousand dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment.
The placing or distributing of any inflammable, explosive or combustible
material or substance, or any device in any building or property mentioned
in the foregoing sections in an arrangement or preparation with intent to
eventually willfully and maliciously set fire to or burn same, or to procure
the setting fire to or burning of same shall, for the purposes of this act
constitute an attempt to burn such building or property.
19861
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Arson and Related Offenses
(1) Arson. A person is guilty of arson, a felony of the second degree,
if he starts a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose of:
(a) destroying a building or occupied structure of another; or
(b) destroying or damaging any property, whether his own or
another's, to collect insurance for such loss. It shall be an affirmative
defense to prosecution under this paragraph that the actor's conduct
did not recklessly endanger any building or occupied structure of
another or place any other person in danger of death or bodily injury.
(2) Reckless Burning or Exploding. A person commits a felony of the
third degree if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on
his own property or another's, and thereby recklessly:
(a) places another person in danger of death or bodily injury;
or
(b) places a building or occupied structure of another in danger
of damage or destruction.
(3) Failure to Control or Report Dangerous Fire. A person who knows
that a fire is endangering life or a substantial amount of property of another
and fails to take reasonable measures to put out or control the fire, when
he can do so without substantial risk to himself, or to give a prompt fire
alarm, commits a misdemeanor if:
(a) he knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other
legal duty to prevent or combat the fire; or
(b) the fire was started, albeit lawfully, by him or with his assent,
or on property in his custody or control.
(4) Definition. "Occupied structure" means any structure, vehicle or
place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or for carrying on
business therein, whether or not a person is actually present. Property is that
of another, for the purposes of this section, if anyone other than the actor
has a possessory or proprietory interest therein. If a building or structure is
divided into separately occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is
an occupied structure of another.
452 [Vol. 51
158




THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF
ARSON IN ALASKA
A. 1913 to 1957: Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
§§ 65-5-1 to 65-5-7 (1948)
§ 65-5-1. Arson: Burning dwelling house of another. That if any person
shall willfully and maliciously burn any dwelling house of another, or shall
willfully or maliciously set fire to any building owned by himself or another,
by the burning whereof any dwelling house of another shall be burned such
person shall be deemed guilty of arson, and upon conviction thereof shall
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than ten nor more
than twenty years. [ALASKA CoMP. LAWS ANN. 1913, § 1911; [hereinafter
ACLA] ACLA 1933, § 4789]
§ 65-5-2.-Burning other buildings or boat. That if any person shall
willfully and maliciously burn any church, courthouse, townhouse, meeting
house, asylum, college, academy, schoolhouse, prison, jail, or other public
building erected or used for public uses, or any steamboat, ship, or other
vessel, or any banking house, warehouse, express office, storehouse, man-
ufactory, mill, barn, stable, shop, or office of another, or shall willfully and
maliciously set fire to any building or boat owned by himself or another, by
the burning whereof any edifice, building, boat, or vessel mentioned in this
section shall be burned such person shall be deemed guilty of arson, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary not less than five nor more than fifteen years. [ACLA 1913, § 1912;
ACLA 1933, § 4790]
§ 65-5-3. Burning buildings other than those in §§ 65-5-1, 65-5-2, or
bridges, etc. That if any person shall willfully and maliciously burn any
building whatsoever of another other than those specified in sections 65-5-1
and- 65-5-2, or shall willfully and maliciously burn any bridge, lock, dam or
flume of another, or erected or used for public uses, such person, upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary
not less than one nor more than ten years. [ACLA 1913, § 1913; ACLA
1933, § 47911
§ 65-5-4. Offense by married woman. That the preceding sections of this
chapter shall each extend to and include a married woman who may commit
19861
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either of the crimes therein specified, though the property burned or set on
fire may belong wholly or in part to her husband. [ACLA 1913, § 1914;
ACLA 1933, § 4792]
§ 65-5-5. Burning lumber, hay, etc. That if any person shall willfully
and maliciously burn any pile or parcel of boards or other lumber, timer,
or wood; or any stack of hay, grain, or other vegetable product, or any hay,
grain, or other vegetable product severed from the soil, but not stacked; or
any growing grass or grain, or other growing vegetable product of the soil
not his own, such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime, and upon
conviction thereof, if the property burned shall exceed in value thirty-five
dollars, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than
one nor more than ten years; but if the property burned shall not exceed the
value of thirty-five dollars, such person, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the Federal jail not less than one month nor
more than one year, or by fine not less than twenty-five nor more than one
hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of
the Court. [ACLA 1913, § 1915; am L 1927, ch 23, § 1, p 51A 1933, § 4793]
§ 65-5-6. Burning insured property. That if any person shall willfully
burn or in any other manner injure or destroy any property whatever which
is at the time insured against loss or damage by fire or other casualty, with
intent to defraud or prejudice the insurer, whether the same be the property
of such person or of any other, such person, upon conviction thereof, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than three nor more
than seven years. [ACLA 1913, §1916; ACLA 1933, § 4794]
§ 65-5-7. "Dwelling house" defined. That any building is deemed a
"dwelling house" within the meaning of the sections of this act defining the
crime of arson any part of which has usually been occupied by any person
lodging therein. [ACLA 1913, § 2088; ACLA 1933, § 5066]
B. 1957 to 1978 (The Model Arson Law years): Alaska Stat.
§§ 11.20.010 to 11.20.070 (1962)
Sec. 11.20.010. First degree arson. A person who willfully and mali-
ciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or
procures the burning of a dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or
vacant, or a kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is a part of
a dwelling, or belongs to or adjoins a dwelling, whether his property or the
property of another, is guilty of arson in the first degree, and upon conviction
is punishable by imprisonment for not less than two nor more than 20 years.
[§ 65-5-1 ACLA 1949; am §1 ch 141 SLA 1957]
Sec. 11.20.020. Second degree arson. A person who willfully and ma-
liciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels
or procures the burning of a building or structure of any kind, whether his
property or the property of another, not included or described in § 10 of
[Vol. 51454
160
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss2/1
ARSON LAW
this chapter, is guilty of arson in the second degree, and upon conviction is
punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 10 years,
or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by both. [§ 65-5-2 ACLA 1949;
am § 2 ch 141 SLA 1957]
Sec. 11.20.030. Third degree arson. A person who willfully and mali-
ciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels
or procures the burning of personal property of another of the value of $100
is guilty of arson in the third degree, and upon conviction is punishable by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than three years, or by a fine
of not more than $3,000, or by both. [§ 65-5-3 ACLA 1949; am § 3 ch 141
SLA 1957]
Sec. 11.20.040. Offense by married woman. Sections 10-30 of this chap-
ter extend to and include a married person who commits any of the crimes
specified, though the property burned or set on fire belongs wholly or in
part to the other spouse. [§ 65-5-4 ACLA 1949; § 76 ch 127 SLA 1974]
Sec. 11.20.050. Fourth degree arson. A person who willfully and mali-
ciously attempts to set fire to or attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or
procure the burning of a building or property mentioned in §§ 10-40 of this
chapter, or who commits an act preliminary to an attempt, or in furtherance
of an attempt is guilty of arson in the fourth degree, and upon conviction
is punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than two
years, or a fine not to exceed $1,000, or by both. [§ 65-5- 5(a) ACLA 1949;
am § 4 ch 141 SLA 1957]
Sec. 11.20.060. Attempted arson defined. The placing or distributing of
a flammable, explosive or combustible material or substance, or a device in
a building or property mentioned in §§ 10-50 of this chapter in an arrange-
ment or preparation with intent to eventually, willfully and maliciously set
fire to or burn, or to procure the setting fire to or burning of the building
or property is, for the purposes of this chapter, an attempt to burn the
building or property. [§ 65-5-5(b) ACLA 1949; am § 4 ch 141 SLA 1957]
Sec. 11.20.070. Burning to defraud insurer. A person who willfully and
with intent to injure or defraud the insurer sets fire to or burns or attempts
to set fire to or burn or who causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or
procures the burning of a building, structure or personal property, whether
his property or the property of another, which at the time is insured against
loss or damage by fire, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction is punishable
by imprisonment for not less than one no more than five years, or by a fine
of not more than $3,000, or by both. [§ 65-5-6 ACLA 1949; am § 5 ch 141
SLA 19571
C. 1978 to 1986 (to date): Alaska Stat.
§§ 11.46.400 to 11.46.450 (1983)
Sec. 11.46.400. Arson in the first degree. (a) A person commits the crime
of arson in the first degree if the person intentionally damages any property
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by starting a fire or causing an explosion and by that act recklessly places
another person in danger of serious physical injury. For purposes of this
section, "another person" includes but is not limited to fire and police service
personnel or other public employees who respond to emergencies, regardless
of rank, functions, or duties being performed.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony. [§ 4 ch 166 SLA 1978;
am § I ch 39 SLA 1983]
Sec. 11.46.410. Arson in the second degree. (a) A person commits the
crime of arson in the second degree if the person intentionally damages a
building by starting a fire or causing an explosion.
(b) In a prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense
(1) that no person other than the defendant had a possessory,
proprietary, or security interest in the building or that all persons
having such an interest consented to the defendant's conduct; and
(2) that the sole intent of the defendant was to damage or destroy
the building for a lawful purpose.
(c) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony. [§ 4 ch 166 SLA
1978]
Sec. 11.46.430. Criminally negligent burning. (a) A person commits the
crime of criminally negligent burning if with criminal negligence the person
damages property of anotehr by fire or explosion.
(b) Criminally negligent burning is a class A misdemeanor. [§ 4 ch 166
SLA 1978]
Sec. 11.46.450. Failure to control or report a dangerous fire. (a) A person
commits the drime of failure to control or report a dangerous fire if the
person knows that a fire is endangering life or a substantial amount of
property of another and fails to take reasonable measures to put out or
control the fire, when the person can do so without substantial personal risk,
or to give a prompt fire alarm if
(1) the person knows that the person is under an official, con-
tractual, or other legal duty to prevent or combat the fire; or
(2) the fire was started by the person, with the person's consent,
or on property in the person's custody or control.
(b) Failure to control or report a dangerous fire is a class A misde-
meanor. [§ 4 ch 166 SLA 1978]
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